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2. Introduction
During the Soviet Union period (1922–1991), administrators in Moscow sought to
modernize its predominantly Muslim Central Asian regions. Soviet and Muslim
authorities found common ground. Although the Communist agenda in the long run
was to destroy Islam, which they saw as prejudice against reason, Lenin described
“Muslim folk heroes as emblematic of the human struggle against oppression”, while
Muslim scholars noted that Islam could legitimize “even the rule of a usurper as
means of assuring the public order and the unity of all Muslims”. The tone between
the Soviet and Muslim authorities can be read between the lines in a letter from the
Central Religious Muslim Board in 1942 to Stalin: “...champion of the liberation of
oppressed peoples and a man ever attentive to the need of the peoples...May Allah
bring your work to a victorious end.” (Marshall, Bird and Blane, 1971). Implicitly,
the council signalled that they were sympathetic to Stalin’s cause, but that he would
not succeed without the assistance of Allah (Froese, 2008).
This example illustrates the subject of this dissertation, legitimacy under dual moral-
ities: the moralities are Islam and Communism while the question of legitimacy is
the Soviet rule in Central Asia. The concept of morality can be contrasted with our
tendency for sympathy: sympathy is our innate tendency to sympathize with the
needs of others, while our notions of morality are abstract ideas that guide us to bal-
ance the needs of several parties when these are in conﬂict (Tomasello, 2016). While
sympathy is a tendency we are born with, the content of our moralities is learned
through socialization. Diﬀerent people from diﬀerent backgrounds, such as Russians
and Kyrgyz, have often internalized diﬀerent moralities, such as Communism and
Islam. Legitimacy of an outcome implies that it adheres suﬃciently to a morality. In
our opening example, the Muslim scholar points out that the enforcement of Soviet
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rule assures the outcome of public order; a natural interpretation would be that he
sees Soviet rule in Central Asia as suﬃciently adhering to Islam as to be legitimate.1
Where people with diﬀerent moralities interact, rules need to account for diﬀerent
notions of what is legitimate. This is important for avoiding conﬂict and ensuring
that formal rules are enforced. Enforcing rules restricting behaviour that is seen as
legitimate can often be seen as a transgression by the restricted, which can often lead
to conﬂict. Rules restricting behaviour that is considered to be legitimate tend not
to be enforced. Thus, to create functioning formal rules without causing conﬂicts in
populations with diﬀerent moralities, we need to understand legitimacy under dual
moralities.
This dissertation is about the dynamics that may arise when actors seek to socialize
others into their moralities, interpret whether moralities, or selﬁsh motives, motivate
actions, or enforce their views of what is legitimate. All chapters of this disserta-
tion consider interactions between people with two diﬀerent and distinct moralities
prescribing mutually excluding outcomes as legitimate.
In my opening example, the Soviet and Muslims authorities both saw it in their
interests to co-operate (Conquest, 1970); hence, they had incentives to ﬁnd common
ground and did so to a large extent. It is, however, often the case that people with
diﬀerent moralities do not ﬁnd such common ground, either because their leaders do
not have incentives to encourage them to do so, or simply because it can often be
a major challenge. A thematic common thread in the chapters of this dissertation
is to explain why this is the case; the dissertation focuses on mechanisms that help
explain why interaction among people with diﬀerent moralities is often a major, and
1As the observant reader might have deduced, an alternative title of my dissertation, “Legitimacy
under dual moralities” could be “Outcomes suﬃciently adhering to two abstract ways of thinking
about balancing sympathy for others”.
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enduring, cause of friction and conﬂict among them.
The ﬁrst chapter explores the consequences of people disliking being pressured to
change their own morality. The second chapter establishes that, and oﬀers insight
into why, people with diﬀerent moralities often consider others’ intentions as selﬁsh.
The third chapter shows that people are interested in enforcing solutions adhering
to their own moralities, independently of what those aﬀected by their decision ﬁnd
legitimate. A methodological common thread throughout the dissertation is that
the chapters create concepts and analytic tools that structure our understanding of
legitimacy in dual morality settings, before it reviews empirical material through the
lens of developed theories.
The theories developed in this dissertation are made under the assumption that when
people with diﬀerent moralities interact certain dynamics arise with some regular-
ity. This type of dynamics can be understood by abstractions that allow insight
to be transferred from one example to another. An example of such regularity is
our tendency to discretely categorize each other into groups. Although the content
of moralities might be dynamic and vary from person to person, people’s mutual
perceptions and categorizations of each other’s moral views are often stable and
distinct Tomasello (2014). If their categorization into discrete separable categories,
such as “Muslim” or “Communist”, remains stable, complex, yet predictable, dy-
namics might arise. Thus, understanding and describing this complex dynamic for
one case might inform understanding of another, i.e., the dynamics arising between
“Liberal” and “Conservative” might also arise between “Protestant” and “Catholic”.
The models are a stylization of the mechanisms to explain the phenomena that oc-
cur in the real world. They are built as logical consequences that arise from explicit
assumptions; the models are not meant to be a holistic picture of every relevant
parameter determining a phenomenon. Thus, the conclusions of the model hold as
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long as the assumptions hold and the insights are relevant as long as the mechanism
is the relevant driving mechanism behind a phenomenon. I now describe the three
chapters in more depth.
The ﬁrst chapter, “What limits the powerful in imposing the morality of their au-
thority?”, asks why moralities in a society are not always a direct function of the
wishes of its rulers. The chapter oﬀers a theory of why and how this can hold, even
in the very long run, by building on a surprisingly simple assumption: coercion re-
sentment. Coercion resentment is the assumption that people have an intrinsically
negative reaction to being coerced, making coercion a potentially counter-productive
measure. The chapter explores the consequences of coercion resentment in a formal
model of how rulers can use coercion to discourage socialization of moralities other
than the one upon which the ruler has built his legitimacy. The model focuses on
the dynamics arising from the interaction between three decisions: the ruler’s choice
regarding how much coercion to apply; and the decisions of the ruled regarding how
much eﬀort to put into socializing others into their morality and whether or not to
try to remove the ruler through committing an insurrection. Two historical periods
are presented through the lens of the model: the Counter-Reformation in early mod-
ern France and the Holy Roman Empire (1517–1685), and the Soviet secularization
project (1922–1991).
The second chapter, “Suspicious minds and views of fairness”, investigates how we
understand the motivation of people with moralities diﬀerent to our own. The chap-
ter opens by structuring, in a simple model, our understanding of how we interpret
intentions behind actions. Central to this chapter is the concept of suspicious at-
tribution: our tendency to attribute behaviour not adhering to our own morality
to selﬁshness. I show that suspicious attribution can arise from under-estimating
how many have a morality diﬀering from our own, projection bias; and overestimat-
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ing the selﬁshness of people with moralities diﬀerent to our own, out-group stereo-
types. I then present results in support of suspicious attribution from an incentivized
laboratory setting. Participants in my experiment display both suspicious attribu-
tion, projection bias and out-group stereotypes, and my data suggest these are what
cause suspicious attribution. Finally, I discuss how this mechanism can be central
to understanding polarization of attitudes, and how prosocial individuals legitimize
engagement in group conﬂicts.
The third and ﬁnal chapter, “Paternalist motivation: An experimental test”, was
written together with Xianwen Chen. The chapter examines whether we take the
morality of those aﬀected into account when deciding whether or not to impose
states adhering to our own morality upon others. The chapter oﬀers the terms
“non-paternalist” or “paternalist motivation” to diﬀerentiate what motivates us to
impose states upon others. Non-paternalist motivation is deﬁned as a desire to
impose states upon others only if those aﬀected think it constitutes a legitimate
outcome, while paternalist motivation is motivation to implement our own view
regardless of the views of those aﬀected. The chapter then oﬀers an experimental test
of whether the moralities of the aﬀected are relevant when we decide whether or not
to enforce our moralities. We conduct an experiment and ﬁnd that our participants
have paternalist motivation: they are willing to pay to implement outcomes adhering
to their moralities, but they do not take the moralities of the aﬀected into account.
We discuss how this ﬁnding has implications for collective choice in groups where
moralities vary.
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Chapter 1
1
What limits the powerful in imposing the morality of their
authority?
Abstract
This paper models a game between an authority seeking to implement its preferred
morality, and a parental generation seeking to socialize a younger generation into
their own morality. The authority chooses a coercion level for adhering to the non-
state morality, whereupon the parental generation chooses whether to insurrect and,
if not, how much to invest in socialization. The novel feature of this paper is that we
formalize and explore the consequences of an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion:
coercion resentment. The key result is to show the necessary micro level assumptions
for an inefficient interval of coercion that can account for authorities choosing to
restrain their use of coercion. Furthermore, the paper characterizes the socialization
and insurrection preferences required for long-run equilibrium to be path dependent.
Two historical periods are presented through the lens of the model: the Counter-
Reformation in early modern France and the Holy Roman Empire (1517–1685), and
the Soviet secularization project (1922–1991).
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1. Introduction
Polities generally seek to have legitimacy; that is, to rule in alignment with the inter-
nalized moralities of its population.1 A crucial dimension of state legitimacy, and the
focus of this paper, is whether the values of the polity, on which its formal institutions
and moral right to rule are built, are aligned with the moralities of its population.2
One way of attaining legitimacy is by using extrinsic incentives, generally referred to
as coercion. This approach may, however, invoke an intrinsic counteraction, making
coercion potentially counter-productive. The paper embeds this micro assumption,
referred to as coercion resentment, into an overlapping generations model of morali-
ties where an authority seeks to maximize the prevalence of its preferred morality by
using coercion. The model analyzes how opposing effects of the extrinsic incentives
to comply, and the intrinsic incentives to resist, determine the prevalence of different
moralities.
Greif and Tadelis (2010) poses the question “Why do the powerful often fail to
promote the morality of their authority?”. In other words, what are the mechanisms
behind moral persistence in the face of hostile institutional environments? If people
simply choose to internalize the morality that gave them the highest extrinsic utility,
moralities, and subsequently group identities, would simply be a function of the in-
stitutional environment. This would imply that everyone holds the most opportune
1A morality can be understood as a vector of beliefs and values that is internalized and embedded
in a person: examples are political ideologies, religious or ethnic identities.
2Another important dimension is whether the state works to fulfill the values on which it builds
its institutions, or whether it serves the interests of individuals who control the state, commonly
referred to as corruption (Nye, 1967).
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morality; in most cases, the morality aligned with the ruling regime. The dynamics
of moralities such as religious, national or ideological identities could then be ignored
in political economy analysis and at most, be treated as a rigidity. Assuming moral-
ities are a passive function of extrinsic incentives would, however, account poorly for
the persistence of minority identities such as the Jews in Europe, states’ investments
in costly nation building and foreign nationals’ voluntary participation in perilous
group conflicts such as the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939).
These historical instances illustrate that intrinsic reactions play an important role
in the dynamics of legitimacy and state development, both in the short and long
term. Minority moralities in hostile institutional environments can be remarkably
persistent, as demonstrated by the historical evidence presented in Greif and Tadelis
(2010) of Jews in Medieval Spain, while other historical examples, such as David
Laitin’s study of the Russian diaspora in the former USSR (Laitin, 1998), show
quick adoption of new beliefs, norm sets and national identities, pointing to a rapid
change in internalized values.
This paper’s main contribution is to build a micro-founded model decomposing the
effect of coercion aimed at changing moralities, into extrinsic and intrinsic reac-
tions. The extrinsic reaction to coercion is a reduction of group identification as a
response to incentives, while the intrinsic reaction to coercion is a strengthening of
in-group identification and out-group resentment within the group being targeted.
The model assumes that authority attempts to force people to change their morali-
ties will invoke a resentment towards the authority, making certain levels of coercion
counter-productive to attaining legitimacy.
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A premise of the model is that authorities seek to maximize legitimacy. To any
authority, having a high level of legitimacy is desirable for a number of reasons. As
Max Weber argues, it increases the probability of staying in power, reduces enfor-
cment costs and expands the possibility frontier of imposing policy (Greif, 2008),
and increases willingness for altruistic behaviour, such as conscription (Levi, 1997)
or payment of taxes (Levi, 1999). The key motivation of states in building national,
ideological or religious identities is to make populations respond in a manner that
is emotionally related to the morality represented by the state. This is what makes
religious and national identities powerful tools for authorities: the ability of inter-
nalized norms to invoke reactions that align the interest of the individual with the
perceived interest of imagined national, political or religious communities. Further-
more, a population with homogenous moralities enables central policy-making (Tilly,
1992); indeed, services such as law and policing hinge on, and grow out of, common
sets of norms and values.
In the short term, the most obvious way to gain legitimacy is to take norms and
values as given, and rule in accordance with the prevailing majority morality. To
authorities of polities with heterogenous moralities, this implies making compromises
between moralities where they are incompatible, typically at the cost of reduced legit-
imacy (Johnson and Koyama, 2013). A state might, however, enhance its legitimacy
by increasing the portion of the population with internalized norms similar to those
of its institutions. This can be done either by application of “sticks”: disincentives
and coercion, or “carrots”: increasing the incentives of belonging to the authority’s
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morality.3 This article focuses on the “stick” approach, coercion, and how it invokes
an intrinsic negative reaction, making it a potentially counter-productive measure.4
The model develops necessary assumptions for analyzing the equilibrium coercion
level and morality prevalence in the overlapping generations model of Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2001). This equilibrium is given as a function of parental preferences
for their child adhering to their morality, and the strength and functional form of
coercion resentment. A key result of this analysis is to show that authorities will only
restrain use of coercion when there exists an inefficient interval of coercion, which
is shown to imply a non-linear response to coercion. The paper then analyzes the
dynamic problem of what constitutes equilibrium coercion level when the authority
can iteratively reset the coercion level and the prevalence of minority morality deter-
mines an insurrection constraint on coercion use. We explore the dynamic property
of states in coercion reliance, defined as an inability of an authority to decrease coer-
cion, as doing so will increase minority prevalence thus increasing their insurrection
capability and triggering an insurrection. The key result of this analysis is to show
when responses to coercion create path dependency i.e. the insurrection and social-
ization preferences needed for equilibrium minority prevalence to be dependent on
the history of the polity.
3 Other measures include increasing socialization and easing communication by creating common
standards, i.e., through building of roads, standardizing the language, creating common school
systems and investing in common symbols.
4To the extent that “carrots”, i.e., positive incentives, invoke a negative reaction among members
of the non-state morality, the analysis generalizes to authorities imposing positive incentives for
adhering to their morality.
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The paper presents anecdotal historical evidence to demonstrate macro level re-
straints on coercion use. First, we review the Counter-Reformation in early modern
France (1517–1685) and the Holy Roman Empire (1517–1648). The early modern
French kings and the Holy Roman emperors built their legitimacy on the Catholic
faith. The spread of Protestantism following Luther (1517) posed a direct threat to
their program of state consolidation. As a response to this introduction of religious
heterogeneity, they embarked on programs of homogenization. We argue that in this
period, only unconfrontational or strongly coercive policies were stable over time.
This supports model predictions that authorities restrain coercion use, and that any
long-term stable coercion level must not give the authority any incentive for gradual
increases in coercion. The paper then presents a brief comparative study of European
early modernity before and after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) through the lens of
the model; it shows how the change of international institutions affects constraints
on use of coercion and consequently, minority prevalence.
Furthermore, we review evidence from Soviet secularization policies (1922–1991) to-
wards the Christians and Muslims in the USSR. The Soviet Union sought to increase
its legitimacy by increasing support for communism and diminishing the impor-
tance of religion. This secularization project was conducted in a comparatively more
cautious way in regions where cultural differences were larger, recognizing the po-
tential counter-productiveness of secularization attempts, in line with the proposed
micromechanism of coercion resentment.
The paper develops as follows: the remainder of Section 1 reviews the related litera-
ture, Section 2 presents the overlapping generations model of Bisin and Verdier (2000,
2001) and Section 3 expands the basic model to include a legitimacy-maximizing au-
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thority, coercion resentment and an endogenously determined insurrection constraint.
Section 4 shows how the macro predictions of the model fit the Soviet secularization
project and the Counter-Reformation in early modern France and the Holy Roman
Empire. Section 5 concludes the paper and raises questions that can be investigated
in future extensions of the theory. The appendices contain proofs, and some further
analysis and interpretations of the model.
1.1. Related literature
The model’s critical micro assumption is coercion resentment: individuals are as-
sumed to react negatively towards the authority in response to coercion. More
specifically, it is assumed that at least some level of coercion to hold a morality
will cause individuals to respond by increasing their investment in socializing this
morality. Why individuals act in such a way can be understood from different strands
of the literature. Three main perspectives are reciprocity, fulfilling internalized norms
and increased investment in social motives to help the group face a common external
threat.
Reciprocity: coercion resentment can be understood as a group level version of
the general trait of reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis, 2011): the tendency to retaliate
against hostile actions and reward beneficial actions. The assumed mechanism is
that individuals who have internalized the coerced morality and feel that the author-
ity has harmed their group, wish to punish the group associated with the coercion
through activities aimed at stopping the authority’s influence.
Salience of fulfilling internalized norms: coercion resentment might also be under-
stood as increased salience of acting in accordance with internalized norms. The au-
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thority, and indirectly, the individuals aligned with state morality, become a salient
enemy of non-state morality if they appear as having hostile intentions. The need to
act in line with non-authority internalized norms will involve confronting individuals
of state morality and stopping the spread of their morality, once they are conceived
as being a threat. In other words, an individual who has internalized a set of values
will receive intrinsic utility from actively deterring the influence of an authority pur-
suing an agenda opposing his values, as this will help defend his internalized values.
Social motives: a threat from an external foe increases in-group identification. This
finding has a long-standing tradition and has solid empirical support in the social
psychology literature (Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013). As coercion of non-state moral-
ity increases, the authority will be seen as a threat to the non-state morality group.
This increased external threat invokes an emotional reaction that triggers investment
in social identity activities for individuals who have internalized non-state morality.
The presence of a threat to the group increases in-group identity and strengthens hos-
tility towards the out-group. The out-group threat effect is documented to increase
a number of different group-related behaviours, including increased investment in
socialization (Huddy, Sears and Levy, 2013).5 Finally, once coercion is imposed on
a morality, defying the coercion and acting in accordance with the coerced morality
become costly, and can hence be used as a credible social signal of intrinsic motiva-
tion.
5Although strengthening of group identity is theoretically different from a utility loss of children
adhering to an opposing morality, the implications are equal for the purpose of this study: a society
of two mutually excluding moralities.
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The paper draws on classical political science analysis of the state’s role in moral
dynamics. This literature initially focused on cultural unification into nation states,
arguing that the relatively high pre-existing (pre-990 A.D.) homogeneity of moral-
ity in Europe contributed to Europe’s relatively rapid state consolidation (Tilly and
Ardant, 1975), and later focused on the survival and persistence of minority cultures
through mechanisms of cultural resistance (Allardt, 1979; Rokkan, 1999).
The paper relates to four strands of the economics literature: social economics, group
conflict, state legitimacy and path dependency in societal outcomes. The model
is an expansion of the social economics model by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001),
where overlapping generations transfer moralities and the prevalence of each moral-
ity is determined by parental investment in socialization. Models in social economics
have addressed the role of cultural persistence through differences in socialization
investment by mechanisms such as oppositional culture (Bisin et al., 2011), bias in
education systems (Carvalho and Koyama, 2013) and social signalling of identity
(Carvalho, 2013). Social economics models have generally not focused on actions of
state actors or individuals’ relation to a state (Bisin and Verdier, 2010). Following
Greif and Tadelis (2010), this paper extends the author’s master’s thesis (Schøyen,
2011) and is novel in making a connection between the policies of a state author-
ity and the prevalence of non-state minority moralities. Greif and Tadelis (2010)
introduce an authority that controls the institutional environment to maximize the
morality on which it builds its legitimacy, into the Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001)
framework. This paper extends Greif and Tadelis (2010) by letting the agents in the
model intrinsically react to coercion. In contrast, the agents in the model of Greif
and Tadelis (2010) are static in the sense that they do not intrinsically respond to
coercion. The paper also contributes by introducing an endogenous dimension of
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power: an insurrection constraint on the use of coercion that is dependent on the
prevalence of non-state morality.
The paper also relates to the literature on ethnic and political violence, especially
the understanding of use of force as a root cause of counter-mobilization in the form
of a strategic response (Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2014), or increased saliency of iden-
tity because of group conflict (Sambanis and Shayo, 2013). Acemoglu and Wolitzky
(2014) focus on the informational aspects of group conflicts that lead to hostile
actions followed by hostile reactions. They develop a dynamic Bayesian game of se-
quential aggressive or conciliatory actions between groups, where the driving static
is whether agents interpret the hostile actions of opposing groups as the actions of
a fundamentally aggressive type, or the actions of a non-aggressive type retaliating.
They consider the informational aspect of group conflict, while this paper analyzes
group conflict driven by an intrinsic reaction. Sambanis and Shayo (2013) build a
formal model endogenizing the process of identification with an ethnic group. They
allow for identification on multiple levels and focus on a social identity equilibrium
between groups, where saliency determines the level of identification. Both these
papers consider group relations and their internal dynamics, while in the model pre-
sented here, the agency lies in the state authority and population responses to the
level of coercion.
Furthermore, the paper relates to a growing new literature on state legitimacy. The
role of the state in nation building is formally analyzed in the economics literature
by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) and Alesina and Reich (2013), while Greif and Rubin
(2014) illustrates the need for independent agencies to provide legitimacy to the state.
Greif and Rubin (2014) consider how the English Crown’s breach with the Catholic
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Church created a need for a new external agent to legitimize the king’s power, thus
increasing the need for approval of an independent agent, such as parliament. John-
son and Koyama (2013) investigate the relationship between the legitimacy gained
by aligning the state with a specific religious belief rather than a compromise be-
tween several, and the economic cost of enforcing that belief. Whereas these papers
focus on different sources of legitimacy and alignment between state and morality,
this paper focuses on the use of force, its military constraints, and intrinsic reaction
to the use of force to change moralities.
Finally, this paper relates to recent work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2017) in devel-
oping dynamic models where path dependency arises in societal outcomes. Acemoglu
and Robinson (2017) develop a model of dynamic contest for power, where the state
and society sequentially make costly investments in conflict capital. They find path
dependency in the power of the state because of the discouragement effect of compe-
titions: the interaction between incentives to invest and economies of scale in capital.
This mechanism leads to a dynamic where either state and society invest in conflict
capital to be thus equally matched in power, or, one of the parties ceases to invest
and has no power. While Acemoglu and Robinson (2017) focus on conflict capital,
this paper models dynamics of available labour for conflict, i.e., sizes of morality
groups, when the coercion level changes the size of groups that determine the ability
to coerce without having an insurrection. Path dependency arises as non-linearities
in response to coercion, and the initial size of morality groups determine which co-
ercion levels can be implemented by iteratively changing the coercion level.
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2. A basic model of socialization
Following Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), we introduce an overlapping generations
model where parents invest in costly socialization to make their child internalize
the morality of the parents. First, the basics of the model and the mechanisms of
socialization are developed. We then develop assumptions regarding the parents’
utility function and derive its implications. All the results here mirror the results
from Bisin and Verdier (2001).
2.1. The model
The population consists of a continuum of agents who live in two periods, as a
child at time t and as a parent at time t + 1. Each agent produces one offspring;
thus, the size of the population remains stable. There are two moralities, m ∈ {a, b}.
Moralities are mutually exclusive; a portion qt of the parent population holds morality
a at time t, while 1 − qt holds morality b. Moralities are transmitted from one
generation to the next through parental socialization from parent to child, or through
oblique transmission: the influence of the general population. The probability is
τm that parental socialization is successful and the child adopts the morality of
the parent; and 1 − τm that parental socialization fails, in which case the child
is obliquely socialized and the offspring will adopt either morality a or morality b
with a probability equal to the morality’s prevalence in the population. A child
who internalizes morality m is referred to as an m morality child. Let Pmn be the
probability that an individual of morality m has an n morality offspring.
P aa = τa + (1− τa)qt , P ab = (1− τa)(1− qt) (1)
P bb = τ b + (1− τ b)(1− qt) , P ba = (1− τ b)qt (2)
13
The portion of the population with morality a at time t + 1, qt+1, is then given as
follows.
qt+1 = qtP
aa + (1− qt)P ba = qt + qt(1− qt)(τa − τ b) (3)
From (3) it follows that the change in the share of morality a individuals is given by
qt(1−qt)(τa−τ b): the difference in the probability of successful parental socialization
times the product of the share of moralities.
Parents choose τm to maximize expected utility by balancing the cost of parental
socialization, denoted by the function H(τm), and the benefit of a higher probability
of successful parental socialization. Let the utility of an m morality parent having
an n morality child be denoted umn , then using (1) and (2), we attain the following
utility function Um for parents.
Ua = [τa + (1− τa)qt]uaa + (1− τa)(1− qt)uba −H(τa) (4)
U b = [τ b + (1− τ b)(1− qt)]ubb + (1− τ b)qtuab −H(τ b) (5)
We now impose some assumptions on the parents’ preferences for their child’s moral-
ity and the cost function of parental socialization. First, we assume that parents
prefer their child to have the parents’ morality.
Assumption 1. Own morality preference Parents prefer their child to have
the same morality as themselves: uaa − uab > 0, ubb − uba > 0.
Second, the utility loss of having a child internalize an opposing morality is assumed
to be symmetric for the two types of parents. Defining u as the utility derived from
the child having the parents’ own morality and u as the utility derived from having
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the opposing morality, we can write the following assumption.
Assumption 2. Symmetric utility loss of opposing morality Parents of a
and b morality have symmetric utility loss in having children of opposing morality:
uaa − uab = ubb − uba = u− u = ∆u.
Third, we assume that the cost of socializing the child into the preferred moral-
ity H(τm) obeys the Inada conditions.
Assumption 3. Inada assumptions Inada conditions apply to the cost of invest-
ment in parental socialization: H ′(τm) ≥ 0, H ′(0) = 0, limτm→1 H ′(τm) =∞, H ′′(τm) >
0.
The first part of Assumption 3 states that the marginal cost increases with the
probability of success, and the second that there is no marginal increase in the cost
of socialization at no parental socialization, τm = 0. The third and fourth parts of
Assumption 3 state that the marginal cost approaches infinity as the probability of
having a child successfully socialized into the preferred morality approaches certainty,
and that the increase in marginal cost is strictly increasing in τm. The assumption
of no increase in cost at τm = 0 implies that τm will be strictly positive whenever the
utility of having successful parental socialization is strictly positive for m morality
parents. The assumption that the cost of socialization grows towards infinity implies
there will always be some failed parental socialization leading to oblique socializa-
tion. Hence, there will always be some children obliquely socialized into the opposing
morality in mixed morality populations. We can now derive the optimal levels of τm
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from (4) and (5), which are given by the first order conditions (FOCs).
H ′(τa) = (1− qt)∆u, H ′(τ b) = qt∆u (6)
The optimal level is given by the expected marginal benefit of investing in parental
socialization, being equal to the marginal cost. From Assumption 3, the Inada con-
ditions and (6), we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The smallest morality group always invests more in parental social-
ization: τ bt ≤ τat if and only if qt ≤ (1− qt).
As the benefit of having a child with the parents’ morality is assumed to be symmet-
ric, a difference in investment must imply a difference in the cost of failed parental
socialization. Any difference in the utility of failed socialization arises, as the prob-
ability of the child obliquely internalizing the preferred morality differs because of
different group size. Minority parents have a higher probability of their child internal-
izing the majority morality obliquely if parental socialization fails, and consequently
invest more in socialization, hence Lemma 1.
A steady state equilibrium (SSE) level of q, denoted as q∗, is reached when qt = qt+1.
It follows from (3) that for qt = qt+1 to be fulfilled, qt(1− qt)(τa− τ b) = 0 must hold.
This is the case for qt = qt+1 = 0, qt = qt+1 = 1, i.e., single morality populations, or,
as will be shown, at the interior SSE where τa = τ b. In cases of q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1,
there will be no utility gain from parental socialization as all individuals in the popu-
lation will have the same morality, and oblique socialization will lead to the preferred
morality of the parent. The single morality equilibrium is, however, unstable in the
event of external shocks; if one parent of another morality enters the population,
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this parent would choose a very high investment in parental socialization because
the probability of the child adopting the desired morality in the case of oblique so-
cialization would be very low. This would be repeated for future generations and
consequently, the prevalence of introduced morality of the minority would grow until
the unique interior q∗ = 1
2
is reached.
Lemma 2. There is a unique stable interior SSE at q∗ = 1
2
.
The only stable equilibrium is q∗ = 1
2
; any initial population with a q different
from one or zero will converge towards it. If the population is out of the SSE, the
share of minority morality individuals will grow with time as the smaller morality
group invests more in socialization, as stated by Lemma 1, until again qt = qt+1 =
1
2
.
The fact that the stable interior is q∗ = 1
2
arises because of Assumption 2: symmetry
of preferences. Asymmetrical preferences where an interior SSE exists at τa = τ b,
leads to an asymmetrical, i.e., q∗ 6= 1
2
, stable SSE.6
3. Legitimacy maximizing given coercion resentment and an insurrection
constraint
We now extend the model to include an authority that can issue a penalty, referred to
as coercion, for adhering to non-state morality. Furthermore, we make assumptions
of how the agents respond to this coercion and analyze the use of coercion under
exogenous and endogenous constraints to which different levels of coercion can be
6 The assumption of symmetric preferences is made in order to focus on the role of the state
rather than on any difference between the desirability of the moralities themselves. The following
analysis generalizes for asymmetrical preferences.
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imposed. To focus on the implications of coercion resentment, we follow Greif and
Tadelis (2010) in assuming that the authority can impose coercion at zero cost. The
results can be extended trivially to a model where coercion is costly to the authority.
3.1. The extended model
There is an authority β controlling the state, where a state is defined as a monopoly
on the employment of coercion, pi, within the territory where the population is situ-
ated. This authority builds its legitimacy on b morality and wishes to maximize its
prevalence by imposing coercion for adhering to a morality. The utility maximization
problem of the authority, Uβ, is as follows.
max
pi
Uβ = min
pi
q∗(pi) (7)
To maximize the prevalence of b morality, the authority sets the level of coercion
pi for adhering to morality a. The level of coercion is assumed to be unbounded;
pi is defined over the domain pi ∈ [0,∞), but we assume that the authority is bound
by an upper feasibility constraint pimax on the level of coercion it can impose. Hence,
we restrict our analysis within the feasible interval pi ∈ [0, pimax].7
The coercion level can be interpreted as ranging from low, such as social sanctions
or issuance of fines for having morality a, to high, such as criminal penalties, and the
maximum feasible level, pimax, is referred to as a gunpoint threat. Including the level
of coercion, pi, and resentment towards b morality caused by coercion, C(pi), in the
utility function of the parents of a and b morality respectively, yields the following.
Ua = [τa + (1− τa)qt](u− pi) + (1− τa)(1− qt)(u− C(pi))−H(τa) (8)
7 Feasibility might reflect either technological constraints in terms of what can be implemented,
or an upper limit in terms of what the state apparatus will impose.
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U b = [τ b + (1− τ b)(1− qt)]u+ (1− τ b)qt(u− pi)−H(τ b) (9)
These two utility functions capture the two following assumptions of how agents re-
spond to coercion.8 First, we assume that the utility of having an a morality child
is lower when there is coercion.
Assumption 4. Parental empathy for coercion The utility of having an a
morality child is (uma − pi).
Second, we assume coercion resentment, imposing coercion invokes a negative in-
trinsic reaction among the a non-state morality parents; i.e., they will have lower
utility in having a b morality child.
Assumption 5. Coercion resentment The utility to an a parent of having
a b morality child is (uab − C(pi)).
Note that the reduced utility, from introducing coercion, of an a morality child is the
same for parents of both moralities. This reflects the fact that a morality children
face an extrinsic cost, while the coercion resentment cost of having a b morality child,
an intrinsic loss of utility, is limited to non-state morality parents. We now derive
8At qt ∈ {0, 1} parents will be indifferent between successful parental socialization or oblique
socialization. As the cost of investing some infinitesimal amount in socialization or investing nothing
τm = 0 is equal, they will be indifferent between these two outcomes. We impose that τm = 0 for
qt ∈ {0, 1}.
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the optimal levels of τm from (8) and (9), which are given by the FOCs.
(1− qt)(∆u− (pi − C(pi))) = H ′(τa) (10)
qt(∆u+ pi) = H
′(τ b) (11)
Comparing (10) and (11) with the FOCs in the baseline model, (6), we see that the
b morality parent increases socialization investment as pi incurs a more severe utility
loss if parental socialization fails and the child obliquely internalizes a morality. For
a morality parents, coercion introduces two opposing effects: they have an incentive
to reduce their investment, as having an a morality child becomes less extrinsically
beneficial; and an incentive to increase investment, as b morality becomes less intrin-
sically beneficial as a result of coercion resentment. Without assuming a functional
form on the coercion resentment function, we cannot say which effects dominate at
which coercion levels.
As developed in the basic model of socialization, we see from (3) that a necessary
condition for a stable interior SSE level is equal levels of investment, τm, in parental
socialization of a and b morality. If parents invest equally in socialization, they have
equal marginal costs: H ′(τa) = H ′(τ b). Hence, we can use (10) and (11) and estab-
lish the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For all pairs of {pi,∆u} two exterior SSEs exist. For some, but not
all, pairs of {pi,∆u} a unique stable interior SSE exists, given by q∗(pi) = ∆u−pi+C(pi)
2∆u+C(pi)
.
This result is a basic extension of Proposition 1 in Greif and Tadelis (2010). The
stationarity properties of (3) imply that the population will always converge to its
SSE value. The Inada assumptions on investment in socialization imply positive
20
investment in socialization for a pi corresponding to an internal SSE, hence the pop-
ulation will not reach any exterior solution in the convergence process as long as the
SSE is internal. We define an initial interior SSE as some q∗(pi0) ∈ (0, 1), where pi0
is some initial coercion level pi0 ∈ [0, pimax] : q∗(pi0) ∈ (0, 1) and establish this as the
following lemma.
Lemma 4. Imposing a coercion level pi′ corresponding to an internal SSE q∗(pi′) ∈
(0, 1) from an initial interior SSE q∗(pi0), will make q converge to q∗(pi′).
This result is a basic extension of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in Bisin and
Verdier (2001). To illustrate the dynamics of the model, let us assume that at time
t the coercion level is pi and the population is in an interior SSE with q∗(pi). Assume
that the value of pi changes at t + 1 to pi, where pi > pi, and that the net effect of
coercion for a morality parents, (pi − C(pi)), is sufficiently increasing in the interval
[pi, pi] such that q∗′(pi) < 0.9 At t + 1, q remains unchanged but investment in so-
cialization changes; the a parents will now invest less in socialization as they have a
net lower utility in having a morality children, while the b parents will invest more
in socialization as the outcome of unsuccessful parental socialization, having an a
morality child, is less desirable to them. Socialization efforts now differ and q drops
to qt+2 < q
∗(pi) for the first generation presiding over the change in pi. At time t+ 2,
parents will make the socialization investment decision with qt+2, which is strictly
smaller than qt+1. Hence, a morality parents will face a higher probability of their
offspring having b morality through oblique socialization and will consequently in-
9This implies the average C ′(pi) is less than two in the interval, as can be seen from (31) in
Appendix 2.
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crease their parental socialization. The level of the minority morality qt will converge
towards q∗(pi) until the SSE condition from (3) of τa = τ b, i.e., equal investment in
parental socialization, is restored at the SSE with q∗(pi).
Imposing a coercion level that does not correspond to an internal SSE must imply a
value of pi such that one of the morality groups will cease to invest in socialization.
This will lead to q∗(pi) reaching the external SSE without the morality group that
ceases to socialize their children within one generation.
We now discuss the coercion resentment function. The form of the coercion re-
sentment function can be understood as a normalization of the effect of coercion
resentment relative to the effect of coercion normalized to a unit scale, i.e., assumed
to be simply pi. Thus, discussion of the net effect of coercion for a morality parents
can be centred around the coercion resentment function, C(pi). First, some fairly
unrestrictive functional form assumptions are made of C(pi):
C(pi) is a function of the C2 class, it is C(0) ≥ 0 and it has C ′(pi) > 0, over the domain [0, pimax].
(12)
C2 is the class of functions for which the first and second derivatives are continuously
defined over the entire domain of the function.
The coercion resentment function is assumed to be S-shaped.10 The convex part
of the coercion function captures the idea that there is an increasing marginal emo-
tional response to an increase in pi for initial levels of coercion. As the authority
10As shown in Appendix 2, linear, convex or concave coercion resentment functions have trivial
and unique optimums.
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increases pi, it goes from being perceived as representative of b morality individuals,
which favours and endorses b morality, to being perceived as an enemy of a moral-
ity individuals, with aggressive intentions of reducing the prevalence of a morality
individuals. The concave interval means that the change in this response becomes
negative beyond some point; as the intentions of the authority become clear, higher
levels of coercion cause a smaller increase in resentment. We define a point pˆi in the
open interval, pˆi ∈ (0, pimax) and assume that:
C ′′(pi) =
{ > 0 for pi ∈ [0, pˆi)
= 0 for pˆi
< 0 for pi ∈ (pˆi, pimax].
(13)
Furthermore, we make the following assumption of the C(pi) function.
Assumption 6. Varying coercion resentment The marginal utility loss be-
cause of coercion resentment approaches zero at the beginning and at the end of
[0, pimax]; limpi→0C ′(pi) = 0, limpi→pimax C
′(pi) = 0, and is strictly larger than two at
least at one point, pi′ ∈ (0, pimax); C ′(pi′) > 2.
We define a coercion level pi′ as marginally effective if q∗′(pi′) < 0. Using the as-
sumptions of C(pi) in (12), (13) and Assumption 6, we can develop the following
lemma on the overall effect of coercion.
Lemma 5. Coercion is marginally effective at the beginning and at the end of
[0, pimax], and there is at least one level of coercion, pˆi, that is strictly marginally
ineffective: q∗′(pˆi) > 0.
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The existence of a level of coercion that is strictly marginally ineffective, preceded
and followed by marginally effective levels of coercion, is a crucial assumption on
which the following results rest: variation in the marginal efficiency of coercion.
With no variation in the marginal effectiveness of coercion, i.e., if all levels of coer-
cion in [0, pimax] were marginally effective or were strictly marginally ineffective, the
result would be trivial: the authority would either always apply the maximum level
of coercion or never apply any coercion at all.
Whenever q∗(pi) is strictly positive for all pi ∈ [0, pimax], the assumptions that C(pi)
is monotonically increasing in pi and has a continuous second derivative, imply that
q∗(pi) will always have a unique infimum in the open convex part of C(pi), (0, pˆi) where
q∗′(pi) = 0. We denote the coercion level giving this infimum as piq ∈ (0, pˆi), and refer
to it as a nonconfrontational level of coercion. Furthermore, we denote pieq to be the
first coercion level larger than piq that has q
∗(pi) equal to the unconfrontational level:
pieq is defined as a coercion level such that piq < pi
e
q and q
∗(pieq) ≡ q∗(piq). (14)
pieq will only be defined for functional forms where C(pi) is sufficiently concave in
(pˆi, pimax]. There will always be a unique supremum value of q
∗(pi) in the concave
part of C(pi); we denote this level as piq ∈ (pˆi, pimax]. Applying Lemma 5 to the effect
of coercion, the assumptions placed on C(pi) in (12) and (13) and Lemmas 3 and 4
on the interior SSE, we can develop Lemma 6 on the functional form of q∗(pi).
Lemma 6. q∗(pi) is characterized by the following properties:
I) a unique global or local maximum(piq) and a unique global minimum(piq)
or
II) a unique global or local maximum(piq), a local minimum(piq) and a global, poten-
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tially unique, minimum (pi′ ∈ [pieq , pimax])
or
III) a global minimum (pi′′ ∈ (0, pˆi), where q∗(pi′′) = 0).
In addition, there will always be a local or unique global maximum at q∗(0) = 1
2
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The properties of q∗(pi) are dependent on the size of utility loss for parents from
having children with differing morality, ∆u, and on the strength of the coercion re-
sentment relative to the intrinsic effect of coercion. Class III) applies when ∆u is
sufficiently small and coercion resentment is sufficiently weak such that a coercion
level pi′′ ≤ piq gives q∗(pi′′) = 0. If q∗(piq) > 0, then either class II) or class I) applies,
depending on the concavity of C(pi) in (pˆi, pimax]; if C(pi) is sufficiently concave such
that q∗(piq) > q∗(pimax) then class II) applies, if not, then piq is a global minimum, and
I) applies. Note that class I) is qualitatively similar to a convex C(pi): it has a unique
non-zero minimum q∗(pi) value. Class III) is qualitatively similar to a linear coercion
resentment function, i.e., C(pi) = K0 + K1pi, with K1 > 2, while II) is qualitatively
non-convex. Figure 1. illustrates the three possible classes of q∗(pi).
3.2. Analysis
We now analyze the optimal level of coercion for an authority minimizing the share
of individuals with a morality in SSE, q∗(pi). We assume that the authority chooses
pi from an initial interior SSE, q∗(pi0). First, we discuss the model without any con-
straint on the use of coercion within [0, pimax]. Second, we discuss the optimal coer-
cion levels under an exogenously given constraint on coercion, ρ ∈ (0, pimax). Finally,
we discuss the model under an endogenously given constraint ρ(q∗(pi)) ∈ [0, pimax].
11 When q∗(pi) is characterized by III) it may also have a unique global or local maximum (piq).
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Figure 1: Three examples of q∗(pi) from pi0 = 0, constructed using C(pi) = tan−1 pi.
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The no constraint analysis is done to analyze how different functional forms on C(pi)
within [0, pimax] change the optimum. The constraints added within the [0, pimax]
interval are strategic constraints that are used to show how a change in a constraint
within a given interval changes the optimal level of coercion. As the initial coercion
level pi0 will not influence the optimal choice of the authority for the no or exogenous
constraint cases, it is omitted from the analysis of these cases and only introduced
for the endogenous constraint analysis.
Note that in this analysis we do not restrict the optimal choice of pi to lead to
an interior solution; if the authority can impose a pi′ that corresponds to the exterior
solution, q∗(pi′) = 0, it will do so.12
No constraint
As established in Lemma 4 and subsequent discussion, an authority in q∗(pi0) can
choose any feasible pi′ and will always converge to the corresponding q∗(pi′) ∈ [0, 1].
Applying Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 to the utility function in (7), the maximization
problem for an authority is given by the following.
max
pi
Uβ = min
pi
[
∆u− pi + C(pi)
2∆u+ C(pi)
] = min
pi
q∗(pi) (15)
The optimal coercion level with no constraints on the use of coercion, piNC , is de-
12 The utility function in (7) implies that whenever a set, i.e., multiple, (pi′′, pi′′′) corresponds to
q∗(pi) = 0, the authority will be indifferent as to which pi ∈ (pi′′, pi′′′) to impose; by institution we
refer to the imposed level as the lowest pi that attains q∗(pi) = 0. Once the population is in an
exterior SSE, q∗ will no longer be a function of pi and the model is silent on which pi the authority
will impose.
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termined by the properties of q∗(pi), given by {∆u,C(pi)}. Consequently, the results
follow directly from Lemma 6. For sufficiently strong coercion resentment and large
∆u, class I ) applies. For class I), the imposed level of coercion will be piNC = piq,
as q∗(piq) is strictly smaller than q∗(pimax) and will consequently be preferred by the
authority. Hence, when coercion resentment is sufficiently strong, such that q∗(pi) is
at its minimum for unconfrontational levels of coercion, the authority will not im-
pose the maximum level of coercion, even when it is able to do so. The population
will remain in an interior solution in the presence of both morality types with an
unconfrontational level of coercion.
If class II) applies for q∗(pi), the optimal level of coercion will be piNC ∈ (pieq , pimax] if
any pi′ gives q∗(pi′) = 0. Otherwise, piNC = pimax will be the optimal level of coercion
and the population will be stable at an interior solution at q∗(pimax). If class III)
applies to q∗(pi), ∆u is sufficiently low and coercion resentment is sufficiently weak
so that the authority can impose a coercion level that is lower than the unconfronta-
tional level, and attain q∗ = 0. We sum up the no constraint analysis in Proposition
1 as follows.
Proposition 1. Coercion use under no constraint Let pi′ denote a level of
coercion such that q∗(pi′) = 0. The optimal level of coercion under no constraint,
piNC , will be as follows for the different classes of q∗(pi).
I) piNC = piq
II) piNC = pi′ ∈ (pieq , pimax), if no pi′ is defined then piNC = pimax
III) piNC = pi′ < piq, where pi′ is always defined.
Referring to an authority that imposes a coercion level strictly lower than its highest
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implementable level towards a non-zero a morality group as exhibiting restraint, we
can establish the Corollary of Proposition 1 as follows.
Corollary of Proposition 1. Restraints under no constraint An authority
facing no constraint on coercion will only restrain its use of coercion when SSE q∗(pi)
is of class I).
Exogenous constraint
Several factors external to the model can constrain the use of coercion by an au-
thority: the authority might recognize constitutional legal rights, there might be
institutionalized rights constraining what pi the state apparatus can issue, or sur-
passing a coercion threshold might trigger an intervention by foreign powers. To
analyze optimal use of coercion when the authority’s ability to impose coercion is
limited, piEC , an exogenous constraint ρ ∈ (0, pimax) is introduced. We assume an
initial coercion level pi0 ∈ [0, ρ] from which any [q∗(0), q∗(ρ)] can be reached. In
addition to determining the optimal piEC , we also focus on when the constraint will
be binding at the optimal coercion level.13
Including a constraint on the use of coercion leaves an authority with the follow-
13Binding constraints might change the level and the saliency of conflict between morality groups.
Furthermore, it will presumably be easier to empirically observe binding constraints, such as explicit
threats of intervention and emerging population movements, than unbinding and latent constraints
that might be in the form of unrealized outcomes anticipated by an authority.
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ing optimization problem.
max
pi
Uβ = min
pi
[
∆u− pi + C(pi)
2∆u+ C(pi)
] s. t. pi ≤ ρ (16)
Trivially, an exogenous constraint ρ ∈ (0, pimax) affects the optimal level of coercion
piEC if, and only if, it is strictly smaller than the optimal adjustment under no con-
straint, ρ < piNC . Noting this, we can develop the following proposition on the opti-
mal level of coercion, piEC , for an authority facing a constraint on the use of coercion.
Proposition 2. Coercion use under an exogenous constraint If a con-
straint affects coercion use under an exogenous constraint, ρ ≤ piNC and ρ 6= pieq , the
following holds.
(i) piEC = ρ if and only if ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq).
(ii) piEC = piq < ρ if and only if ρ ∈ (piq, pieq).14
The result shows that constraints in ρ ∈ (piq, pieq), an interval of coercion that an
authority will always find undesirable to impose and referred to as the inefficient
interval of coercion, lead to an imposed level of coercion piEC = piq with a constraint
that is non-binding in the optimum: piEC < ρ. Furthermore, if ρ changes from within
ρ′ ∈ (piq, pieq) to some level ρ′′ > pieq , the coercion level will jump discontinuously from
piEC = piq to pi
EC = ρ′′.15
Considering Lemma 6, we see that the inefficient interval is only defined for functional
form II); we use this together with Proposition 2 to develop the following proposition.
14With ρ = pieq the authority is indifferent between imposing piq and pi
e
q .
15 Proposition 2 has relevant implications for the policy problem of an external agency setting a
constraint ρ to limit an authority’s use of coercion when q∗(pi), as discussed in Appendix 3.1.
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Corollary of Proposition 2. Restraints under constraint An authority will
restrain its use of coercion as a response to a constraint if and only if the q∗(pi) is of
class II) and the constraint is in the inefficient interval of coercion: ρ ∈ (piq, pieq).
Hence, a legitimacy-maximizing authority rationally restraining its level of coer-
cion as a response to a constraint, must imply a non-convex response to coercion.
In this model, it also implies that the imposed coercion level piEC is equal to the
unconfrontational level of coercion piq.
Endogenous insurrection constraints
We now analyze the model, assuming an endogenous insurrection constraint on the
use of coercion, dependent on the initial prevalence of a morality, q∗(pi0). For
tractability, the insurrection constraint ρ(·) is assumed to be dependent on q∗(pi)
rather than on qt: ρ(q
∗(pi)).16
We first define the insurrection constraint, then we show that the solution to the
static optimizing problem of setting pi from an initial pi0 is not necessarily an equi-
16A description of which conditions are needed for equivalence between solving the authority’s op-
timization problem constrained by an insurrection constraint dependent on the SSE q∗(pi), ρ(q∗(pi))
or by a constraint dependent on qt, is included in Appendix 4.1.
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librium if the authority has the opportunity to reset pi in the new SSE, q∗(pi).17 To
address this issue, we develop a formal definition of the set of implementable coercion
levels, Spi0 , for an authority with a given initial condition pi0. To find which of the
implementable levels of coercion will lead to an equilibrium outcome, we develop a
notion of dynamically stable equilibria, characterized by the authority not having an
incentive to change piIC if this was the initial coercion level: pi0 = pi
IC .18 Finally, we
investigate which coercion levels characterize dynamically stable equilibria and show
how the model may display path dependence; i.e., different initial conditions may
give different equilibria.
The endogenous insurrection constraint is defined as the highest coercion level for
which the minority has negative excepted utility of committing an insurrection. The
insurrection constraint function ρ(q∗(pi0)) defines the maximal coercion level that can
be implemented for some initial state q∗(pi0) without the a morality committing an
insurrection. Note that there is no explicit link between the insurrection decision
and coercion resentment; the private decision processes of how much to invest in
socialization may be very different to the public decision processes for a morality
group to commit an insurrection. There is no specified outcome for an insurrection;
because we assume the authority sets pi in order to avoid an insurrection, we im-
plicitly assume that the authority must find the insurrection outcome to be worse
17Note that because Lemma 5 implies convergence from an internal to another internal SSE,
we cannot say that the authority can reset pi once qt reaches q∗(pi). The issue can be solved by
assuming that the authority can reset pi once qt is within some infinitesimal interval  of q∗(pi).
This is, however, not necessary to address which stable equilibria exist and are reachable within
t ∈ [0,∞), which is the subject of this model, hence we omit this complication.
18 A standard definition of stability in dynamic games (Petrosyan, 2016).
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than being able to reset pi, satisfying the constraint. Implicitly, we also assume that
the minority might avoid or reduce coercion given a successful insurrection. We first
impose the following assumption on the insurrection constraint.
Assumption 7. Monotonically increasing insurrection constraint The insur-
rection constraint ρ(q∗(pi)) is a continuous mapping from q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) to [0, pimax].
It is monotonically decreasing in q∗(pi) and has a continuous first derivative.19
We insert the endogenous insurrection constraint into (15) to attain the author-
ity’s static optimization problem with an endogenous insurrection constraint in the
following.
max
pi
Uβ = min
pi
[
∆u− pi + C(pi)
2∆u+ C(pi)
] = min
pi
q∗(pi) s.t. pi ≤ ρ(q∗(pi0)) (17)
Unless the authority can set pi only once, and is unable to subsequently readjust
its pi, the solution to (17) is not necessarily a dynamically stable equilibrium. As the
insurrection constraint is dependent on q∗(pi), choosing the optimal pi = pi′ from an
initial condition q∗(pi0) may imply that the new insurrection constraint is less bind-
ing, ρ(q∗(pi0)) < ρ(q∗(pi′)). Hence, the pi′ solving (17) may be dynamically unstable
in the sense that the authority may have an incentive to set a new pi′′ > pi′ in order
to attain a lower SSE, q∗(pi′′) < q∗(pi′).
19 We discuss interpretations of the insurrection constraint in Appendix 3.2.
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To find the dynamically stable coercion level an authority will implement, we first
develop a formal notion of which coercion levels an authority can implement if it has
the opportunity to reset pi an infinite number of times, Spi0 . We first define the set of
sustainable coercion levels, SΠ ≡ {pi : pi ≤ ρ(q∗(pi))}: these are the levels of coercion
that, at their corresponding SSE level, do not breach the insurrection constraint. As
it is not necessarily the case that all pi ∈ SΠ are implementable from a given initial
condition pi0, Spi0 is a subset of the set of sustainable levels Spi0 ⊆ SΠ. We formally
define the set of implementable coercion levels, Spi0 , from an initial condition pi0 as
follows.
Definition of the set of implementable coercion levels: A coercion level pi′
is in the set of implementable coercion levels Spi0 if and only if there exists a finite
sequence {pin}N0 ≡ {pi0, pi1, pi2, ..., piN}, where N ∈ [0,∞) with piN = pi′ that satisfies
the following two criteria.
1. Every coercion level in {pin}N1 is implementable from its previous value; pin ≤
ρ(q∗(pin−1)) for all n = 1, 2...N .
2. Every coercion level in {pin}N1 is sustainable; pin ∈ SΠ for all n = 1, 2...N .
The set of SSE levels corresponding to the set of implementable coercion levels is
denoted as Qpi0 ≡ {q∗(pi) : pi ∈ Spi0}. Spi0 and Qpi0 will be non-empty for any pi0.2021
To further study Spi0 , we develop the composite function ρˆ(pi) ≡ ρ(·) ◦ q∗(pi) as
20By assumption, the initial condition corresponds to a sustainable level of coercion, pi0 ≤
ρ(q∗(pi0)).
21 Implicitly, we here assume that pi can only be reset once a q∗(pi) is reached. A discussion of
the set of implementable coercion levels where the authority can reset pi at any t is included in
Appendix 4.2.
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Figure 2: The curved line is an example of ρˆ(pi) while the 45-degree line is the fix-point-line.
Any pi0 ≤ pifix will give Spi0 = s′ = [0, pifix], while a pi0 ≥ pi′fix will give Spi0 = {s′, s′′} =
{[0, pifix], [pi′fix, pimax]}.
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the composite of the insurrection constraint ρ(q∗(pi)) and q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1), i.e., a value
of ρˆ(pi′) is the insurrection constraint at the SSE corresponding to pi′: q∗(pi′).22 The
functional form of ρˆ(pi) will determine the properties of Spi0 and will be determined
by the form of q∗(pi) in conjunction with the form of the insurrection constraint ρ(·).
As ρ′(q∗(pi)) is assumed to be monotonically increasing in q∗(pi), the functions ρˆ(pi)
and q∗(pi) will always have derivatives of equal sign.23 Plotting an illustration of the
ρˆ(pi) function exemplified by a convex ρ(·) function is done in Figure 2.
Not all implementable coercion levels are sustainable. If a coercion level pi′ in-
creases the SSE from q∗(pi0), it will decrease the insurrection threshold of the a
morality group and might lead to an insurrection at q∗(pi′). Hence, a coercion level
pi′ might be implementable, ρˆ(pi0) > pi′, lower than an authority’s initial condition,
pi′ < pi0, but still be unsustainably low. A coercion level may also be implementable
but be unsustainably high. If an authority was to implement an implementable but
unsustainable coercion level pi′, the state would remain stable at the time of imple-
mentation, but have an insurrection once q converges to its q∗(pi′) level, at which the
size of the a morality group is large enough as to choose to commit an insurrection at
pi′. Whenever a coercion level is implementable, ρˆ(pi0) > pi′, but also unsustainable,
ρˆ(pi′) < pi′, it implies that q∗(pi) is strictly increasing in the interval between pi0 and
pi′. Hence, an authority minimizing q∗(pi) will never implement an unsustainably
low pi in a path towards an piIC , as an unsustainable level of coercion must imply
22 As ρ(·) is a continuous function mapping q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) to pi ∈ [0, pimax], and the function
q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) is a continuous function mapping [0, pimax] to q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1), the composite of the
two, ρˆ(pi) is a continuous function mapping [0, pimax] to [0, pimax].
23This trivially holds because ρˆ(pi) ≡ ρ(q∗(pi)) and Assumption 7 statement ρ(·)′ > 0 for all
q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) implies that when q∗(pi)′ > 0 then ρˆ(·)′ > 0.
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imposing a pi increasing the SSE.24
The non-linearities in q∗(pi) mean there might exist unsustainable levels of coer-
cion pi′ between the upper and the lower bound of a Spi0 . We define any subset of
SΠ that is not a union of two disjoint non-empty open sets, as s.
25 As ρˆ(pi) may
cross the fix-point-line multiple times, there may be multiple s sets separated by
unsustainable pi in a Spi0 . As ρ(q
∗(pi)) is strictly decreasing in q∗(pi), an authority
with pi0 ∈ s′ will always be able to set pi′ = ρˆ(pi0) until it reaches an end point of s′.
However, because of non-linearities in q∗(pi) this is not necessarily true for Spi0 ; i.e.,
more sophisticated programs of changes in the coercion level might be needed.
Authorities with composite insurrection constraints such that zero is not a sustain-
able coercion level, 0 6∈ SΠ, are defined to be strongly coercion reliant: they will be
reliant on strictly positive levels of coercion to sustain their state, and impose pi > 0
without any inherent incentive to minimize q∗(pi).26 We establish the following as a
formal definition of coercion reliance.
Definition of weak and strong coercion reliance: An authority is defined
as strongly coercion reliant whenever ρˆ(0) < 0 and weakly coercion reliant whenever
there exists unsustainable levels of coercion pi′ that are lower than the initial condi-
24An example of an authority that could implement an unsustainably low pi is one that seeks to
gradually reduce pi and knows the direction of q∗′(pi) but is uncertain of the magnitude.
25This definition is adopted from Mendelson (1975).
26 Assuming that a group with superior coercive capability will always commit an insurrection, an
authority with coercion reliance 0 6∈ Spi0 implies that the minority has superior coercive capability
at q∗(0) = 12 . Note that, in a more general framework, this might occur whenever q
∗(0) > 12 .
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tion: pi′ < pi0 : pi′ /∈ Spi0 .
As ρ(·) is homogenously decreasing in q∗(pi), a strictly marginally inefficient interval
of coercion between intervals of marginally effective pi, such as (piq, piq), must exist
for weak coercion reliance to occur independently of strong coercion reliance.27 We
establish this as Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Weak coercion reliance and coercion inefficiency Weak coer-
cion reliance occurring without strong coercion reliance implies a strictly marginally
inefficient interval of coercion between intervals of marginal effective coercion levels.
The bounds of Spi0 will either be a coercion level at which the insurrection constraint
binds the q∗(pi′) to which it has converged; i.e., at the line of fix-points referred to as
the fix-point-line, of ρˆ(·) defined as pifix ≡ {pi : ρˆ(pi) = pi}, or the bounds of Spi0 will
be at the bounds of the [0, pimax] interval. We define the different types of bounds on
Spi0 as follows.
Definition of constraints on the set of implementable coercion levels: For
any pi0, any upper or lower bounds of the set of implementable coercion levels from
pi0, Spi0 , will be either:
I. a strategic constraint, if the coercion level at the bound of Spi0 is a fix-point of the
insurrection constraint, pifix
27 An interesting consequence of this is that under weak coercion reliance without strong coercion
reliance, a gradual reduction of pi towards 0 will lead to state failure, while a sudden change from
pi0 to 0 will not.
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II. a feasibility constraint, if the coercion level at the bound of Spi0 is pimax.
If the upper bound of Spi0 is a strategic constraint, defined as pifix ≡ sup{Spi0},
it must lie at a crossing of the fix-point-line by the composite insurrection function
from above. An upper strategic constraint on Spi0 , pifix, will be an attractor fix-point
with ρˆ′(pi) < 1; the authority can increase pi until it arrives at this level of coercion
and will do so if this is the minimum of Qpi0 . This property arises from the fact that
ρˆ(pi) is continuously defined, hence any coercion level pi′ in the open Spi0 set must
satisfy ρˆ(pi′) < pi′, while a strategic constraint by definition is on fix-point-line where
ρˆ(pifix) = pifix. The opposite holds for a strategic constraint at the lower bound of
Spi0 , defined as pifix ≡ inf{Spi0} because the insurrection function has a lower bound
that is a crossing of the fix-point-line from below, and it holds that ρˆ′(pifix) > 1.
Hence, pifix is a repeller fix-point; the response to the use of coercion changes the in-
surrection threshold sufficiently that the authority can increase pi from pifix to higher
levels of coercion.
We now find the authorities’ optimal level of coercion amongst the implementable
coercion levels, Spi0 , by developing the notion of a dynamically stable equilibrium,
piIC .
Definition of a dynamically stable equilibrium: A dynamically stable equi-
librium is defined as a coercion level and an SSE {piIC , q∗(piIC)} such that piIC is the
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optimal coercion level if piIC is equal to the initial condition pi0, pi0 = pi
IC . 28
This definition implies that a dynamically stable equilibrium {piIC , q∗(piIC)} must
fulfil the following three conditions (conditions 2 and 3 follow from 1, but are in-
cluded for completeness).
1. piIC is the solution to the static optimization of the authority (17) when pi0 = pi
IC .
2. Socialization investment for both morality groups is unchanged at q∗(piIC), i.e.,
q∗(piIC) is an SSE.
3. The a morality group does not choose to commit an insurrection at piIC ; i.e., the
coercion level does not breach the insurrection constraint; piIC ≤ ρ(q∗(piIC)).
Conditions 2 and 3 in the definition of a dynamically stable equilibrium are ful-
filled for all pi ∈ Spi0 , while condition 1 is fulfilled by the pi in Spi0 that maximizes Uβ.
Hence, we find piIC by solving the following.
piIC ≡ {argmax
pi
Uβ = min
pi∈Spi0
[
∆u− pi + C(pi)
2∆u+ C(pi)
]} (18)
Any authority that can infinitely reset pi will always be at, or in a sequence {pin}N−10
28This is equilibrium in the infinitely repeated game where the authority first chooses pi′, where-
upon a morality parents collectively choose whether to insurrect, and if not, parents of both morality
groups choose their levels of socialization investment τa, τ b. New generations of parents then keep
setting the socialization investment for each generation. When the population is in the new SSE,
qt = q∗(pi′), the authority can set a new coercion level, and the game is repeated. Note that the
parents only have preferences for their child’s morality, not for any later generation, which simplifies
the strategic aspects of the game.
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leading up to, a dynamically stable equilibrium {piIC , q∗(piIC)}. The dynamically sta-
ble equilibrium piIC will be unique corresponding to every feasible pi0, except for one
special case.29 The monotone derivative of the insurrection function, ρ′(q∗(pi)) < 0,
implies that at any iteration there can never be another q∗(pi) giving a higher insur-
rection constraint than the lowest attainable q∗(pi). Hence, there cannot be a lower
reachable q∗(pi′) than the pi′ reachable through minimizing q∗(pi) in every iteration.
In other words, maximizing capability to reach any long-term goal and maximizing
short-term gains will imply equal behaviour. The prediction of the dynamical equi-
libria is robust to the introduction of time preferences when coercion is costless and
ρ(q∗(pi)) is monotonically decreasing in q∗(pi).
Any dynamically stable equilibrium will either be at a strategic constraint, a fea-
sibility constraint or a local minimizer of q∗(pi). We establish this as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Dynamically stable equilibria For any initial condition pi0,
the dynamically stable equilibrium piIC is a coercion level equal to either:
I. the unconfrontational level of coercion as an interior point of Spi0 : pi
IC = piq
II. a strategic constraint at the upper bound of Spi0 : pi
IC = pifix
29The only instance in which the minimum of Qpi0 does not correspond to a unique minimum
pi′ is the case where {piq, pieq} ∈ Spi0 , ρˆ(piq) = pieq and pieq = pifix; then by definition inf(Qpi0) =
{q∗(piq), q∗(pieq)}. Hence, piIC = {piq, pieq} and the authority will be indifferent between imposing piq
or pieq . In an application of the model, this issue can be solved by considering whether the relevant
authority has other considerations that make coercion costly, in which case piIC = piq, or beneficial,
in which case piIC = pieq .
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III. the upper feasibility constraint at the bound of SΠ: pi
IC = pimax.
30
When {∆u,C(pi)} is sufficiently low such that q∗(pi) is of class III), piIC will either
be equal to a strategic constraint pifix ∈ [0, piq) or the lowest pi′ attaining q∗(pi) = 0,
depending on whether the composite insurrection function is such that pi′ is imple-
mentable from pi0. For q
∗(pi) of class I), the dynamically stable piIC is equal to piq
if this is implementable, and equal to some strategic constraint pifix > piq if not.
For q∗(pi) of class II), authorities will end up in stable gunpoint equilibria with two
morality populations if pimax is implementable and 0 < q
∗(pimax). If there exists an
implementable pi′ such that q∗(pi′) = 0, then the population will approach single
morality equilibrium. If this is not the case, then either piIC is equal to piq, the un-
confrontational level of coercion, or the equilibrium must be a strategic constraint,
either at some coercion level above pifix ∈ [0, piq) or below pifix ∈ (pieq , pimax), the open
interval of inefficient coercion levels, (piq, pi
e
q).
Equal to the model under a exogenous constraints, the equilibrium piIC = piq is
the only one where the authority restrains its use of coercion in equilibrium; it im-
poses a coercion level strictly lower than the highest implementable coercion level.
The equilibrium piIC = pifix is given by ρˆ(pi) and implies a coercion level at a binding
insurrection constraint. Finally, the equilibrium where piIC = pimax can be under-
30Note that because equilibrium is defined as mutual reinforcing behaviour determining an out-
come, the equilibrium with a coercion level similar to the feasibility constraint at pimax could be
omitted, as it is the feasibility constraint that determines pi′ = piIC and is not set at any threshold
where pi changes a strategic choice made by the a morality group to commit an insurrection.
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stood as an equivalent of legitimacy at the “barrel of a gun”. The gunpoint level of
legitimacy is defined as the legitimacy that can be achieved at the q∗(pi) correspond-
ing to socialization investment at its SSE value of pimax.
When a composite insurrection function is such that different initial conditions, pi0,
generate different Spi0 sets, the model will have path dependency; different initial
conditions will give different dynamically stable equilibria, piIC . For a composite
insurrection function ρˆ(pi) with two crossings at the fix-point-line, such as the one
described in Figure 1, SΠ will consist of two disjoint subsets, s, one lower s
′ and one
upper s′′. Assume that Spi0(pi) = {s′′, s′}, then pi0 ∈ s′ and pi0 ∈ s′′ will produce
different sets of implementable coercion levels, depending on whether there is any
way of implementing the minimal pi′ in the upper subset s′′ from the lower s′; that
is, if ρ(inf{Qpi0}) < inf{s′′}.
Generally, lower subsets of SΠ, such as s
′, will always be contained in higher sets of
implementable coercion levels, such as Spi0 . This arises because an authority never
instantaneously triggers an insurrection by lowering the coercion level. Only when
coercion levels lower than the initial condition are unsustainable, can reductions in
coercion lead to an insurrection. Hence, path dependency only goes from low to
high levels of coercion; an authority can be restricted to impose a lower level of co-
ercion than it would otherwise be able to impose, but cannot be restricted to impose
higher levels of coercion than it otherwise could because of historical factors. In
other words, the lower bound of SΠ is the lower bound of any Spi0 . We conclude our
formal analysis by developing path dependency as a proposition.
Proposition 5. Path dependency If and only if there exist initial conditions
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pi0 6= pi0, such that the set of implementable coercion levels from pi0 or pi0 differ,
Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅, will different initial conditions pi0 = pi0 and pi0 = pi0 give different
dynamically stable equilibria: piICpi0 6= piICpi0 .
The intuition for why piIC will always be different for different Spi0 is as follows: when
the composite insurrection function is such that the sets of implementable coercion
levels are different, it implies that some levels are sustainable and contained in one of
the sets, but unimplementable from the highest implementable coercion level in the
lower set. As ρ(·) is homogenously increasing, this implies that one of the sets must
contain a higher pi corresponding to a lower q∗(pi) than the other; the dynamically
stable equilibrium will always be the lowest attainable q∗(pi); and piIC is the min-
imum of Qpi0 and must consequently be different for the two different sets: Spi0 ,Spi0 .
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Consequently, the model makes the prediction that coercion levels and correspond-
ing SSE prevalence of morality groups will in some cases be inherently dependent on
history in conjunction with the included long-term equilibrating factors.
v
The crucial assumption behind the developed results is that some levels of coercion
31We also showed that, equivalent to different sets of implementable coercion levels is that the
lowest coercion level in the subset containing the coercion level equal to the upper dynamically
stable equilibrium, piICpi0 , must not be implementable from the lowest implementable q
∗(pi) from the
other initial condition: inf{Qpi0}. This inf{Qpi0} is by definition the q∗(pi) at the dynamically
stable coercion level for this initial condition, pi0. Defining the subset s
′′ ∈ Spi0 as the subset
containing piICpi0 , an alternative formulation of Proposition 5 is: Dynamically stable equilibria differ,
piICpi0 6= piICpi0 , if and only if there exist two initial conditions pi0 6= pi0 such that ρˆ(piICpi0 ) < inf{s′′}.
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are marginally effective and that at least one level of coercion in between these levels
is strictly marginally ineffective.
We note that any constraint on coercion can be categorized as either a feasibility or
a strategic constraint, in the sense that it will either be endogenously dependent on
q∗(pi) or it will not. Furthermore, note that any interval of coercion [0, pimax] giving a
class I) functional form of q∗(pi) can be seen as a feasibility constraint in some larger
interval [0, pimax] of class II) functional form.
32 We can sum up two main insights
from the model as follows.
Main insight into coercion use: A legitimacy-maximizing authority will restrain
coercion of a morality when non-convexities in the response to coercion make impos-
ing more efficient coercion levels either strategically or feasibly unimplementable.
Main insight into path dependency: Dynamically stable equilibrium is in-
herently given by the history of the polity whenever there exist coercion levels that
are sustainable but unimplementable from some initial conditions. 33
Furthermore, we have established that the strategic constraints must be fix-points of
the composite insurrection function, the mechanisms for how polities can converge
32 As coercion resentment is decreasing in the last part of the interval C ′′(pi) < 0 for pi ∈ (pˆi, pimax],
any q∗(pi) of class I) must converge towards class II) as pimax → ∞. This implies piNC = pimax, as
pimax →∞.
33Note that, whenever multiple dynamically stable equilibria exist, an exogenous temporary in-
crease in insurrection capability can move the dynamically stable equilibrium between sets of long-
term implementable coercion levels.
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into state failure when coercion levels are unsustainable and the formal definition of,
and some necessary conditions for, weak and strong coercion reliance.
Most results should naturally generalize for other non-linear functional forms where
the marginal effectiveness of coercion varies with its level; i.e., dynamically stable
equilibria will either be at a pifix or at a local or global minimum of q
∗(pi) within
[0, pimax]. For instance, assuming an S-like coercion resentment function tantamount
to the one assumed with several consecutive convex and concave areas, the results of
the analysis would naturally generalize to this functional form; for each sufficiently
concave interval there would be an additional inefficient interval of coercion and for
each sufficiently convex interval there could be an interior stable equilibrium.
4. The theory applied to history
We now consider the religious homogenization in early modern Europe (1517–1685)
and the Soviet secularization project (1922–1991) through the lens of the model.
The dynamics of changing moralities mainly take the perspective of rational elites
seeking to maximize their influence, where the sentiments of the population are seen
as prerequisites to their strategies. The analysis assumes instrumental motivations
rather than idealistic motivations for imposing the morality of the state upon the
population. This is a simplifying assumption about intentions, which by nature
will ultimately be difficult to prove or refute, as it is challenging to distinguish
between how religious and ideological differences serve as motivation or justification
for actions. Note that if one assumes elites to be fully intrinsically motivated, their
motivation will often be to implement the authorities’ preferred morality as an end
in itself, which coincides fully with the proposed utility function of maximizing its
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prevalence. In other words, regardless of why the authorities wish to maximize their
morality, the analysis remains the same as long as the authorities see it as a policy
objective to maximize the prevalence of individuals who share the morality of the
state.
4.1. Religious tolerance in early modern France and the Holy Roman Empire 1517–
1685
The Christian Schism after the Reformation in 1517 and the subsequent spread of
the Protestant faith, fuelled by the introduction of the printing press (Rubin, 2014)
and dismay with the policies of the Catholic Church, led to an increase in religious
heterogeneity in early modern Europe. The French kings and the Holy Roman em-
perors (β) built their legitimacy on the Catholic Church (b), and the introduction
of Protestantism (a) posed a threat to the legitimacy of their states (Johnson and
Koyama, 2013).34 In the first part of early modernity (1517–1618), both the French
and Holy Roman rulers witnessed a spread of Protestantism, combined with local
nobility reforming to the Protestant faith to gain regional independence, leading to
religious civil wars. This new religious cleavage enhanced existing ongoing processes
of regional fights for independence and removed the possibility of polyvalent religious
legitimization; in France, against the backdrop of a growing absolutist state, in the
Holy Roman Empire, against the backdrop of a fragmenting empire.
The initial religious wars and periods of upheaval ended with the admission of re-
ligious rights at the Peace of Augsburg (1555) in the Holy Roman Empire and the
Edict of Nantes (1598) in France. These concessions were made as the rulers real-
34For ease of presentation we do not distinguish between different Protestant faiths, i.e.,
Lutheranism and Calvinism.
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ized the unproductiveness of the coercive measures (C(pi)), coupled with an inability
to sustain the ensuing military pressure (Wilson, 2009). As Johnson and Koyama
(2013) put it: “This intensified persecution became increasingly ineffective: it served
to strengthen the faith of Protestants and encouraged them to organize”, the use
of coercion was counter-productive, i.e., compatible with a micro level presence of
coercion resentment.
Coercion resentment in the Holy Roman Empire
The Holy Roman Empire was not a unified state, but rather a decentralized empire
structure of smaller kingdoms with varying degrees of loyalty to the ruling Habsburg
family and the Holy Roman Empirical authorities. Protestantism served as both a
cause of and an excuse for peripheral resistance against the central authorities; lower
level princes actively used religious cleavages and changed their religious affiliations
to challenge the hegemony of the Emperor, build alliances and gain influence (North
and Thomas, 1973). This demonstrates how religious homogeneity was a necessity
for maintaining a strong state, and why implementing the morality of the state was
seen as imperative for preserving the Empire united and under the control of the
ruling Habsburg elite.
After granting Protestants (a morality) the right to practice their faith at the Peace
of Augsburg, the Emperor Charles V (1516–1556) still saw Protestants as a challenge
to his powers and, at his death, the Habsburg family was divided between moderate
and traditionalist views of which policies should be adopted towards the Protestants.
The Habsburgs recognized the current coercion level was in the inefficient (piq, pi
e
q)
interval, but were uncertain and divided on the direction forward, and whether co-
48
ercion levels beyond pieq would trigger an insurrection.
The moderates wanted to pursue a nonconfrontational line and build legitimacy
for both faiths, while the traditionalists saw the Habsburgs as having an intrinsic
calling to be the champions of the Catholic faith in Europe and wished to purge
the empire of Protestantism through the use of force, i.e., to increase pi.35 In the
language of the model, the Habsburgs seemed to see their policy options as being
either nonconfrontational or strong and confrontational with levels of coercion that
they knew would be at the edge of, if not beyond, the set of implementable coercion
levels Spi0 . History would prove that the Habsburgs did not have the internal military
or the external strategic position to impose the coercion levels that they attempted.
In 1618, it became clear that Ferdinand II, who had pursued strong anti-Protestant
policies in Austria, would be the successor to the throne; this further increased ten-
sion in the Protestant dominated region of Bohemia. In the period from the Peace of
Augsburg in 1555 to 1618, the Protestants increased their numbers (Cantoni, 2015).
This is compatible with an increased investment in socialization and consequently
q∗(pi), in line with a micro level coercion resentment. The imminent coronation
greatly increased resentment towards the Empire and the anticipated change to-
wards a more confrontational policy. Through the lens of the model, this can be seen
as tipping the insurrection constraint following resentment towards the emperors’
35 Emperor Rudolf II (1572–1608) conducted a conciliatory policy towards the Protestants and
saw an alliance as a way to unify the Empire (Helfferich, 2009). He was, however, an introvert and
an ineffective emperor, and during his reign imperial influence deteriorated. Similarly, in his short
reign Emperor Mattihas (1612–1618) ran conciliatory policies towards the Protestants.
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new-found ambition for a counter-reformation; it clearly acted as a prerequisite for
the approaching conflict. The renewed program of confrontational religious homog-
enization that was anticipated after the coronation of the more religiously dedicated
Emperor Ferdinand II, strongly contributed to the Protestants’ insurrection at the
Second Defenestration of Prague, sparking the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) be-
tween Protestants and Catholics in Germany (Wilson, 2009).
Initially, Emperor Ferdinand II was successful in suppressing the Protestants; in the
terminology of the model he had overstepped his insurrection constraint, but was
able to crush the ensuing rebellion. The Empire won the first part of the war ending
with the Battle of White Mountain (1620). Ferdinand II might have succeeded in
uniting the Empire under one faith had it not been for foreign involvement in the
conflict. Foreign powers joined the conflict and sided with the Protestants to further
their own causes: Protestant Denmark-Norway feared that a Catholic victory would
threaten its sovereignty, Sweden feared that a strengthened emperor would ally with
Catholic Poland to reclaim the Swedish crown, while the Catholic French aided the
Protestant rebels in the Holy Roman Empire to weaken the Habsburg Empire and
deter the elite from supporting their Habsburg relatives reigning in Spain.36 The
Holy Roman Empire lost the war; Emperor Ferdinand II’s violation of the insurrec-
tion constraint of the Holy Roman Empire in 1618 is, together with the Peace of
Augsburg, responsible for Germany remaining a religiously divided country to this
day.
36Ringmar (2007) refutes this explanation of the Swedish rationale and argues that the Swedish
elite embarked on the mission in Germany in order to be taken seriously as a Protestant European
power. Nevertheless, the Swedes used a regional conflict to further their own agenda.
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Religious cleavages worked to further other strategic agendas for neighbouring au-
thorities, as a legitimate way to engage in foreign conflicts (Nexon, 2009). These
factors were to change with the new inter-state institutional order that was estab-
lished as the war ended with the Peace of Westphalia, contributing to that while
Ferdinand II’s attempt to remove Protestantism ultimately failed, the French Crown
would succeed 40 years later.
Religious persecution of the French Huguenots
Similar to the wars of religion in the Holy Roman Empire, the French Crown had
waged war with its Protestant population, the Huguenots, from the beginning of
the Reformation (1517). Recognizing the unproductiveness of its policies during the
French Wars of Religion, the French Crown settled for a nonconfrontational equi-
librium with the Edict of January at St. Germaine in 1562. Protestantism was
decriminalized, but the Huguenots were not allowed to worship publicly; an illustra-
tive example of a nonconfrontational level of coercion, piq, in our model. The period
following that of the study by Johnson and Koyama (2013) was generally a period
of increased prosecution of religious minorities following increased state capacity.
Prior to the decision to once more outlaw Protestantism with the Revocation of
the Edict of Nantes in 1686, advisors close to the French king, Louis XIV, recog-
nized the potential counter-productiveness of this policy (Sutherland, 1988). Initially,
measures were introduced gradually, as French historian Elisabeth Labrousse puts
it: “measures, therefore, had to be constantly presented, albeit with a good deal of
sophistry, not as aggressive sanctions but simply as a withdrawal of the kings’ favours
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from the minority.” (Sutherland, 1988). Marginal changes to the coercion level were
gradually imposed to reduce salience and potential counter reactions. Louis XIV’s
advisors recommended a continuation of this policy by identifying the Huguenots as
schismatic, a measure more gentle than outlawing Protestantism. However, Louis
XIV chose the stricter, more confrontational line and the death penalty for Protes-
tants was introduced in France on 1 July 1686. While it seems that the king’s advisors
recognized the potential for a reaction to his policies, the king was surprised by the
negative response and mass exodus. His hopes had been for reformation rather than
relocation as a Protestant response.
While the granting of religious rights in 1547 to the Huguenots was given in or-
der to make peace with a politically and military powerful group, the revocation of
the rights was made to a small group that posed little or no military threat following
a long and gradual increase of coercive measures by the French Crown (Rae, 2002).
Thus, in terms of the model, because piq was not the upper limit of the set of im-
plementable coercion levels, the crown did not hit any fixed points of the composite
insurrection function along the program of increases in pi towards the dynamically
stable equilibrium, which would turn out to be the gunpoint equilibrium. In line
with Proposition 2, once the coercion levels approached an inefficient level, Louis
XIV went directly to a clear case of a gunpoint threat and avoided any potentially
inefficient coercion levels in (piq, pi
e
q).
Scholars studying the period surmise that without the actions of the state, the
Huguenot identity might have withered away in the absence of persecution (Labrousse,
1985 in Rae, 2002). The identification of emigrated French Protestants as Huguenots,
a separate identity from the Catholic French, would remain strong, albeit outside
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France (Sutherland, 1988). This insight is interesting in the light of the model; it
points to either the “cultural memory” of persecution, C(pi), as having a long-term
identity building effect, or a persistent high investment in socialization. The policy
held no military cost for the French king but had a reputational cost. The reactions
from foreign kings were negative, condemning the treatment of the French Huguenots
(Labrousse, 1985 in Rae, 2002), perhaps pointing to nascent expectations of minority
rights being respected in international relations.
A comparative perspective on religious persecution in the Holy Roman Empire and
France: The role of the Peace of Westphalia
The aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia, has been thor-
oughly studied in terms of international relations and considered to be the start of
the modern state system. Interpreting the new institutional paradigm of interna-
tional relations in Europe as relaxing the insurrection constraint, ρ(q∗(pi)), because
of a lower risk of foreign involvement, can account for the freezing pattern in the map
of religious identities after 1648 in Europe, which is thoroughly documented in the
political science literature (Rae, 2002; Nexon, 2009; Tilly and Ardant, 1975; Rokkan,
1999).
The human suffering in the war, which killed an estimated third of the popula-
tion within the borders of modern-day Germany, increased both demand for a new
paradigm and respect for new institutional rules of international relations in Eu-
rope.37 Furthermore, among the elites, the Thirty Years’ War was seen as an ex-
37Estimates of population loss range from 10 per cent to 45 per cent (Theibault, 1997).
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ample of how not to wage war, an example of the dangers of religious passions and
mercenary armies (Philpott, 2001).
Among the changes agreed at Westphalia was the principle of territoriality which
created at least a minimal requirement for a legitimate claim to territory. It tied
religious identities to territorial identities, increasing the need for religious homo-
geneity. The treaty obliged the king to have the same religious affiliation as that
of his polity (Wilson, 2009), thus reducing the incentives of changing faith to gain
power. Furthermore, it outlawed the use of religious tension in neighbouring coun-
tries as a legitimate reason for engagement in civil wars. Together with the further
delegitimization of mercenary armies, these measures effectively decreased the insur-
rection constraint, as religious minorities lost their ability to further the interests of
foreign powers as strategic “jus ad bellum” as a pretext to go to war.
The model points to how lower insurrection constraints will lead to lower prevalence
of non-state morality, either through a quicker convergence towards an equilibrium
or by enabling the authority to impose a program towards the gunpoint equilibrium.
Hence, the model can account for how the Peace of Westphalia increased internal
homogenization as a consequence of the delegitimization of religious schisms as a
pretext for foreign involvement in internal conflicts.38
38The potentiality of foreign powers using religious schisms to legitimize military action in Con-
tinental Europe, and the absence of this risk in Britain as an island nation with strong natural
borders, might potentially provide another piece of the puzzle in understanding the comparative
early emergence of elite intentions to achieve religious tolerance in Britain.
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While attempts to homogenize the Holy Roman Empire led to insurrection, foreign
involvement and subsequent religious division of the Empire, the potential Huguenot
mobilization could not be turned into a pretext for foreign involvement and con-
sequently became a military threat to the French king under the new institutional
framework. This absence of threat from neighbouring countries greatly relaxed the
insurrection constraints as governments could focus on internal enemies when pursu-
ing homogenization, thus predicting a closer alignment between territory and state
moralities (Nexon, 2009).
The changing military technology, away from professionalized soldiers with train-
ing in the use of both firearms and swords, towards mass armies primarily reliant
on gunpowder, placed a higher military value on draftable citizens.39 In the lan-
guage of the model, changing military technology led to a higher ρ′(q∗(pi)) and the
insurrection constraint became more sensitive to the prevalence of state morality as
military capabilities became more sensitive to mass support. This, in turn, led to
an increase in demand for homogenization of populations, enabling the drafting of
large standing armies against external threats, which would propel the development
of consolidated states.
4.2. The Soviet secularization project 1922–1991
The Soviet authorities (β) had a clear and stated agenda to reduce the prevalence of
religious morality (a), and used coercion (pi) against the major religions of the USSR,
39The empirical relationship between military technology and the need for mass armies is dis-
cussed widely, from the classic Roberts (1954) to the recent economics literature, see for instance
Onorato, Scheve and Stasavage (2014).
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Christianity and Islam, in order to increase the prevalence of its own secular moral-
ity, communism (b).40 Similar to that of the Catholic kings of early modernity, the
approach towards religious communities in the USSR was initially very oppressive.
The Great Terror of the 1930s saw widespread killings and forced gulag encampment
of religious individuals who failed to denounce their religion. From 1937 onwards, the
Soviet authorities altered their policies towards religion. The combination of strong
coercive measures which proved inefficient according to the Soviet authorities’ own
1937 consensus and the need to apply religious and national sentiments at the be-
ginning of the second world war(WWII), moved secularization measures from severe
and strongly coercive, to unconfrontational and less malignant (Froese, 2008).41
Data from Froese (2008) shows how religious morality (q) in the USSR decreased
as a consequence of deliberate Soviet policies to reduce its prevalence (see Figure
3.), while it increased again after the fall of the Soviet Union following the cessation
of anti-religious policies (pi) (see Figure 4.). All in all, the attempt to secularize
Christian regions of Soviet society was successful in that it led to a drastic reduction
in the prevalence of religious morality, but it did not lead to full removal of religious
sentiment.
40Implicitly, we here assume that communism can be understood as a set of internalized values
on par with religion; indeed, the Soviet authorities themselves saw it this way Kula (2005).
41Illustrative of the approach of the authorities are the names of the atheist movement founded
by the USSR authorities. Before 1920 the organization of atheists was named League of Militant
Atheists, literally translated from Russian: League of the Militant Godless. It was disbanded at the
onset of WWII when the secularization project was put on hold. A subsequent atheist organization
founded after WWII was named the Knowledge Society.
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Figure 3: Religious affiliation with all religions before the Soviet Union, during the Russian Empire
(1900), is shown as the bottom blue bars and in the Soviet Union (1970) is shown as the top red
bars
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Figure 4: Affiliation with the majority religion in the Soviet Union (1970) is shown as the top red
bars and after the Soviet Union in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (1995) is shown
as the bottom blue bars. Source: Froese (2008). All Christian countries have Orthodox Christianity
as the majority religion except Lithuania which is Roman Catholic and Latvia which is Lutheran,
while all Muslim countries in the Soviet Union have Sunni Islam as their majority religion except
for Azerbaijan, which is of the Shia Islamic faith.
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The Soviet authorities and Christian churches
From 1937 onwards the major Christian churches of the Soviet Union were able to
continue their practice, albeit facing censorship and demands from the authorities
to serve the purposes of the Communist Party. The high degree of organization and
internal hierarchies meant that both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Catholic
Church were forced to become integrated into the Soviet system and continue their
practice while facing strong censorship. Protestantism and other less hierarchical
Christian communities were often strengthened by feelings of spite towards the So-
viet authorities’ anti-religious policies, i.e., a response to the level of coercion. To
the extent that religion persisted in the predominantly Christian parts of the So-
viet Union, it did so largely by the use of what Greif and Tadelis (2010) refer to as
crypto-morality: hidden from the public eye.
The persistence of religion was stronger in areas where churches were aligned with
other cleavages relative to the Russian amalgamate of identities associated with the
Soviet rule. This was especially true where the church was seen as opposing the
state; one example is membership of the autonomous Lithuanian Roman Catholic
Church, which was seen as synonymous with resistance to the Soviet authorities
Froese (2008). This suggests that where the framing of religious persistence was
aligned with other in-group and out-group dynamics, the cultural difference, ∆u,
towards secular USSR identity was higher. A possible explanation is that, as the
framework predicts, a higher ∆u leads to a higher prevalence of non-state moral-
ity, qt, which gave members of these communities a higher utility in rejecting the
authority in terms of social recognition and led to more visible resentment towards
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anti-religious policies.
Coercion resentment in Central Asia region of the Soviet Union
The secularization policies towards the Muslims in Central Asia were even more cau-
tious than towards the predominantly Christian Orthodox part of the Soviet Union.
In Central Asia, the insurrection risk was higher because of the weaker military pres-
ence and larger cultural differences between the local Muslim morality and the secular
Communist morality, ∆u. The potential gains for the local population from Soviet
rule, modernization and economic development, were higher than in the Baltic re-
gions. Hence, in accordance with predictions from the classic Nash bargaining model
(Nash, 1953), Communist and local leaders on both sides had poor outside options
and better incentives to co-operate, contributing to a climate of communication be-
tween elites that was comparatively more benign than that between Moscow and
Baltic elites.
Froese (2008) describes how Soviet and Muslim authorities found common ground.
Although the Communist agenda in the long run was to destroy Islam, which they
saw as prejudice against reason, Lenin described “Muslim folk heroes as emblematic
of the human struggle against oppression”, while Muslim scholars noted that Islam
could justify “even the rule of a usurper as means of assuring the public order and the
unity of all Muslims”. The tone between the Soviet and Muslim authorities can be
read between the lines in a letter from the Central Religious Muslim Board in 1942
to Stalin, “...champion of liberation of oppressed peoples and a man ever attentive to
the need of the peoples...May Allah bring your work to a victorious end.”(Marshall,
Bird and Blane, 1971). Implicitly, the council signalled that they were sympathetic
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to Stalin’s cause, but that he will not succeed without the assistance of Allah (Froese,
2008).
The Soviet authorities framed communism as modernization, sweetening the deal
of Soviet rule with promises of economic development to gain the partial support of
Islamic intellectuals in Central Asia (Northrop, 2001). Policies such as the removal
of Muslim courts were cautiously framed as modernization and done in co-operation
with moderate Islamists. Stalin initially allied with Muslim modernization move-
ments, most notably the Jadidism movement which sought to “rationalize Islam,
to purify it and bring it into line with the modern era” through “progress, devel-
opment and growth”. Although the secularization of the Central Asian USSR was
deliberately nonconfrontational, there were, however, clear reactions to the Soviet
anti-religious policy. An illustrative example of this is the violent reactions to the
1920s Hujum policy of having Muslim women remove their veils (Northrop, 2001).
Stalin would later deceive his former Jadid allies and purge most of its leadership on
suspicion of their ambitions for further national independence for the Central Asian
republics (Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, 1967). Stalin’s fears of growing
demands for autonomy were not unfounded; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay
(1967) describe how Muslim national identities that were barely present in 1917
emerged in part as a result of the anti-religious policies to gain increasing salience
in 1967. They account for this effect by what they describe as “resentment against
cultural and administrative domination of the Russians”, sentiments that could be
turned into momentum for an insurrection against the USSR.
However, the promises of development and growth were not reneged by the So-
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viet authorities; they trusted that their Muslim counterparts would not attempt to
secede enough to endow them with a more working economy. This growth happened
alongside positive social changes in Central Asian USSR; for instance, women were
given a comparatively independent role and educational levels were increased, further
integrating Central Asian USSR with Moscow. Together with the strengthening of
Russian military capability, these changes made any threat of cessation less realistic
(Conquest, 1970).
Stalin either persecuted in a heavy-handed manner or kept a nonconfrontational
approach. This implies that he avoided a mid interval of coercion, in line with the
model’s prediction of authorities avoiding the inefficient (piq, pi
e
q) interval where la-
tent strategic constraints are in place. While the treatment of Muslims in Central
Asia was relatively benign, the treatment of smaller groups of Muslims in the south-
western region of Russia, such as the Crimean Tartar and the Chechens, was much
more coercive and confrontational: forced deportations and subsequent expropria-
tion of land were the primary instruments (Conquest, 1970). The potential threat
of the Russian Muslim population in the south-west, and Caucasus allying with the
Germans, were used as a pretext for deportations, but this motive cannot explain
why the differential treatment persisted after the end of WWII. The comparative
differences may be explained by the Soviet authorities being aware of an inefficient
interval of coercion (piq, pi
e
q) and restraining their use of coercion as a response to an
insurrection constraint in Central Asia, while pursuing levels beyond pieq in Europe,
where they had no strategic constraints. Assuming that Stalin perceived the response
to coercion as stable across regions, this historical evidence supports Proposition 2
and indicates that the combination of cultural differences and a negative response to
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coercion was sufficiently hostile as to fall under class II) in the USSR.42
5. Concluding remarks
We have developed a model that demonstrates how the micro foundations of coercion
resentment can be used to understand the macrodynamics of legitimacy-maximizing
authorities. We have argued that the assessed monarchs of Early Modernity and
Stalin restrained their use of coercion in response to strategic constraints in a way
that is explainable by our theoretical framework.
The model implicitly assumes atomized agents and abstracts from dynamics of legit-
imacy caused by communities, organizational structure, framing or strategic interac-
tion between elites. These implicit simplifications are justified as long as community
leaders are equally good at maximizing their own influence by playing on salient
cleavages. If both moralities have leaders that frame situations equally well in terms
of creating saliency, then the underlying potential for a cleavage will be the relevant
mechanism at play. In other words, if one considers the “facts on the ground”, i.e.,
the actual given potential for action, the cards in the hands of the community lead-
ers, then, if, on average, they play their cards equally well, the mechanisms in the
model will be the driving factors.
42The disparately harsher treatment of the eastern Muslims continued after the end of WWII,
pointing to an additional consideration for Stalin’s differential treatment, the heightened need for
greater legitimacy and a stronger capability for coercion in Europe. Stalin also gained an additional
benefit from coercing the eastern Muslims; it sent a credible signal about the cost of collaboration
with competing authorities to other minority communities.
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There are several potential extensions of this model that can address related ques-
tions in future research.
Parental preferences for coercion: An applied problem is considering that the par-
ents of state morality can fully or partially set the coercion level. In the model here
developed parents of the state morality will need lower levels of parental socialization
to attain their preferred morality in an equilibrium with positive levels of coercion.43
Assuming that the majority of parents do not have utility in the outcomes of the
state, parents of state morality will prefer the coercion level that balances the trade-
off between private preferences for lowered socialization and social preferences for
future generations of state and non-state morality children and parents. Exploring a
model where parents can set coercion levels in conjunction with historical evidence
can shed light on processes where democracies become coercive or authoritarian.
Further theoretical work along these lines can address the question of to what extent
totalitarian policies emerge from political demand or political supply.
Evolutionary properties of state competition: note how the model predictions hold in
a framework where authorities are na¨ıve about the effect of coercion; authorities that
impose coercion levels within the set of implementable coercion levels will endure,
and others perish from insurrections. Future theoretical analyses that apply the set
of implementable coercion levels can tie together empirical evidence of historic and
pre-historic processes of state competition in new ways. For instance, consider an
extension of this model where populations of polities of uniform size and initial con-
43This holds as long as the state morality is also the majority morality. If the state morality is a
minority, the issue depends on functional form i.e. socialization responses to the use of coercion.
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ditions compete. Assume that the authorities are na¨ıve about the effect of coercion
but able to use military capabilities externally to overtake neighbouring states. The
population of polities in such a model presumably will, over time, converge towards
only polities that impose the dynamically stable equilibria; room for deviation from
optimal polices will grow with differences in the relative sizes of polities and their
initial conditions. Hence, it appears that the proposed equilibria can arise from state
competition, in line with the arguments set forth in Tilly (1992), even under condi-
tions of na¨ıvete´ about the effects of, and constraints on, coercion.
Costly coercion under discounting: exogenous variations in insurrection costs, varia-
tions in the benefits of legitimacy of the authority and variations in seceding for the
minority can arise from factors such as rough terrain or rents from natural resources.
Hence, there are reasons to assume that the set of implementable coercion levels
might be different for authorities with access to the same military technology, and
that authorities might choose to impose different coercion levels because of differences
in benefits, costs or legitimacy.44 Furthermore, under costly coercion, equilibrium
outcomes will also be determined by the time preferences of the authority; there will
be a trade-off between the discounted future benefit of legitimacy and the present
cost of coercion. This could account for why different dynastic structures, i.e., with
more or less direct hereditariness of power, could lead to different policies. In modern
44 An extended model that includes these properties could provide a micro foundation to Barfield
(2010)’s explanation of the high ethnolinguistic variance in Afghanistan. He places emphasis on
how rough terrain, giving a low insurgency cost compared with the low value of attaining legitimacy,
together with multiple historic influences, i.e., multiple seed moralities, and low benefits of having
legitimacy, have contributed to the large cultural heterogeneity observed in Afghanistan.
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democracies, such differences in incorporating the future can arise from variations
between candidate politics versus party politics.
Strategic aspects of multiple competing authorities: technology and the composition
of multiple ethnic groups might make the set of sustainable coercion levels empty for
any single authority; hence in some instances, creating strategic coalitions between
authorities is a necessity for establishing a sustainable state. The model could be
extended towards a co-operative game theory framework to analyze the strategic
dimensions of internal and external competing authorities under varying insurrec-
tion constraints. This can address questions such as sustainable polity borders and
how intervention in polities with multiple authorities should optimally apply local
power structures.45 Furthermore, the endogenous treatment of morality prevalence
enables the framework to identify a peace agreement between competing authorities
that will not be sustainable in the long term; i.e., when long-term changes in the
prevalence of moralities will affect power balances to render a previous agreement an
out-of-equilibrium outcome.
Framing and timing of coercion: it seems likely that effects such as cultural memory,
incentives of community leaders and sluggishness in investment in military technol-
ogy, change the effect of coercion and consequently the set of implementable coercion
45 Expert on state development in Africa, Robert H. Bates, predicts that the key to understanding
the structure of wars in Africa versus Europe lies in understanding that the Peace of Westphalia
constrained the European elites in terms of using neighbouring ethnic cleavages to further their
cause (Weingast and Wittman, 2008). Use of ethnic conflicts in the search for influence has generally
been a major cause of instability in central Africa; one example is the conflict in eastern Congo
(1998–2003).
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levels. Furthermore, different programs in terms of how gradual changes are and how
they can be framed, will imply that the set of reachable coercion levels will differ
for different strategies and different pre-histories. Explicit modelling of the effects
of timing and framing of coercion can be applied to understand how short-term pro-
cesses determine convergence towards the long-run equilibria.
Strategic conditions of coercion reliance: which strategic pre-histories are conducive
for authorities establishing coercion reliant states? Addressing this question can
complement the rich and established literature on the path to inclusive institutions
from a new angle: how did authorities strongly reliant on coercion arrive in this sit-
uation? Furthermore, it can potentially give theoretical insights into which paths of
state development lead to malignant outcomes, and at what critical junctures these
paths can be avoided.
The framework’s explicit modelling of population responses, together with the possi-
bility of strategic analysis, makes it a potential tool for policy analysis for an external
agency constraining an authority’s use of coercion. Generally, limiting the level of
accepted coercion will depend on the views of external agencies about the ratio of
the cost of commission versus the cost of omission, i.e., the cost of limiting coercion
and the benefit of limiting the suffering caused by coercion itself. Further research
can develop a theory that incorporates ethnic compositions and power relations as
inputs to predict the initial states, i.e., polity borders that can create sustainable
uncoercive states, the cost of reaching these states and where the pitfalls of state
failure lie.
Building and empirically investigating general models of these dynamics play an
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important role in using the conflicts of the past to avoid conflicts in the future, and
to further understand how diversity of moralities can be an equilibrium outcome in
the face of legitimacy-maximizing authorities. Although technology, beliefs and insti-
tutions change, as long as human nature remains stable, the past will be informative
of the future. From understanding democratic transitions to policy recommenda-
tions in states such as Syria and Afghanistan, legitimacy and its dynamics remain
an important phenomenon.
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7. Appendix 1: Proofs
7.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1: The smallest group always invests more in parental socialization: τ bt ≤ τat
if and only if qt ≤ (1− qt).
Proof: Suppose qt < (1 − qt), it then follows from (6) that H ′(τ bt ) < H ′(τat ). By
the Inada condition of H ′′(τm) ≥ 0 in Assumption 3, it follows that τ bt < τat . The
only if part follows from the fact that there are only two moralities.

7.2. Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2: There is a unique stable interior SSE at q∗ = 1
2
.
Proof: We show that for (i) there exists a unique interior SSE at q∗ = 1
2
, (ii)
and that it is stable.
(i) Existence and uniqueness of an interior q∗ = 1
2
.
An SSE level of q, denoted q∗, is reached when qt = qt+1. It follows from (3),
qt+1 = qt + qt(1− qt)(τa− τ b) that for qt = qt+1 to be fulfilled, qt(1− qt)(τa− τ b) = 0
must hold. Hence, at any interior SSE, i.e., q∗ ∈ (0, 1), τa = τ b. From (6), it follows
that this implies qt = (1− qt), which gives q∗ = 12 .
(ii) Stability of q∗ = 1
2
.
We will show that for any qt ∈ (0, 1) 6= q∗ there will be convergence towards q∗.
Suppose qt > q
∗, it then follows from (6) that H ′(τ bt ) < H
′(τat ). By Lemma 1 it
follows that τ bt > τ
a
t . By (3), qt+1 < qt when τ
b
t < τ
a
t and qt+1 < qt for τ
b
t > τ
a
t . Thus,
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any qt ∈ (0, 1) will converge to q∗. In other words, (0, 1) is a q∗ basin of attraction.

7.3. Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3: For all pairs of {pi,∆u}, two exterior SSEs exist. For some, but not all,
pairs of {pi,∆u} a unique stable interior SSE exists, given by q∗(pi) = ∆u−pi+C(pi)
2∆u+C(pi)
.
Proof: (i) For all pairs of {pi,∆u}, two exterior SSEs exist.
By definition, a SSE is given by qt = qt+1. For qt ∈ {0, 1}, (3) implies that qt = qt+1
for any pair of {pi,∆u}.
(ii) For some, but not all, pairs of {pi,∆u}, a unique stable interior SSE exists,
given by q∗(pi) = ∆u−pi+C(pi)
2∆u+C(pi)
.
Suppose ∆u
′−pi′+C(pi′)
2∆u′+C(pi′) =
1
2
and that {pi′,∆u′} is the imposed pi and ∆u. We now show
that this implies there exists an SSE where q∗(pi′) = 1
2
.
Consider qt =
1
2
. As ∆u′ − pi′ + C(pi′) = 1 > 0, (10) implies that τa > 0 for
qt > 0. As ∆u
′ + pi′ > 0, we see from (11) that τb > 0 for (1− qt) > 0. For qt = 12 to
be an SSE, it follows from (3) that τa = τb. This implies the left side of (10) should
equal the left side of (11). Under qt =
1
2
, this gives 1
2
(∆u−pi′+C(pi′)) = 1
2
(∆u+pi′).
This implies 2pi′ = C(pi′), which is consistent with ∆u
′−pi′+C(pi′)
2∆u′+C(pi′) =
1
2
.46
Uniqueness of the interior SSE q∗(pi) is trivially given by the fact that q∗(pi) =
46This argument holds mutatis mutandis for any q∗(pi′′) = ∆u
′′−pi′′+C(pi′′)
2∆u′′+C(pi′′) =
m
n ∈ (0, 1) and
qt =
m
n . Hence, for any {∆u′′, pi′′} such that q∗(pi′′) = ∆u
′′−pi′′+C(pi′′)
2∆u′′+C(pi′′) ∈ (0, 1), an internal SSE
exists.
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∆u−pi+C(pi)
2∆u+C(pi)
is a single-valued function. The equilibrium is stable as (0, 1) is a q∗(pi)
basin of attraction following the lines of the argument in the proof of Lemma 2 part
(ii).
We finally show that for some {pi′′,∆u′′}, no interior SSE exists. Suppose {pi′′,∆u′′}
is such that ∆u′′−pi′′+C(pi′′) ≤ 0. By (10) and the Inada assumption that H ′(0) = 0
and limτ→1H ′(τ) = ∞, it follows that τa = 0 for all qt. As ∆u > 0 by Assumption
1, it follows from (11) that τb > 0 for all qt. It follows from (3) that if τa 6= τb for all
qt, no interior SSE exists.

7.4. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4: Imposing a coercion level pi′ corresponding to an interior SSE, q∗(pi′) ∈
(0, 1), from an initial interior SSE, q∗(pi0), will make q converge to q∗(pi′).
Proof: Assume the population is in some interior q∗(pi0), and at time t = 0 a
pi′ 6= pi0 : q∗(pi′) ∈ (0, 1) is imposed. As pi′ 6= pi0 and there is a unique inte-
rior SSE by Lemma 3, the FOC conditions for an SSE cannot be fulfilled, i.e.,
q0(∆u−pi′+C(pi′)) 6= (1− q0)(∆u+pi′) at time t = 0. This implies H ′(τ bt ) 6= H ′(τat );
because of the Inada conditions on H(·) it follows that τ bt 6= τat , and by (3) it follows
that q1 6= q∗(pi0). We define the following sequence of q0, q1...qN values under pi′ as
{q0, q1......qN , pi′} ≡ {qt}pi′ .
We first establish that (i), any qt in {qt}pi′ will move in the direction of q∗(pi′);
(ii), no qt ∈ {qt}pi′ is equal to the absorbing state exterior SSE qt ∈ {0, 1}; and
finally (iii), that qt → q∗(pi′).
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(i) Any qt ∈ {qt}pi′ will move in the direction of q∗(pi′).
By qt moving in the direction of q
∗(pi′), we mean that if qt > q∗(pi′) then qt > qt+1
and if qt < q
∗(pi′), then qt < qt+1.
First, note that as qt = q
∗(pi′), as established in the proof of Lemma 3, it holds that
(1− q∗(pi′))(∆u− pi′+C(pi′)) = q∗(pi′)(∆u+ pi′), as follows from the proof of Lemma
3. Suppose qt > q
∗(pi′). It then follows that (1− qt)(∆u− pi′ +C(pi′)) < qt(∆u+ pi′)
which, by (10) and (11), implies H ′(τa) < H ′(τb). It follows from the Inada condition
of H ′(·) > 0 that this implies τ bt > τat . Suppose qt < q∗(pi′), then the opposite holds.
By (3) it holds that qt < qt+1 when τ
b
t < τ
a
t and qt > qt+1, if τ
b
t > τ
a
t .
(ii) No qt ∈ {qt}pi′ is equal to the absorbing state exterior SSE: qt ∈ {0, 1}.
We first show that an interior q∗(pi′) implies positive levels of socialization for both
groups at all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ , then, we demonstrate that this implies no exterior qt ∈ {0, 1}
is in {qt}pi′ .
As q∗(pi′) = ∆u
′−pi′+C(pi′)
2∆u′+C(pi′) ∈ (0, 1) it must hold that ∆u′+pi′ > 0 and ∆u′−pi′+C(pi′) >
0. The FOC conditions, (10) and (11) and the Inada condition H ′(0) = 0, implies
that τa > 0, τb > 0 for any qt > 0 when ∆u
′ + pi′ > 0 and ∆u′ − pi′ + C(pi′) > 0.
Hence, there will always be τat > 0, τ
b
t > 0 under pi
′ for all qt−1 > 0. As q0 ∈ (0, 1),
it follows that τa > 0, τb > 0 and qt−1 > 0 for all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ .
From (3), qt+1 = qt + qt(1 − qt)(τa − τ b). We see that an exterior q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1
cannot be reached from any interior qt ∈ (0, 1) if τa > 0, τ b > 0.
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(iii) qt → q∗(pi′).
This proof applies Proposition 1, Proposition 2 and the definition of cultural substi-
tution in Bisin and Verdier (2001 p 303–307). Following the proof of Proposition 2
in Bisin and Verdier (2001), we show that socialization level τ , as a function of qt,
satisfies the definition of cultural substitution in Bisin and Verdier (2001). It then
follows from Proposition 1 in Bisin and Verdier (2001) that this implies qt → q∗(pi′).
We define qat ≡ qt and qbt ≡ 1 − qt, and denote a portion of a morality m, qm.
The requirements for cultural substitution on page 303 in Bisin and Verdier (2001)
can be stated as: (i) τm = dm(qmt ), where d
m(qmt ) is a continuous function; (ii)
dm(1) = 0; and (iii) dm(qmt ) is strictly decreasing in q
m
t .
(i) τm = dm(qmt ) is a continuous function.
From (10) and (11) it follows that:
τa = H
′−1((1− qt)(∆u− pi′ + C(pi′)). (19)
τb = H
′−1(qt(∆u+ pi′)). (20)
We first show that H ′−1(·) is defined. First, note that the Inada conditions H ′(τ) ≥ 0,
H ′′(τ) > 0 and H ′(0) = 0, imply that H ′(·) > 0 for all τ other than τ = 0. The Inada
condition limτ→1H(τ) =∞ implies that H ′(τ) maps from [0, 1)→ [0,∞), H ′(0) = 0
and H ′′(·) > 0, implies H ′(·) has a continuous positive derivative. Hence, for every
qmt , H
′(·) assigns a unique value; i.e., H ′(·) is a one-to-one defined continuous inverse
function H ′−1(τm), mapping from [0, 1)→ [0,∞).
As everything inside H ′−1(·) in (19), (20) but qt remains fixed for all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ ,
and because q∗(pi′) > 0, implies that ∆u− pi′ + C(pi′) = Ka > 0, ∆u+ pi′ = Kb > 0;
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we can define H ′−1(qmKm) ≡ dm(qm). As qt ∈ (0, 1), we can write τa = da(qt) and
τ b = db(1− qt).
(ii) dm(1) = 0.
Following from (8) and (9), parents are indifferent between choosing some infinites-
imal amount of socialization and no socialization for qt ∈ {0, 1}. By assumption in
footnote 9 on page 18, we have assumed that it holds that τa = 0 for qt = 1 and
τ b = 0 for (1− qt) = 1, hence for qm = 1 it holds that τm = 0, i.e., dm(1) = 0.
(iii) dm(qm) is strictly decreasing in qm.
We see from (19) and (20) that ∂H
′−1((1−qt)K1)
∂qt
< 0 and ∂H
′−1(qtK2)
∂(1−qt) < 0 for all qt. From
the Inada assumptions H ′′(·) > 0 and H ′(·) ≥ 0, and we have established that H ′−1(·)
is continuously defined, therefore it follows that d′m(qm) < 0 for all qm ∈ (0, 1).
The rest of the proof follows directly from Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Proposi-
tion 1. Inserting τa = di(qt) and τ
b = di(1 − qt) into (3) and taking the continuous
time limit and denoting the continuous rate of change q˙, we attain equation (3) in
Bisin and Verdier (2001) on page 303:47
q˙ = q(1− q)[da(q)− db(1− q)]. (21)
From part (i) of the proof we have τa > τ b when qt < q
∗(pi) and vice versa, hence
it follows that da(1 − q) − db(q) > 0 for qt < q∗(pi), and da(1 − q) − db(q) < 0 for
q > q∗(pi). Similarly, from Lemma 3 we have da(1 − q∗(pi)) = db(q∗(pi)). Note that
47To see why the result is also valid for the discrete time case, see the discussion in Bisin and
Verdier (2001) in footnote 9 on page 303.
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∂q˙t
∂q
∣∣∣
q=0
= da(0) − db(1) > 0 and ∂q˙
∂q
∣∣∣
q=1
= db(0) − da(1) > 0 because dm(·) satisfies
cultural substitution. As q∗(pi) is unique, and (21) continuously maps from q into
q˙, the basin of attraction of q∗(pi′) under pi′ is (0, 1), which implies that qt → q∗(pi′)
(Bisin and Verdier, 2001).

7.5. Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5: Coercion is marginally effective at the beginning and end of [0, pimax],
and there is at least one level of coercion, pˆi, that is strictly marginally ineffective:
q∗′(pˆi) > 0.
Proof: Marginal effectiveness is defined as q∗′(pi) < 0. We show that Assumption
5 implies marginal effectiveness is negative at pˆi, and that marginal effectiveness of
coercion is positive at pi ∈ {0, pimax}. We first show that q∗′(pi) < 0 for pi ∈ {0, pimax}.
Generally, q∗′(pi) is given by:
q∗′(pi) =
(C ′(pi)− 2)∆u− C(pi) + piC ′(pi)
(C(pi) + 2∆u)2
. (22)
Assumption 6 implies C ′(pi) = 0 at pi ∈ {0, pimax}. Inserting C ′(pi) = 0 into (19)
gives:
q∗′(pi) =
−1
C(pi) + 2∆u
< 0. (23)
We now show that q∗′(pˆi) > 0. By the functional form assumption on (13) C ′′(pˆi) = 0
and by the C2 assumption on C(pi) in (12), there must be an open interval of 
length around pˆi, where C ′′(pi) = 0. In this interval the function is linear, hence we
can assume the coercion resentment function is C(pi) = K0 +K1pi for some K1. For
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C(pi) = K0 +K1pi the marginal effectiveness of coercion in pi
′, q∗′(pi′), is given by:
q∗′(pi′) =
(K1 − 2)∆u
(K1pi′ + 2∆u)2
. (24)
As the functional form assumptions of C(pi) made in (13) imply that C ′′(pi) is strictly
non-zero in [0, pˆi) and negative in (pˆi, pimax], it must be that C
′(pi) is at its maximum
value at pˆi. By the last part of Assumption 6 at least one pi′ ∈ (0, pimax) must have
C ′(pi) > 2, and the maximum of C ′(pi) is at pˆi. Hence, it must hold that C(pˆi) > 2.
Inserting K1 = 2 into (20), we attain q
∗′(pi) = 0, and because K1 = C(pˆi) > 2 it must
hold that q∗′(pˆi) > 0.

7.6. Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6: q∗(pi) is characterized by the following properties:
I) a unique global or local maximum(piq) and a unique global minimum(piq)
or
II) a unique global or local maximum(piq), a local minimum (piq), and a global, po-
tentially unique, minimum (pi′ ∈ [pieq , pimax])
or
III) a global minimum (pi′′ ∈ (0, pˆi), where q∗(pi′′) = 0).
In addition, there will always be a local or unique global maximum at q∗(0) = 1
2
.
Proof: We prove the lemma by (i) demonstrating the existence of extremal points
when q∗(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, pimax]. We then show that the classes are exhaustive of
all scenarios, by first (ii) noting what the sign of the derivative of q∗′(pi) over [0, pimax]
must be; we then use this to show (iii) that any possible q∗(0) +
∫ pimax
0
q∗′(pi)dpi will
place the functional form within either class I), II) or III). Finally, we show (iv) the
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uniqueness properties of the extremal points.
(i) Existence of extremal points
Suppose q∗(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, pimax]. We show that this implies there exists a
unique minimum in (0, pˆi), piq, and a unique maximum in (pˆi, pimax), piq, where pˆi is
the turning point of C ′′(pi).
We start by showing there is a unique minimum in [0, pˆi). First, we show there
exists at least one pi such that q∗′(pi) = 0 in [0, pˆi). We note from the proof of Lemma
5 that:
q∗′(pi) =
(C ′(pi)− 2)∆u+ piC ′(pi)− C(pi)
(C(pi) + 2∆u)2
. (25)
It follows from Lemma 5 that q∗′(0) < 0, which by (25) implies (C ′(0) − 2)∆u <
C(0). Similarly, it follows from Lemma 5 that q∗′(pˆi) > 0 which by (25) implies
(C ′(pˆi)−2)∆u+ pˆiC ′(pˆi) > C(pˆi). All functions are continuously defined by the C2 as-
sumption of C(pi) in (12), hence (C ′(pi)−2)∆u+piC ′(pi) and C(pi) must cross at (0, pˆi),
giving q∗′(pi) = 0 for some pi ∈ [0, pˆi). We denote this pi value piq. We now show that
piq is a unique value. Note that, following from Assumption 1, (12) and (13), we have
∆u > 0, C ′′(pi) > 0 for pi ∈ [0, pˆi), and C ′(pi) > 0. This implies that the derivative of
(C ′(pi)−2)∆u+piC ′(pi), C ′′(pi)∆u+C ′(pi)+piC ′′(pi) is strictly larger than the deriva-
tive of C(pi), C ′(pi), for all pi ∈ [0, pˆi). This implies C(pi) and (C ′(pi)−2)∆u+piC ′(pi)
can only cross once at [0, pˆi) and consequently, piq is unique. Finally, we show that
the unique q∗′(piq) = 0 in [0, pˆi) is a minimum. Note that the derivative of C(pi) is
always smaller than the derivative of (C ′(pi)− 2)∆u+ piC ′(pi). Considering (25), we
see that q∗′(0) > 0, q∗′(pˆi) < 0 and 0 < pˆi imply that (C ′(pi)− 2)∆u + piC ′(pi) starts
from an initial lower value at pi = 0, surpasses C(pi) at piq, and is strictly larger than
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C(pi) for pi ∈ (piq, pˆi]. Considering (25), we see this implies q∗′′(pi) > 0 for pi ∈ (piq, pˆi],
q∗′(pi) > 0 for any pi > piq, and q∗′(pi) < 0 for any pi < piq. Hence, piq is a unique
minimum in [0, pˆi).
We now show the existence of a unique maximum point in (pˆi, pimax]. Note that it
follows from (12) and (13) that C ′′(pi) < 0 for pi ∈ (pˆi, pimax], C(0) ≥ 0 and C ′(pi) > 0.
This implies that q′′∗(pi) = C
′′(pi)(∆u+pi)−C′(pi)2(C(pi)+2∆u)
(C(pi)+2∆u)4
< 0 for pi ∈ (pˆi, pimax]. From
Lemma 5 it follows that q∗′(pˆi) > 0 and q∗′(pimax) < 0. Hence, q∗′(pi) is continuous
and strictly decreasing in pi ∈ (pˆi, pimax] from strictly positive to strictly negative,
hence there must be one, and only one, pi′ ∈ (pˆi, pimax) such that q∗′(pi′) = 0. This pi′
is defined as piq, the unique maximum in (pˆi, pimax].
48
(ii) The sign of q∗′(pi)
First, note that from part (i) of the proof we have piq < pˆi < piq. From Lemma 5
and part (i) of the proof, it follows that q∗′(pi) is strictly increasing from q∗′(0) < 0
to q∗′(piq) = 0 and onward to q∗′(pˆi) > 2, and strictly decreasing from q∗′(pˆi) > 2 to
q∗′(piq) = 0 and onward to q∗(pimax) < 0. Hence, if q∗(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ [0, pimax],
then we note the following.
q∗′(pi) < 0 for all pi ∈ [0, piq)
q∗′(pi) > 0 for all pi ∈ (piq, piq)
q∗′(pi) < 0 for all pi ∈ (piq, pimax]
48 As limpimax→∞
∆u−pimax+C(pimax)
2∆u+C(pimax)
< 1 for all ∆u ∈ [0,∞), the exterior q∗(pi) = 1 can never be
reached; it consequently holds that q∗(piq) ∈ (0, 1).
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(iii) q∗(pi) will be characterized by functional form class I), II) or III)
We first show that if piq is not defined, then the functional form is of class III). We
than show that if piq is defined it implies that q
∗(pi) is characterized by class I) or
class II). We then establish when q∗(pi) is characterized by class I) or class II).
Note that from part (i) of the proof we have q∗′(0) < 0 and q∗′′(0) > 0. If q∗(pi′′) = 0
for some pi′′ in the interval [0, pˆi), where q∗′(pi) < 0 such that q∗(0)+
∫ pi′′
0
q∗′(pi)dpi = 0
then, because q∗′(piq) = 0 and q∗′(piq) > 0 by definition, piq is not defined. Then q∗(pi)
is at a global minimum at this pi′′ and the functional form is of class III).
If there is no pi′′ ∈ [0, pˆi], while q∗′(pi) < 0 such that q∗(pi′′) = 0 exists, then q∗′(pi′) = 0
where q∗(pi′) > 0 exists, and this pi′ is piq. As q∗′(pi) > 0 for (piq, piq), q∗(pi) > 0 for all
pi ∈ [0, pˆi], it then follows from part (i) of the proof that there exist piq ∈ (0, pˆi) and
piq ∈ (pˆi, pimax).
We note that once q∗(pi) = 0, the SSE for any pi is zero. Thus, q∗(pi) ceases to
change with pi once it reaches 0. Hence, we can impose q∗′(pi) = 0 for any q∗(pi) = 0
such that we can define integrals of q∗′(pi) for pi ∈ [0, pimax], even if q∗(pi) = 0 for
some pi ∈ [0, pimax]. Hence, we can write the integral of q∗(pi) over [0, pimax] for any
functional form of q∗(pi) where piq and piq are defined as follows.
q∗(0) +
∫ piq
0
q∗′(pi)dpi +
∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi +
∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi (26)
We know the sign of q∗′(pi) in each interval from part (ii) of the proof. As piq is
defined, it follows that q∗(0) +
∫ piq
0 q
∗′(pi)dpi > 0.
We note the definition of pieq is piq < pi
e
q and q
∗(pieq) ≡ q∗(piq). If
∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi +
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∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi ≤ 0, then, because all functions are continuous, q∗(pieq) must be de-
fined. Considering (26) and part (ii) of the proof, we see this implies that q∗(pi) has
two minima, piq and some pi
′ : pi′ ≥ pieq , and one interior maximum, piq. This implies
that the functional form falls within class II).
If
∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi +
∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi > 0, then there will be no q∗(pi′) where pi′ > piq;
i.e., pieq is not defined. Considering (26), we see this implies that all pi
′ > piq have
the property q∗(pi′) > q∗(piq), i.e., q∗(pi) has only one minimum, piq, and one interior
maximum, piq. This implies that the functional form lies within class I).
(iv) Properties of the extremal points
Following from the lemma and the sign of q∗′(pi) noted in part (ii) of the proof, there
are five possible extremal points, two maximum points pi ∈ {0, piq}, and three possi-
ble minimum points pi ∈ {pi′, piq, pi′′}, where pi′ ∈ [pieq , pimax] and pi′′ ∈ (0, piq). We here
establish the properties of the points of importance in the lemma: pi ∈ {pi′, piq, piq, pi′′}.
We first show the properties of pi′′ ∈ (0, piq). If follows from part (iii) of the proof
that if pi′′ is defined, it implies q∗(pi′′) = 0, hence pi′′ is always a global minimum.
We now show when q∗(piq) is a local or global maximum. We have already es-
tablished in part (i) that piq is the only interior maximum point. From the sign of
q∗′(pi) over [0, pimax] noted in part (ii) of the proof, it follows that the other possible
maximum point lies at q∗(0). If q∗(0) < q∗(piq), piq is a unique global maximum; if
q∗(0) ≥ q∗(piq) then q∗(piq) is a local maximum.
We now show when q∗(piq) is a unique global, non-unique global or local minimum.
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Suppose that
∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi +
∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi > 0. From part (iii) of the proof this
implies a functional form of class I), and piq is the only minimum and hence a unique
global minimum point. Suppose
∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi+
∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi = 0, then piq is a non-
unique global minimum, because it must then hold that q∗(piq) = q∗(pimax). Suppose∫ piq
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi +
∫ pimax
piq
q∗′(pi)dpi < 0, then piq is a non-unique local minimum because
this implies there exists a pi′ such that q∗(piq) < q∗(pi′).
We now show q∗(pi′) where pi′ ∈ [pieq , pimax] is a global minimum. As q∗′(pi) < 0
for pi ∈ (piq, pimax) as established in (ii) of the proof, this minimum is unique global
if pi′ = pimax and q∗(pi′) < q∗(piq). The minimum pi′ is non-unique global if pi′ < pimax;
this implies q∗(pi′′′′) = 0 for all pi′′′′ ≤ pi′. The minimum pi′ is also non-unique global
if q∗(pi′) = q∗(piq) and pi′ = pimax, as follows from the preceding discussion of the
properties of piq.

7.7. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: Let pi′ denote a level of coercion such that q∗(pi′) = 0. The optimal
level of coercion under no constraint, piNC , will be as follows for the different classes
of q∗(pi):
I) piNC = piq,
II) piNC = pi′ ∈ (pieq , pimax), if no pi′ is defined then piNC = pimax,
III) piNC = pi′ < piq, where pi′ is always defined.
Proof: This proof follows from Lemma 6 and the assumption that the authority
is minimizing q∗(pi), as captured in (7).

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7.8. Proof of Corollary of Proposition 1
Corollary of Proposition 1: An authority facing no constraint on coercion will only
restrain its use of coercion when SSE q∗(pi) is of class I).
Proof: A restraint on coercion implies a coercion level pi′ being strictly smaller than
the highest implementable coercion level with a non-zero q∗(pi). It follows directly
from Proposition 1 that this only occurs under q∗(pi) of class I).

7.9. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: If a constraint affects coercion use under an exogenous constraint,
ρ ≤ piNC and ρ 6= pieq , the following holds.
(i) piEC = ρ if and only if ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq).
(ii) piEC = piq < ρ if and only if ρ ∈ (piq, pieq).
Proof: We first note the three possible scenarios of piEC of ρ ∈ [0, pimax], and then
demonstrate parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition.
If the authority is minimizing q∗(pi) by (7) and Lemma 6, it follows that if ρ 6= pieq
and ρ ≤ piNC then there are three different scenarios of ρ ∈ [0, pimax] as follows.
I) ρ ∈ [0, piq]→ piEC = ρ.
From part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 6, it holds that q∗′(pi) < 0 for all pi ∈ [0, piq).
Hence, the minimal q∗(pi) for ρ ∈ (0, piq) is always equal to ρ.
II) ρ ∈ (piq, pieq)→ piEC = piq < ρ.
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By the proof of Lemma 6 part (iii), piq is the minimum value in [0, pimax], un-
less pieq is defined. By definition pi
e
q is a unique pi value larger than piq, such that
q∗(pieq) = q
∗(piq), which follows from (26) and the proof of Lemma 6 part (ii). Hence,
for every pi′ ∈ (piq, pieq) it holds that q∗(pi′) > q∗(piq) and piq must be the minimum of
the open interval of [0, pieq).
III) ρ ∈ (pieq , pimax]→ piEC = ρ.
From part (ii) of the proof of Lemma 6, q∗′(pi) < 0 for all pi ∈ (piq, pimax] because
pieq ∈ (piq, pimax) any pi′ > pieq implies q∗(pieq) > q∗(pi′). By Lemma 6 it follows that
pi = piq is the minimum of pi ∈ [0, pieq). As q∗(piq) ≡ q∗(pieq) by definition in (14), the
minimum q∗(pi) when choosing a piEC ∈ [0, ρ], where ρ ∈ (pieq , pimax] is ρ.
Note that ρ ∈ [0, piq] or ρ ∈ (pieq , pimax] implies ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq). Thus I) and III) can
be combined so that the different scenarios of ρ ∈ [0, pimax] can be stated in the
following.
ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq)→ piEC = ρ (27)
ρ ∈ (piq, pieq)→ piEC = piq < ρ (28)
Note that the proposition states that ρ 6= pieq , and I) implies that ρ = piq → piEC =
piq = ρ. Thus, (28) and (27) cover all possible scenarios of pi
EC for ρ ∈ [0, pimax],
which implies the following.
piEC = ρ→ ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq) (29)
piEC = piq < ρ→ ρ ∈ (piq, pieq) (30)
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Part (i) of the proposition follows from (27) and (29). Part (ii) of the proposition
follows from (28) and (30).

7.10. Proof of Corollary of Proposition 2
Corollary of Proposition 2: An authority will restrain its use of coercion as a re-
sponse to a constraint if and only if the q∗(pi) is of class II) and the constraint is in
the inefficient interval of coercion, ρ ∈ (piq, pieq).
Proof: We first note that by definition on page 28, an authority exhibiting restraint
as a response to the constraint, imposes piEC , that is:
1. a response to a constraint: a piEC that is different than the optimal adjustment
without constraints, piEC 6= piNC
2. a restraint: a piEC strictly lower than its highest implementable level, piEC < ρ ≤
pimax.
We first show the if part, that q∗(pi) is of class II) and ρ ∈ (piq, pieq) implies a re-
straint on coercion as a response to a constraint. We then show the only if part
by first demonstrating that if ρ /∈ (piq, pieq) then there is no restraint on coercion.
Finally, we show that if q∗(pi) of class I) or class III) and ρ ∈ (piq, pieq), then piEC is
not a response to a constraint.
If q∗(pi) is in class II) and ρ ∈ (piq, pieq), then from part (ii) of Proposition 2 piEC =
piq < ρ. Then pi
EC is a restraint as a response to a constraint, because piEC = piq <
pieq < pi
NC .
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If ρ /∈ (piq, pieq) and ρ 6= pieq , then piEC = ρ by part (i) of Proposition 2; hence,
piEC is not a restraint. If piNC = piEC = {pieq , piq}, then piEC is not a response to a
constraint.
If q∗(pi) is of class I) and ρ ∈ (piq, pieq), then from propositions 1 and 2 we have
piNC = piEC = piq. Thus, pi
EC is not a response to a constraint. If q∗(pi) is of class
III) and ρ ∈ (piq, pieq), then by propositions 1 and 2 piNC = piEC = pi′ < ρ where
q∗(pi′) = 0; consequently, piEC is not a response to a constraint.

7.11. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Weak coercion reliance occurring without strong coercion reliance im-
plies a strictly marginally inefficient interval of coercion between intervals of marginal
effective coercion levels.
Proof: Strong coercion reliance implies pi = 0 is an unsustainable level of coercion.
Weak coercion reliance implies there exists pi′ < pi0 such that pi′ ∈ [0, pi0) is unsus-
tainable. Weak coercion reliance without strong coercion reliance implies pi = 0 is a
sustainable level of coercion, 0 ≥ ρ(q∗(0)), while there exists some level 0 < pi′ < pi0
that is unsustainable; i.e., ρ(q∗(pi′)) < pi′. As pi0 by definition implies an interior SSE
not breaching the insurrection constraint, and by Assumption 7 ρ′(·) < 0, weak co-
ercion reliance occurring without strong coercion reliance must imply there exists a
pi′ such that ρ(q∗(pi′)) < ρ(q∗(0)) ≤ ρ(q∗(pi0)). As ρ′(·) < 0, we have q∗(pi′) > q∗(pi0),
where pi′ < pi0.
pi′ < pi0 while q∗(pi′) > q∗(pi0) ≥ q∗(0) cannot occur without an interval of pi, such
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that q∗′(pi) < 0 in between intervals of pi such that q∗′(pi) > 0, which is from the
definition of marginal efficiency on page 21, is a marginal inefficient interval preceded
and followed by marginal efficient levels of coercion.

7.12. Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4: For any initial condition pi0, the dynamically stable equilibrium pi
IC
is a coercion level equal to either:
I) the unconfrontational level of coercion as an interior point of Spi0 : pi
IC = piq
II) a strategic constraint at the upper bound of Spi0 : pi
IC = pifix
III) the upper feasibility constraint at the bound of SΠ: pi
IC = pimax.
Proof: We show that the pi′ corresponding to any minimum point of any Qpi0 , which
by definition is equal to piIC , will fall under either case I), II) or III), hence the
proposition.49 First note that trivially, any minimum point in Qpi0 must correspond
to a piIC in the interior of a subset of an Spi0 , s, or at the boundary of an s.
Suppose the minimum of Qpi0 corresponds to an interior point in an s. As estab-
lished in Lemma 6, q∗(pi) has at most one interior minimum point, piq, and because
ρ′(q∗(pi)) < 0 always holds, q∗′(pi) = 0 must hold at a minimum of Qpi0 , corresponding
to an interior minimum of s. Thus, piIC must be equal to piq and pi
IC fall under case I).
Suppose the minimum of Qpi0 corresponds to a pi
IC that is the limit of a subset
49 If there are several infimum points, any will correspond to a dynamically stable equilibrium,
as the authority will not have any incentive to change pi.
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s, and this limit is different from pimax. pi
IC must be at an upper limit of s, because
at lower thresholds of s lowering pi increases q∗(pi), as follows from proof of Proposi-
tion 3. As the limit piIC is an upper limit different from pimax, it implies there exists a
piIC < pi′ < pimax such that pi′ is infinitesimally larger than the upper limit of the sub-
set. As pi′ 6∈ s, ρ(q∗(pi′)) > pi′. As ρ(·) is assumed to be a continuous mapping with
a continuous derivative, it cannot discontinuously jump from piIC , which is either on
or over the 45-degree fix-point-line, to a point pi′ under the line, without crossing the
fix-point-line.50 Hence, the minimum of Qpi0 must correspond to an upper limit on
the fix-point-line piIC = pifix, which falls under case II).
Suppose the minimum of Qpi0 corresponds to an upper limit of a subset s, then
this limit is piIC = pimax and corresponds to case III).

7.13. Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5: If and only if there exist initial conditions pi0 6= pi0, such that the set
of implementable coercion levels from pi0 or pi0 differ, Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅ will different
initial conditions pi0 = pi0 and pi0 = pi0 give different dynamically stable equilibria:
piICpi0 6= piICpi0 .
Proof: We first show that if Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅, then piICpi0 6= piICpi0 . We then show if
piICpi0 6= piICpi0 then Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅.
Suppose pi0 > pi0 and Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅. By definition of the set of implementable
50The fix-point-line for ρˆ(pi) is illustrated in Figure. 2 on page 34.
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coercion levels there must be at least one pi′ such that pi′ 6∈ Spi0 , but pi′ ∈ Spi0 because
if this was not the case, then the sets would be the same sets; i.e., this is implied by
Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅. This implies that q∗(pi′) < inf{Qpi0}, as ρ(q∗(pi)) is monotonically
increasing in q∗(pi) and pi′ cannot be reached from pi0. Suppose that the difference
between the sets consists of this single coercion level pi′. This pi′ > sup{Spi0} must
then be equal to piIC , because pi′ must corresponds to inf{Qpi0}. This pi′ is different
from piIC because pi′ is not in Spi0 .
51
Suppose the dynamically stable equilibria are different and that piICpi0 > pi
IC
pi0
.52 By
definition piICpi0 corresponds to inf{Qpi0}. As ρ′(·) < 0, it must hold that q∗(piICpi0 ) <
q∗(piICpi0 ) because pi
IC
pi0
can be implemented from piICpi0 , but pi
IC
pi0
gives a lower q∗(pi) than
piICpi0 , by definition. Hence, there must be at least one pi
′ such that pi′ 6∈ Spi0 but
pi′ ∈ Spi0 , namely piICpi0 . By definition of the set of implementable coercion levels, this
implies Spi0 4 Spi0 6= ∅.

8. Appendix 2: Linear coercion resentment functions
Assuming the coercion resentment function is linear, C(pi) = K0 + K1pi for some
K0, K1, yields:
∂q∗(pi)
∂pi
=
(K1 − 2)∆u
(K1pi + 2∆u)2
. (31)
51Note that in the special case where there are two dynamically stable equilibria but equal sets
of implementable coercion levels, it is more likely that different equilibria will arise when there are
different initial conditions.
52 Note that the proposition does not cover the special case of multiple dynamically stable equi-
libria, piICpi0 = pi
IC
pi0
= {piq, pieq}.
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Using coercion as a means to change q∗(pi) would simply not be a useful tool for
K1 = 2, counter-productive for K1 > 2, or productive at any level for K1 < 2. The
solution to the authority’s minimization problem in (7) is trivial for linear coercion
functions: either always coerce as hard as possible or never coerce at all, depending
on whether the coercion resentment, K1, is greater or smaller than two. Similarly,
for a convex or a concave coercion resentment function, the problem of setting the
optimal coercion level will have a unique extremal point at the pi′ that solves:
∆u =
2C(pi′)− pi′
2 + 3C ′(pi′)
. (32)
9. Appendix 3: Further interpretations of the model
9.1. Appendix 3.1: Policy implications of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 has relevant implications for the policy problem of an external agency
setting a constraint ρ to limit an authority’s use of coercion when q∗(pi) is of class II).
Assume that the cost of enforcing the constraint is K0(pimax − ρ), where K0 > 0.
Setting a ρ˜ ∈ (piq, pieq) will have several benefits relative to the constraint ρ 6∈ (piq, pieq).
Imposing ρ˜ implies a costless reduction of the equilibrium coercion level, because the
cost of imposing ρ˜ is K0(pimax − ρ˜), and Proposition 2 implies that at ρ˜ the imposed
coercion level piEC is piq and the actual reduction of coercion is (pimax − piq). Hence,
the cost of reduction is given by (pimax− ρ˜) while the actual reduction is (pimax−piq),
implying that the reduction (pimax−piq)−(pimax− ρ˜) = (ρ˜−piq) is achieved at no cost.
Furthermore, assume that the external agency has imperfect information about the
coercion level, giving the authority a possibility of increasing pi without the external
agency being able to identify the increase. At piq the authority has no incentive to
marginally increase pi in equilibrium, as this would imply imposing a coercion level
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pi in the inefficient interval, i.e., pi ∈ (piq, pieq). A final benefit is that the ρ˜ constraint
is not binding in equilibrium, which will often reduce its salience.
9.2. Appendix 3.2: Interpretations of the insurrection constraint
One possible reason the insurrection constraint has ρ′(q∗(pi)) < 0, is to assume that
increasing the size of non-state morality always increases their capability for commit-
ting a successful insurrection. The lower threshold for committing an insurrection
then follows from a higher probability of a successful outcome of an insurrection.
Capability of attaining a successful outcome in an insurrection will grow with q∗(pi)
for a wide number of applications, hence the assumption of ρ′(q∗(pi)) < 0.
In applications of the model where military capability determines capability to per-
form a successful insurrection, the functional form of ρ(q∗(pi)) is determined by the
current military technology’s ability to transform the share of a morality individuals,
q∗(pi), into military capability. The derivative of the insurrection constraint function
at a particular SSE level, ρ′(q∗(pi′)), will be determined by the relative labour inten-
sity of military power. Assuming the insurrection constraint to be independent of
SSE, ρ′(q∗(pi)) = 0 for all q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) implies a military technology solely depen-
dent on capital. A constant derivative, ρ′(q∗(pi)) = K, for all q∗(pi) ∈ (0, 1) implies
a military technology where every individual in the population has equal ability to
exert military force and there is no scarcity of capital.
Applying the model to a democratic system, the endogenous constraint will reflect
a situation where an authority faces an undesirable outcome contingent on the level
of q∗(pi) not moving beyond some threshold needed to issue a forced referendum or
a motion of no confidence.
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10. Appendix 4: The set of implementable coercion levels
The following discussion provides some conjunctures about the set of implementable
coercion levels under insurrection constraints with other mappings between qt and
the threshold level of insurrection, in Appendix (4.1), and iterative processes for Spi0
where pi can be set at any t, in Appendix (4.2).
10.1. Appendix 4.1: Sufficiency of constraints on ρ(q∗(pi))
We here discuss what requirement must be put on the model to ensure the insurrec-
tion constraint is not breached, given other relations between qt and the threshold
level of insurrection. We then discuss how this changes the set of implementable
coercion levels.
The model considers an insurrection constraint on q∗(pi) rather than qt. For a so-
lution considering an insurrection constraint on q∗(pi) to be sufficient to imply that
the solution would also hold for an insurrection constraint dependent on qt, further
restrictions are needed. The restrictions must ensure that whenever a coercion level,
pi′, satisfying an initial insurrection constraint ρ(q∗(pi0)) ≥ pi′ is imposed, then this
must imply that ρ(qt) ≥ pi′ holds for all qt in the sequence of qt values in the con-
vergence sequence from q∗(pi0) towards q∗(pi′). Following the notation in Lemma 4,
we denote this sequence of qt values as {qt}pi′ . Now we discuss when the following
criterion is met:
If ρ(q∗(pi0)) ≥ pi′ and ρ(q∗(pi′)) ≥ pi′ then ρ(qt) ≥ pi′ for all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ . (33)
As ρ(q∗(pi)) is monotonically strictly increasing, ρ(qt) ≥ pi′ for all qt is ensured if no
qt ∈ {qt}pi′ is larger than the start of the convergence process; i.e., it must hold that
q∗(pi0) ≥ qt, for all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ . This is equivalent to a requirement of no-overshooting
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of q∗(pi0); i.e., q∗(pi0) ≥ qt for all qt ∈ {qt}pi′ . Assuming a change in pi occurring at
time t = 0, then from (3) and requiring qt < qt+1 for any convergence path from
q∗(pi0) to q∗(pi′), we derive that the cost function in socialization efforts must be
sufficiently bounded for changes within qt ∈ (0, 1) such that:
∆tτ
m ≥ ∆tτm∆t+1τm + ∆t+1τm → 1 ≥ ∆t+1τm[1 + 1
∆tτm
]. (34)
If (34) holds for all possible combinations of moving from one qt ∈ (0, 1) to an-
other qt+1 ∈ (0, 1), then (33) is satisfied. Hence, the requirement of no-overshooting
is fulfilled as long as |H(τt)−H(τt+1)| is sufficiently bounded for changes in q ∈ (0, 1).
Assume the insurrection constraint is dependent on a moving average ρ˜(qN,t), where
qN,t ≡ Σ
N
i=0qt−i
N+1
. Furthermore, assume that the convergence process from q∗(pi0) to
q∗(pi′) in (33) occurs within T periods. We know that q∗(pi′) and q∗(pi0) is sustain-
able, and it follows from proof of Lemma 4 part (iii) that any average will converge
towards q∗(pi′); i.e., it holds that qN,T → q∗(pi′) as N → ∞. Hence, in the model
as specified, (33) holds for an infinite moving average, i.e., N = ∞, infinite inertia.
More simply put, (33) holds if military capability remains at q∗(pi0) throughout the
convergence process.
The smaller the N , the stricter the requirement on the convergence processes, and
for N = 0, i.e., no inertia, (34) must always hold. As discussed on page 20, we have
established that the convergence process will occur with every other generation in the
process being above or below the SSE q∗(pi′); i.e., qt < qt+2 < q∗(pi′) < qt+3 < qt+1.
Hence, for any inertia process that can be described by a lag of more than two pe-
riods, N ≤ 2, the requirements of the cost function in socialization efforts will be
strictly weaker than under (34). Furthermore, because a shorter convergence time
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implies that qN,T is closer to qN,0, we see that the requirement will be weaker if
the convergence process is shorter, i.e., if T is low. Trivially for convergence in one
period, T = 1, (33) always holds.
The discussion above has considered whether a constraint on the SSE can be con-
sidered a not sufficiently strict criterion to analyze which q∗(pi) an authority can
dynamically reach. In other words, for another insurrection constraint dependent on
qt, there might be q
∗(pi) ∈ Qpi0 that the authority might not reach. Furthermore,
we have argued that it appears that the set of implementable coercion levels for an
insurrection constraint dependent on qN,t, S˜pi0,N,T will converge towards Spi0 , as the
inertia of military capability converges to infinity, N →∞, and the number of gen-
erations it takes to convergence between steady states converges to one, 1
T
→ 1.
10.2. Appendix 4.2: The set of implementable coercion levels when the authority can
reset pi at every t
In the specified model, the set of implementable coercion levels is given by what the
authority can reach by setting pi′ in q∗(pi0) and then resetting pi once q∗(pi′) is reached.
Assume, as in Appendix 4.1, that an insurrection constraint is dependent on qt rather
than q∗(pi), and that pi can be reset at any t in the convergence sequence {qt}pi′ ,
defined in Lemma 4. The authority would then, potentially, be able to reach q∗(pi) 6∈
Qpi0 . This can arise as there might be qt values in the convergence sequence, {qt}pi′ ,
from which the authority might be able to implement some pi′′ not implementable in
Spi0 , and thus reach q
∗(pi) 6∈ Qpi0 . Investigating what states would then be reachable
would require further inquiry into the extremal values of the convergence sequence
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{qt}pi′ . The states that would be sustainable, SΠ, would not change and there could
still be limits regarding what is reachable from some initial condition; an authority
could still be strategically constrained at an upper bound attractor fix-point pifix. In
other words, Spi0 might be different for other iterative processes, but it appears that
all established results would hold qualitatively.
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Chapter 2
101
Suspicious minds and views of fairness
Abstract
Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions?
As one typically cannot observe the strength or type of people’s fairness view or their
material incentives, inferring intentions from actions is a multidimensional inference
problem. I study this problem by investigating intention attribution in a setting
where the monetary incentives are easily identifiable: a redistribution choice of voting
for either full redistribution or no redistribution. Individuals with above median
incomes will have monetary incentives for no redistribution, and individuals with
below median incomes will have monetary incentives for full redistribution. In a novel
experimental design, participants predict how likely other participants’ redistribution
vote is motivated by selfishness. I find that participants are significantly more likely
to attribute a no redistribution vote to selfishness if they view redistribution as fair.
I define this effect, attributing actions not adhering to one’s own fairness view to
selfishness, as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to
show how suspicious attribution can be explained by two other findings from the
experiment: participants underestimate how many have a fairness view that differ
from their own, projection bias, and overestimate the selfishness of participants with
other fairness views, out-group stereotypes. My results and the idea of suspicious
attribution can contribute to explaining polarization of attitudes and how prosocial
individuals legitimize engaging in group conflicts.
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1. Introduction
Behaviour that does not adhere to one’s morality can either be attributed to another
morality, or to self-interest.1 Moralities other than one’s own can often be hard to
understand or empathize with (Haidt, 2007). Furthermore, empathizing with other
moralities implies acknowledging objections to one’s convictions, something people
often have little incentive or interest in doing (Piketty, 1995). Thus, self-interest is
often attributed to behaviour not adhering to one’s own morality. I define this type
of intention attribution, attributing behaviour not adhering to your own morality to
selfishness, as suspicious attribution.
Understanding how differences in moralities affect our interpretation of intentions is
central to understanding how polarization of attitudes occur (Haidt, 2012). Suspi-
cious attribution will distort perceptions of how many people have selfish intentions
in heterogeneous societies and increase the legitimacy of prosocial types to choose
conflict over dialogue with out-groups. A recent example of such a process is the
polarization of American politics; since the 1990s supporters of the Republican and
Democratic parties have found less common ground. Both sides interpret the inten-
tions of the other party with increasing suspicion, causing them to support increas-
ingly off-centre candidates. This has led to a vicious cycle of polarization (Haidt,
2012) and political deadlock (Binder, 2015). Understanding the role of suspicious
attribution is central to addressing the micro foundation of these processes.
I study suspicious attribution of voting in a simplified redistributive game: players
vote for either full or no redistribution after observing their own income. In this
simplified game of redistribution, the half of the players with above median incomes
1A morality can be understood as a vector of beliefs and values that are internalized and em-
bedded in the person; examples are political ideologies, and religious or ethnic identities.
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will have incentives for no redistribution, while the other half have incentives for
full redistribution. Views of what constitutes fair redistribution also vary, e.g., Re-
publicans and Democrats. Furthermore, it has been shown in experimental settings
that where participants have no incentive in the outcomes, people hold mutually
excluding fairness views about redistribution (Cappelen et al., 2007; Roemer, 2009).
Some find it fair to redistribute earnings to compensate income differences arising
from luck, effort or performance, hereby referred to as egalitarians, others prefer
differences in earnings to be reflected in income differences, hereby referred to as lib-
ertarians.2 Hence, simplified redistribution offers an ideal setting to study suspicious
attribution; material incentives and fairness views prescribe predictable opposite al-
ternatives, creating ambiguity of intentions that can easily be disentangled.
By definition, suspicious egalitarians will attribute no redistribution votes to selfish-
ness, e.g., monetary incentives. In my redistributive game, this implies egalitarians
will infer that no-redistribution votes are cast by selfish people with above median
incomes. Similarly, a suspicious libertarian will attribute a vote for redistribution
to be motivated by selfishness of people with below median income. Suspicious at-
tribution of redistributive votes can arise from two types of beliefs about the type
of voters who casts votes not adhering to one’s fairness view. An egalitarian can
infer that a no-redistribution voter is a selfish type of egalitarian with above median
income; that is, a person with the same fairness view as his own, but who choose
to vote according to monetary incentives rather than according to fairness view. Al-
ternatively, an egalitarian can infer that the voter is indeed a libertarian; however,
he might also believe that most libertarians are selfish types, i.e., mainly motivated
2 My experimental design is not dependent on whether people’s view conform to these labels;
i.e., all that is assumed is that either participants find it fair to redistribute, or not redistribute.
104
by material incentives. I show that the first type of inference arises from projection
bias in fairness views –inflated beliefs about how many people share your fairness
view –while the latter arises from out-group stereotypes –biased beliefs about how
many people with opposing fairness views are selfish types. These mechanisms are
formally outlined in my theoretical framework of suspicious attribution.
In a novel laboratory experiment design I test for suspicious attribution of redis-
tributive choices. Participants are randomly assigned either the role of predictor or
the role of worker. Workers complete tasks, and earn money according to whether
their output is above or below the median worker. Workers then vote for full or no
redistribution after observing how large their earnings are compared to the median
worker. Predictors are paid according to the accuracy of their estimate of how work-
ers casting different redistribution votes have scored on a selfishness measure. The
selfishness measure is the worker’s average number of self-reported favourable coin
tosses, in a setting where the worker is paid for every favourable coin toss and is
not monitored. Implicitly, my design rests on the following assumption: if the pre-
dictor has a suspicious attribution of a worker’s redistributive choice, the predictor
will find it more likely that the worker will lie about the number of favourable coin
tosses to increase his payment. Predictors also estimate how many workers hold each
fairness view, how many workers are selfish types and how many workers are selfish
types contingent on the workers’ fairness views. To show suspicious attribution, a
redistributive vote must be taken as a sign of being a selfish type, and not a sign
of membership of another social group. Thus, the experiment was conducted on a
sample with few or no salient social group cleavages.3
3Minimal group distinctions have been shown to change social inference from projection bias to
stereotyping (Alicke, Dunning and Krueger, 2005).
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The paper offers three main findings. First, I find suspicious attribution bias by egal-
itarians of no-redistribution votes; egalitarians predict a significantly higher proba-
bility of workers voting for no redistribution as being selfish types than libertarians.
Second, I find that both libertarians and egalitarians display projection bias in fair-
ness views; they overestimate the prevalence of their own fairness view. Third, I find
that egalitarians have out-group stereotype bias against libertarians; their estimates
of the prevalence of selfish types among libertarians is upward biased, and are signif-
icantly higher for egalitarian predictors compared with libertarian predictors. I find
supportive evidence linking the three main findings for no-redistribution votes; the
predictors’ suspicious attribution bias is significantly correlated with their out-group
stereotypes and prevalence estimates of fairness view.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. I link the literature on moral
reasoning (Haidt, 2012), social cognition (Alicke, Dunning and Krueger, 2005) and
fairness views (Cappelen et al., 2007; Roemer, 2009) by developing a specific model
of inference of intentions behind distribution choices under projection bias and out-
group stereotypes. Furthermore, the paper is novel in testing intention attribution
behind redistributive choices in an experiment and finding supportive evidence of
suspicious attribution. Projection bias was first demonstrated by Ross, Greene and
House (1977), and is subsequently shown to hold across a large number of fields and
situations (Blanco et al., 2014; Rubinstein and Salant, 2016; Bushong and Gagnon-
Bartsch, 2016); I show projection bias also holds for fairness views. Out-group stereo-
types have been previously found; people attribute negative intentions to people with
differing opinions in general (Reeder et al., 2005), and exaggerate differences con-
nected to political opinions in particular (Graham, Nosek and Haidt, 2012). These
theories focus on perceived stereotypes of political attitudes, while I study predictions
of intentions behind actions and the fairness view of the predictor. The experiment
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applies the approach of using choices made by a party with no incentives in the
outcomes, to signify fairness views first used by Harsanyi (1962). My experiment
uses a coin flipping task as a measure of selfishness, previously applied as an unob-
trusive measure of dishonesty (Cohn, Fehr and Mare´chal, 2014).4 My experiment
uses multiple predictions of behaviour, selfishness and fairness views to disentangle
participants’ beliefs about intentions. This approach is, to the author’s knowledge,
novel. The theoretical model relates to recent work in social learning which inves-
tigated the complexities of inference under projection bias (Gagnon-Bartsch, 2017;
Madara´sz, 2015). I develop a simple novel theory of intention attribution under three
dimensions of uncertainty: monetary incentives, fairness views and selfishness.
This paper proceeds as follows. In part two, a game of attributing intentions to
redistribution votes is presented. I use this game to demonstrate the proposed model
of intention attribution. In part three, the experimental design is presented, then
the results from the main experiment are presented in part four, before the paper
concludes in part five. Appendixes contain proofs, experimental instructions and
some further analysis.
2. A theory of intention attribution for a redistributive game
I analyze intention attribution of redistributive votes under projection bias and out-
group stereotypes. I first present a simple redistributive game, before analyzing the
choices of the workers and the beliefs of the predictors. I then show how suspicious
attribution arises from projection bias and out-group stereotypes. The game cor-
responds to my experiment where I elicit all relevant parameters from the theory.
4 In Appendix 4, I report results from an study that show egalitarians and libertarians have the
same view of lying as a selfish action.
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Proof of the propositions and the theorems are in Appendix 1.
2.1. A redistributive game
The game has two types of players: workers and predictors. The agents play the
following game.
Stage 0. Nature randomly draws an odd number of workers and predictors. Players’
social preferences differ along two dimensions: type, which can either be egalitarian
or libertarian, m ∈ {ξ, λ}, and strength, which can either be weak or strong. A
portion α ∈ (0, 1) of the population is libertarian and 1−α is egalitarian. A portion
µm ∈ (0, 1) of players with fairness views m have weak social preferences, and are
referred to as selfish types, S, while 1 − µm have strong social preferences and are
referred to as non-selfish types, NS.
Stage 1. Worker i undertakes a hidden action ai ∈ {ans, as} which is either selfish or
unselfish. The worker receives a strictly positive amount of money if he chooses the
selfish action, and nothing otherwise.
Stage 2. Worker i draws an output oi ∈ {ol, oh} which is either high, oh, or low,
ol, with equal probability
1
2
, where ol < oh.
Stage 3. The worker casts a vote vi for either full redistribution, vr, or no redis-
tribution, vnr; vi ∈ {vr, vnr}. The outcome is decided by a simple majority vote. If
the full redistribution option receives a majority, everyone is paid an amount y. If the
no-redistribution option receives a majority, high-output workers receive an amount
yh and low-output workers receive an amount yl, where yh > y ≡ yh+yl2 > yl ≥ 0.
108
Stage 4. Predictors observe the structure of the game, the support for distribu-
tions of types and one worker’s vote. He does not observe the worker’s output, the
worker’s fairness view or whether the worker performed the selfish action. A predic-
tor receives a strictly positive amount of money if the predictor correctly predicts
the exact probability that the worker has chosen a selfish action conditional on his
vote.
As predictors only get paid for exact reporting, and I assume all players believe
that the probability distributions for types are single-peaked, the game equilibrium
is given by workers voting according to their type and predictors honestly reporting
their beliefs.
2.2. Workers’ choice
I now analyze the workers’ choice of vote, and selfish or non-selfish actions. I first
define what actions adhere to which fairness views, and make assumptions about the
choices of selfish and non-selfish types. By definition, egalitarians find the outcome
that all workers should receive y fair, while libertarians find the outcome that work-
ers should receive yh if they draw high output oh, and yl if they draw low output ol,
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fair.5 As voting for redistribution, vr, always makes the outcome that all workers are
paid y more likely to occur, I define this vote, vr, as adhering to the egalitarian fair-
ness ideal. Likewise, casting a vote for no redistribution, vnr, is defined as an action
adhering to the libertarian fairness ideal. Both egalitarian and libertarian workers
find it fair to perform the non-selfish action and unfair to perform the selfish action;
i.e., the selfish action adheres to none of the fairness views and the non-selfish action
adheres to both. Furthermore, I assume the following about selfish and non-selfish
types.
Assumption 1. Choices of selfish types and non-selfish types
A non-selfish type i casts the vote vi and chooses the action ai that adheres to his
fairness view. A selfish type j casts a vote vj and chooses the action aj that maxi-
mizes his material incentives.
5 The defined fairness views can grow out of different beliefs about whether output at stage 2
in the game reflects a choice of effort or luck. It can also arise from differences in attitudes about
what constitutes legitimate sources of equality. Roemer (2009) defines a strict egalitarian as a
person who believes an equal distribution is a fair outcome regardless of the source of inequality,
a choice egalitarian as a person who finds it fair to let income differences reflect effort differences
but seek to redistribute inequality arising from luck, while a libertarian will never redistribute
income differences arising from luck or effort. Assuming beliefs in our game do not vary, and both
types believe the output draw is random, the egalitarian type can be a choice or strict egalitarian
believing that workers should be held accountable for choices of effort. Assuming both libertarians
and egalitarians believe the draw of output is not random, but a reflection of a choice of effort, the
egalitarian must be a strict egalitarian and the libertarian can be either a choice egalitarian or a
strict libertarian. Finally, allowing the beliefs about the draw of output to vary, the egalitarian type
can be either a strict or a choice egalitarian believing that the draw is not random; the libertarian
type can be a choice egalitarian believing the draw is not random, or a strict libertarian.
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Selfish types, independent of fairness views, choose the selfish action as; non-selfish
types choose the non-selfish action ans. From yh > y > yl, it follows that ol workers
have material incentives to vote vr, and oh workers have material incentives to vote
vnr. Assumption 1, the redistribution mechanism and the definition of the fairness
views, imply a worker votes according to the drawn output, strength and type of
fairness view, as summarized in Table 1.
The outcome of the vote is dependent on the distribution of types. The distribution
of votes for redistribution is given by: P (vr) = [
#vr
#vr+#vnr
] = 1
2
[µλα+µξ(1−α)]+(1−
µξ)(1− α). Note that, if everyone is selfish, µ = 1, the prevalence of fairness views,
α, does not matter for the vote outcome. If all workers are selfish types, µξ = µλ = 1,
then the distribution of votes only depends on the incentive structure for the actions,
the redistribution mechanism and the draw of output, i.e., P (ol) = P (vr) =
1
2
. The
prevalence of fairness views is increasingly important for the outcome of the vote
if there is a high number of non-selfish workers; for µξ = µλ = 0 the vote is pro-
portional to the prevalence of fairness views, P (vr) = 1 − α. The aggregate vote
share for different portions of selfish types and different fairness views is illustrated
in Figure 1.
2.3. Predictors’ beliefs and suspicious attribution
Suspicious attribution is defined as a belief that votes not adhering to your own
fairness reflect a selfish motivation. I here analyze when a vote not adhering to the
predictor’s fairness view is taken as a signal that the worker is the selfish type. I first
develop the Bayesian probability of a worker being a selfish type conditional on his
vote, P (S|vi), describe when votes are uninformative of type, do comparative static
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Choice Matrix Libertarian Workers
Portion α of the population
High output(oh) Low output(ol)
Selfish (µλ) vnr vr
Non-Selfish (1− µλ) vnr vnr
Choice Matrix Egalitarian Workers
Portion 1− α of the population
High output(oh) Low output (ol)
Selfish (µξ) vnr vr
Non-Selfish (1− µξ) vr vr
Table 1: The choice of actions for the different types of persons. The prevalence of libertarians is
α, while the prevalence of egalitarians is 1− α. The prevalence of selfish types among egalitarians
is µξ, and µλ among libertarians.
112
Figure 1: Theoretical distribution of the share of votes for redistribution, P (vr). The two horizontal
axes give the share of people finding it fair not to redistribute, α, and the share of people prioritizing
monetary incentives over fairness views, µ. The vertical axis gives the portion of votes for full
redistribution, P (vr) =
1
2 [µλα + µξ(1 − α)] + (1 − µξ)(1 − α). In this graph, it is assumed that
the portion of selfish types is equal for both groups of fairness views, i.e., the fairness view is
uncorrelated with selfishness, µλ = µξ. At point A = {µ = 0, α = 1, P (vr) = 0}, all workers
are non-selfish, hold a libertarian fairness view, and thus, all vote for no redistribution. At point
B = {µ = 0, α = 0, P (vr) = 1}, all workers hold an egalitarian fairness view and are non-selfish,
thus, they all vote for redistribution. At the line from point C = {µ = 1, α = 1, P (vr) = 12} to
D = {µ = 1, α = 0, P (vr) = 12}, all workers are perfectly selfish, µ = 1, and thus they all vote
according to their output draw, which makes half of the votes for redistribution, P (vr) =
1
2 . At
the line between A and C everyone holds a libertarian fairness view, α = 1, and as the portion of
selfish types sinks from 1 to 0, P (vr) decreases from
1
2 to 0. At the line between B and D everyone
holds an egalitarian fairness view, α = 0, and as the portion of selfish types sinks from 1 to 0, P (vr)
increases from 12 to 1.
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on P (S|vi), and finally establish when suspicious attribution constitutes a bias.
The predictor observes what vote a worker has cast and reports the conditional
probability that the worker is selfish. Votes for full redistribution are cast by selfish
workers drawing low output, ol, and non-selfish egalitarians. Votes for no redistribu-
tion are cast by selfish workers drawing high output, oh, and non-selfish libertarians.
The predictor’s perceived probability that a worker is a selfish type after observing
a vote vi ∈ {vr, vnr}, denoted as P (S|vi), is as follows.
P (S|vi) = Number of selfish types casting vi
Number of selfish types casting vi + Number of non-selfish types casting vi
(2.1)
Applying Bayes rule, I obtain the following expression for (2.1).
P (S|vi) = P (vi|S)P (S)
P (vi)
≡ E[µvi ] (2.2)
I assume that predictors believe Assumption 1 is true: the incentive structure and
preferences are assumed common knowledge; thus, predictors believe that workers
vote according to Table 1. The predictors believe that a selfish worker votes accord-
ing to his incentives and there is a 1
2
probability that the worker draws ol, and has
incentives to vote vnr. Thus, the probability of a selfish type voting for no redistri-
bution is P (vnr|S) = 12 . The probability of a worker being a selfish type is the sum of
the probabilities of selfish types with both fairness views, P (S), is [µλα+µξ(1−α)].
Non-selfish types vote for no redistribution if they are libertarian. Hence, the proba-
bility that a non-selfish worker votes for no redistribution is equal to the probability
of a worker being a non-selfish libertarian, i.e., P (vnr|NS)P (NS) = 1(1− µλ)α. By
inserting this into (2.2), I attain the following.
E[µnr] =
1
2
[µλα + (1− α)µξ]
1
2
[µλα + µξ(1− α)] + (1− µλ)α (2.3)
114
The term [µλα + (1 − α)µξ] is the weighted average rate of selfish types in the
population, µ, which implies that (2.3) can be written as follows.
E[µnr] =
µ
µ+ 2(1− µλ)α (2.4)
Note from (2.4) that the expected probability of a worker being a selfish type con-
tingent on him casting a non-redistribution vote increases as the number of selfish
libertarians grows or the number of libertarians decreases. Replacing the portion of
non-selfish libertarians with non-selfish egalitarians 2(1−µξ)(1−α), in (2.4), I attain
the probability of a selfish type conditional on observing a vote for redistribution.
First, I consider (2.3) under the special case where the predictor believes there is
equal prevalence of each fairness view α = 1
2
, and fairness views have equal portion
of selfish types, µξ = µλ = µ. Note that, unless the effect of more selfish types among
one of the fairness views exactly offsets the effect of prevalence, the special case of
α = 1
2
and µξ = µλ is the only one where a vote is uninformative. This insight is
presented as a theorem below.
Theorem of prior beliefs for uninformative votes
A predictor will not gain any information about whether a worker is selfish from a
vote vi ∈ {vr, vnr} if he believes the following two conditions hold.
(i) There is an equal probability of a worker holding either fairness view, α = 1
2
.
(ii) The portion of selfish types is equal for different fairness views, µξ = µλ.
I now consider which prior beliefs will create which inferences when votes are infor-
mative of type. First, assume that predictors holds the belief that there is an equal
share of selfish types among libertarians and egalitarians, µξ = µλ. Then equation
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(2.4) implies that a vote for no redistribution will be taken as a signal of being a self-
ish type, i.e., E[µnr] > E[µr], if a majority of workers are egalitarians α <
1
2
. A vote
for redistribution will be taken as a signal of being a selfish type, E[µnr] < E[µr],
if a majority of workers are libertarians, α > 1
2
. If I allow for predictors believing
that there is correlation between being a selfish type and having a fairness view, i.e.,
µξ 6= µλ, and assume predictors belive that there is equal prevalence of fairness views,
α = 1
2
, then whenever there are more selfish types among workers with fairness view
m, µm > µn, the vote adhering to fairness view m will be taken as a signal of a
selfish type. Second, I consider (2.3) under the special case where predictors believe
that the portion of selfish types is equal for both fairness views, µξ = µλ = µ, while
the expected α varies according to the fairness view of the predictor. Defining the
predictors of fairness view m to hold the belief αm, and denoting this expectation as
Em, I find the following inference for an egalitarian predictor observing a vote for no
redistribution.
Eξ[µnr] =
1
1 + 2αξ( 1
µ
− 1) (2.5)
Note that the predicted probability of a worker considered to be selfish after casting
a vote against redistribution decreases in the prevalence of libertarians, and increases
in the prevalence of selfish types. The expression for a libertarian observing a redis-
tribution vote is attained by replacing the term for non-selfish libertarians αξ( 1
µ
− 1)
with non-selfish egalitarians in (2.5). Furthermore, I assume that predictors over-
estimate the prevalence of their own fairness view, projection bias. Denoting the
empirical portion of workers of libertarian fairness type as αW , I define projection
bias as follows.
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Definition: Projection bias in fairness views implies αξ < αW < αλ (2.6)
It follows directly from the definition of projection bias that predictors will have a
different conditional belief of selfishness for a vote not adhering to a predictor’s view.
Relaxing the assumption that there is an equal share of selfish types among holders
of both fairness views, allowing for µξ 6= µλ, and denoting a predictors belief of share
µn of fairness view m, µ
m
n , I develop the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Intention attribution and projection bias in fairness views
Take any two fairness views n and m ∈ {ξ, λ}, such that m 6= n. If holders of fair-
ness views m and n have common beliefs about the portion of selfish types, µmξ = µ
n
ξ
and µmλ = µ
n
λ, projection bias implies that a predictor with view m will cast a vote
adhering to view n as a stronger signal of selfishness than a predictor with view n.
The intuition of the proof of the proposition is as follows. Considering (2.4), if there
are no libertarians, α = 0, then all workers voting for no redistribution are selfish
types; a vote for no redistribution is a certain signal of being a selfish type. Increas-
ing the number of libertarians increases the probability that a no-redistribution vote
was cast by a non-selfish libertarian. A change in the prevalence of libertarian types
α also changes the average selfishness µ if there are different shares of selfish types
amongst the different fairness views, µξ 6= µλ. However, because average selfishness
is a convex combination of selfishness for the two types of fairness views, this effect
is always smaller than the change arising from changes in α. This implies that de-
creasing α always reduces the strength of the no-redistribution vote as a signal of
117
being a selfish type. Hence, under projection bias, egalitarians will always believe α
to be lower than libertarians. Thus, for any common belief of the portion of selfish
types amongst each group, µmλ = µ
n
λ, µ
m
ξ = µ
n
ξ , egalitarians will take a vote for no
redistribution as a stronger signal of selfishness than libertarians. The opposite holds
for how libertarian predictors attribute intentions to a vote for redistribution.
I now analyze how a predictor’s beliefs about the portion of selfish types change
prediction about the probability of a worker being selfish a type contingent on ob-
serving the workers redistributive choice. Trivially, a predictor holding a belief that
more workers, regardless of fairness view, are selfish types will give a higher prob-
ability that any vote vi is committed by a selfish type; observe from (2.4) that for
an egalitarian the portion of selfish types libertarians µλ will effect the probability
of a selfish type casting a no redistribution vote both through the overall portion
of selfish types and by the probability of the no redistribution vote being cast by a
non-selfish type. Defining µ−j − µj as the out-group stereotype for a predictor of
fairness view j, I can establish the following proposition on out-group stereotypes
and non-adhering votes.
Proposition 2. Intention attribution and out-group stereotypes
Out-group stereotypes increase the difference between the predicted selfishness of
workers casting votes not adhering and workers casting adhering to the fairness view
of the predictor.
Following from Proposition 1 and 2 and defining a biased out-group stereotype as
a deviation from the empirical portion of selfish types, I can establish the following
theorem on suspicious attribution bias.
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Theorem of suspicious attribution bias
Assume a predictor of fairness view m holds a rational or an upward biased belief
about the portion of selfish types in his in-group, µmm ≥ µWm . The predictor’s belief
that a vote not adhering to his fairness view is cast by a selfish type will be biased
upward if either:
(i) the predictor has biased out-group stereotypes, µmn > µ
W
n ,
(ii) the predictor has projection bias in fairness views.
For a sufficiently downward biased view of in-group selfishness, i.e., µmm < µ
W
m , the
belief of a selfish type after observing a non-adhering vote might be unbiased even
under projection bias and an upward bias in out-group selfishness. An example of
how likely a vote for no redistribution is to be committed by a selfish type, as a
function of µλ and α under µξ =
1
2
, is presented in Figure. 2.
3. Experimental Design
In this section, I present the experimental design and the participants’ roles. Par-
ticipants who signed up for the experiment were randomly allocated roles. Each
participant had only one role, either as a worker or predictor. Predictors are paid
according to the accuracy of their estimates of what votes and selfish choices workers
made contingent on their vote and fairness view. The worker role is included in order
to study predictions about concrete outcomes rather than hypothetical scenarios. By
eliciting beliefs from predictors who have themselves not made the choices they are
being questioned about, I reduce any risk of an upward bias in estimates because of
predictors’ norm seeking rationalization of choices. All participants are elicited for
age, gender and whether they vote for political parties that actively pursue higher
or lower levels of redistribution. A detailed overview of the experiment design and
119
Figure 2: The vertical axis gives the conditional probability of a worker casting a no-redistribution
vote being a selfish type, E[µnr] =
µλα+(1−α)µξ
[µλα+µξ(1−α)]+2(1−µλ)αξ . The horizontal axis gives the perceived
prevalence of libertarian types in the population α. Different lines reflect different perceptions of
the portion of selfish types in the libertarian population, mu ≡ µλ. The egalitarian selfishness
prevalence, µξ, is fixed at µξ =
1
2 . Note that the probability of a selfish type, given the observation
of a vote for no redistribution, is decreasing in the prevalence of libertarians, α, and increasing in
the prevalence of selfish types among libertarians, µξ.
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the roles in the experiment follow below.
Workers
The workers start by flipping a coin 10 times. Each worker is told to report the
number of times the coin is flipped on the “tails” side, and that he will be paid
four Norwegian kroner per tails outcome. There is no monitoring during the par-
ticipants’ coin flipping phase and the participants are aware of this. Consequently,
the participants can misreport the number of times the coin landed on the ”tails”
side, to increase earnings. The coin flips by the workers are the empirical measure
of selfishness.
Workers are then given 20 minutes to copy as many words as possible from a passage
of text. After this, half of the workers with an above median number of correctly
copied words among workers correctly identified earn a wage of 100 kroner, while
the other half earn zero. Workers cast a vote for either full redistribution, so that
workers are paid identically, or no redistribution, so that workers’ payments equal
their earnings. The option that receives a simple majority is implemented.
Predictors
First, predictors are presented with details of the worker’s role and told that it was
completed by participants who were randomly assigned to the role, and that workers
were drawn from the same subject pool as themselves. Predictors are incentivized
by the quadratic scoring rule to report their expected average number of reported
coin flips by workers, contingent on their redistribution votes and fairness view.6
6 The quadratic scoring rule is adopted following Blanco et al. (2014).
121
Predictors are asked about the group’s average number of reported favourable coin
flips for workers voting for redistribution Ei[µr], and workers voting against redistri-
bution Ei[µnr]. To elicit predictors’ beliefs about any correlation between holding a
particular fairness view and being a selfish type, I also elicit beliefs about the self-
ishness of worker participants according to their fairness view. To elicit predictors’
beliefs about the correlation between fairness views and selfishness, I ask predictors
about their beliefs about workers voting for or against redistribution which have no
incentives over the outcome of the vote.7 Predictors are incentivized to predict the
selfishness of workers with no incentives over outcomes casting an un-incentivized
vote for redistribution Ei[µξ], against redistribution E
i[µλ] and how many workers
with no incentives over the outcome of the vote find redistribution fair Ei[1 − α].8
Finally, predictors are asked about their own fairness view, mi ∈ {ξ, λ}.
7To make these beliefs relate to concrete outcomes rather than hypothetical scenarios, I had a
small group of six workers randomly selected from the same subject sample complete the worker
role without actually working, i.e., these workers just voted for redistribution for other workers,
flipped a coin 10 times and reported the number of favourable outcomes.
8An empirically observed predictor of fairness view m expectation of shares of selfish types µn
is notated Em[µn]; while a theoretical predictor belief is notated µ
m
n . This is done to save notation
in the theory section.
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3.1. Overview of the experiment
Workers
Stage 1 2 3 4
Workers
flip a coin
10 times
and re-
port the
number of
favourable
flips; µi.
Work Ses-
sion 1:
partici-
pants copy
words from
text.
All workers are
informed whether
his number of
correctly copied
words is above or
below the median.
(oh/ol)
Workers vote
for either redis-
tribution or no
redistribution
(r/nr) to deter-
mine first round
payments; (y) or
{yl, yh}.
Predictors
Stage 1 2 3 4 5
Predict pa-
rameters for
workers: E[µ];
E[µr], E[µnr]
Predict pa-
rameters for
workers with
no incentives
in outcomes:
E[1 − α];
E[µξ], E[µλ]
Predictors
flip a coin
and report
the number
of favourable
flips
Predictors re-
port what op-
tion they find
fair, which de-
termines their
type of fair-
ness view m ∈
{ξ, λ}
Receive pay-
ment relative
to prediction
accuracy
Note: Overview of the different experiment stages for the two experimental roles, workers and
predictors. The workers complete their stages before the predictors. Participants fill only one of
two roles.
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4. Descriptive statistics and results
A laboratory experiment with law students from the University of Bergen was con-
ducted on September 3rd 2015. The Faculty of Law at the University of Bergen has
only one field of study, law. Consequently, sessions only involved students from the
same field of study. If the data were drawn from, for example, the social science
faculty where students have different specializations, i.e., sociology and economics,
different redistributive votes would likely reflect stereotypes about different social
groups. The sample size was 210 predictor participants and 18 worker participants.
I conducted an online study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (MTurk) of 99
American respondents to ensure that our selfishness measure is uncorrelated with
ideological preferences, i.e., to confirm that the measure of selfishness is orthogonal
to fairness views.9 Details of all regression results in the main text are included
in Appendix 2, Section 7.1. The results from the MTurk study are described in
Appendix 4.
9 I use which redistribution option predictors reported to find fair as a measure of their fairness
view, rather than cast vote. About 15 per cent of the predictors voted for another redistribution
alternative then what they reported to find fair. Except for projection bias in fairness views, all
results were insignificant when applying predictors’ behaviour, i.e., casting the third-party vote, as
the measure of fairness view. This indicates that beliefs regarding other’s intentions correlate with
what predictors report as being fair, but has weaker correlation with what vote predictors believe is
fair. The pre-experiment hypothesis and analysis plan are available in the online pre-analysis plan
(Schøyen, 2017). This plan was posted online before the author had access to the data from the
main experiment.
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4.1. Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of workers and predictors votes and how they scored on the
measure of selfishness, reported the number of favourable coin tosses, is presented in
Table 1. The majority of workers and predictors were egalitarians. The self-reported
number of coin flips indicates that some participants exaggerated the number of
favourable coin flips to earn more.
Table 1. Actual behaviour: group averages
N Egalitarians 1-α µξ µλ
Predictors 210 56% 6.11 6.55
(2.0) (2.13 )
N Votes for redistribution P (vr) µr µnr
Workers 18 66% 5.5 6.33
(1.62) (1.63)
Note: Redistributive votes P (vr), fairness views (1− α), and reported favourable coin flips µ. The
top line shows the average reported number of favourable coin flips out of 10 tosses, by predictors’
fairness view and number of participants with an egalitarian fairness view. The bottom panel shows
how many workers voted for redistribution and the average number of reported coin flips by their
vote.
The summary statistics of predictors’ expectations of worker behaviour are presented
in Table 2. Predictors of both egalitarian and libertarian fairness views expected
other participants to over-report the number of favourable coin flips. Workers vot-
ing for no redistribution were expected to over-report the number of coin flips to a
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greater extent compared with workers voting for redistribution. As I show in the
results section, the magnitudes and significances of the differences in expectations
of selfishness between libertarian and egalitarian predictors increase when I compare
differences within one predictor’s estimates rather than with group averages.
Table 2. Predicted behaviour: group averages
N E[1-α] E[µr] E[µnr] E[µξ] E[µλ]
Average predictions 210 60 5.42 6.83 5.75 6.58
(24) (1.29) (1.70) (1.63) (1.29)
Average predictions by egalitarians (ξ) 126 67 5.33 6.94 5.72 6.72
(21) (1.25) (1.69) (1.26 ) (1.63)
Average predictions by libertarians (λ) 84 50 5.56 6.65 5.79 6.37
(25) (1.33) (1.70) (1.38) (1.61 )
Note: The table shows the predicted prevalence of fairness views E[α] and predicted average re-
ported favourable coin flips E[µ], among workers according to their votes E[µr], E[µnr] and accord-
ing to their fairness view, E[µξ], E[µλ].
4.2. Results
To study suspicious attribution, I focus on the within-predictor difference in esti-
mated average difference in selfishness between workers voting for or against redis-
tribution, Ei[µnr − µr]. While predictors of both fairness views predict that workers
voting for no redistribution are more selfish, predictors with an egalitarian fairness
view predict a larger difference between workers voting for no redistribution and for
redistribution than libertarian predictors. The differences between egalitarian and
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libertarian predictors’ selfishness estimates according to workers’ votes, Ei[µnr−µr],
and the actual difference, µnr − µr, is shown in Figure 3. The figure shows the aver-
age difference between predictors estimate of average selfishness for workers casting
a vote for redistribution and against redistribution for egalitarian and libertarian
predictors.
This finding can also be shown in a regression framework; I now turn to a regres-
sion analysis of the correlation between predictors’ expected differences in workers’
selfishness according to their votes and the predictors’ fairness view. The binary
variable Dξ indicates a predictors fairness view; it is equal to 1 if a predictor finds
the redistribution option the fair option and 0 else. I estimate the following.
Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Dξ + i (4.1)
The difference in predictors’ expectations of selfishness contingent on vote according
to the predictors’ fairness view β1 in 4.1, is estimated to be 0.51 (0.063) while β0
is estimated to be 1.093(0.000); egalitarians predict the difference in selfishness be-
tween workers voting for redistribution or no redistribution is about one-third larger
than libertarians.10 This is the main finding of the experiment: egalitarians consider
a vote for no redistribution to be a significantly stronger signal of selfishness than
libertarians, suggesting that the fairness view affects intention attribution. Based on
this I establish the first result as follows.
Result 1: Participants’ interpretation of intentions behind redistribution
choices differ according to their fairness view.
10The probability of no effect given the observed estimate, p-value, are stated in parenthesis
throughout the main text. The standard deviations of the estimates can be found in Section 7.1 in
the appendix.
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Figure 3: Differences in the predictors’ reported expected average number of coin flips between
workers voting for redistribution, full redistribution or no redistribution Em[µnr − µr], reported
by predictors’ fairness view m ∈ {ξ, λ}. The solid horizontal line the sample differences between
workers voting for no redistribution or voting for redistribution µnr−µr, 1.3 coin flips. Egalitarians
display significant suspicious attribution bias for no-redistribution votes. Libertarians have an
insignificant suspicious attribution bias for distribution votes.
The differences in averages observed in Figure 3 imply that the suspicious attribution
of no-redistribution votes among egalitarian predictors drives Result 1. In the theory
section I have established that suspicious attribution can be driven by both projection
bias in fairness views and out-group stereotypes. I now analyze whether predictors
have projection bias and out-group stereotypes. I then analyze whether these beliefs
drive Result 1.
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As shown in Figure 4 the predictors displayed projection bias in fairness views; lib-
ertarian predictors reported they thought half the workers were libertarians, E[1 −
αλ] = 0.5, while egalitarians thought about two thirds of workers were egalitarians,
E[1 − αξ] = 0.67. The actual prevalence among the 210 predictors was in between
these estimates, 1 − αξ = 0.56; thus, both egalitarian and libertarian predictors
overestimated the commonness of their fairness view and predictors of both fairness
views displayed projection bias. This can be seen from Figure 4. Based on this, I
establish my second result as follows.
Result 2: Projection bias in fairness views
I find out-group bias, measured by the difference between real and expected self-
ishness, for workers with an egalitarian or libertarian fairness view. This can be
seen from Figure 5. Egalitarian predictors expected the difference in selfihness for
workers casting un-incentivized votes against and for redistribution, Ei[µλ − µξ], to
be equal to 1, while libertarian predictors expected this difference to be equal to
0.58. The difference for the sample µλ − µξ for the 210 predictors was 0.57. Hence,
egalitarian predictors has an upwardly biased perception of the selfishness libertarian
workers, while libertarian predictors has accurate beliefs. The difference between ob-
served behavior and expected selfishness, according to the predictors’ fairness view,
is illustrated in Figure. 5.
I now turn to a regression analysis of the correlation between the differences in out-
group stereotypes, measured by expected selfishness according to workers’ fairness
view, Ei[µλ − µξ], and predictors’ fairness view, Dξ.
Ei[µλ − µξ] = β0 + β1Dξ + i (4.2)
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The effect of a predictor being egalitarian with regards to out-group stereotypes, β1,
is estimated at 0.41(0.11). Both egalitarians and libertarians expect libertarians to
be more selfish, but egalitarians more so and more than the actual observed differ-
ence. Thus, I find that egalitarians have an out-group stereotype in their beliefs
about the selfishhness of the libertarians, while I find no evidence of this for the
libertarians. I establish the following as a result.
Result 3: Egalitarians have biased out-group stereotypes against liber-
tarians.
I find that predictors’ prevalence estimate of egalitarian fairness views among the
workers, Ei[1 − α], and out-group stereotypes against libertarians, Ei[µξ − µλ], are
significantly positively correlated with attribution of selfishness to no-redistribution
votes. I regress the difference in reported coin flips, Ei[µnr − µr], on the prevalence
estimates as follows.
Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Ei[1− α] + i (4.3)
Expecting more participants to hold an egalitarian fairness view significantly corre-
lates with predictions of the difference in selfishness between workers voting for no
redistribution and redistribution; the effect on predictors’ estimates of Ei[µnr − µr]
of one more participant holding an egalitarian fairness view out of 100 workers,
Ei[1− α], is estimated at 0.95(0.093).
Out-group stereotypes against libertarians significantly correlated with suspicious
attribution of no-redistribution votes, Ei[µnr −µr]. I measure out-group stereotypes
as measured by differences in selfishness workers of different fairness views, Ei[µλ −
µξ], as follows.
130
Figure 4: Distribution of predictors’ estimates of how many workers find redistribution fair,
Ei[1−α], reported by predictors’ fairness view. The solid horizontal line indicates the sample value
for the 210 predictors; (1−α) = 56 per cent of predictors cast an un-incentivized vote that workers
should redistribute.
Figure 5: Difference in predictors’ reported expected average number of coin flips between workers
casting an un-incentivized vote for no redistribution or full redistribution, Ei[µλ−µξ], reported by
predictors’ fairness view. The solid horizontal line indicates true differences in reported coin flips
between participants casting an un-incentivized vote for no redistribution or full redistribution in
the sample of 210 predictors; µnr − µr = 0.56 coin flips.
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Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β2Ei[µλ − µξ] + i (4.4)
The effect of out-group stereotypes on suspicious attribution β2 is estimated to be
0.40(0). Based on this, I establish my fourth and final result.
Result 4: Both projection bias and out-group stereotypes account for
suspicious attribution of no redistribution votes.
Out-group stereotypes explain suspicious attribution to a larger degree than projec-
tion bias; regressing predictors expected differences in workers selfishness according
to workers votes, Ei[µnr − µr], on out-group stereotypes, Ei[µλ − µξ], (4.4), gives
a higher explained variance R2 than regressing on prevalence estimates,Ei[1 − α],
(4.3). The correlation between differences in workers selfishness according to vote
and prevalence estimates, becomes insignificant when including out-group stereo-
types effects. The correlation between out-group stereotypes is robust to the inclu-
sion of control variables; out-group stereotypes correlate with degree of suspicious
attribution when the control variables are included. Details on this results along
with additional regression results in shown in Section 7.2 of Appendix 2. In generall
the results indicates that out-group stereotypes are the main driver of the suspicious
attributions of no-redistribution votes.
Summary of main findings
Defining a bias as a deviation from the observed sample averages, my findings of
fairness view are summarized in Table 4.
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Table 4. Main findings: Differences in individual predictors.
Egalitarians Libertarians
Suspicious attribution bias Significant bias Insignificant Bias
Projection bias Significant bias Significant bias
Out-group stereotype bias Significant bias Accurate beliefs
Note: The table shows which biases are found in the beliefs of egalitarian and libertarian predic-
tors.
Note that the theory section predicts that libertarians should have weaker suspicious
attribution of no-redistribution votes if their beliefs about out-group stereotypes are
accurate; my data are supportive of such a mechanism. Finally, note from Figure 3
and Figure 4 that egalitarian predictors believe that workers casting a vote for no
redistribution are more selfish than workers with a libertarian fairness view. This
difference in beliefs about workers casting a vote or holding a fairness view is also
reflected in the level differences in Table 3. This finding is compatible with the
theoretical framework of suspicious attribution; egalitarians predictors believe no-
redistribution votes are cast by both selfish egalitarians and by libertarians, whom
they believe there to be fewer of and to be more selfish than egalitarians.
5. Conclusion
I find evidence that people systematically interpret intentions behind redistribution
choices differently according to their fairness views: egalitarian predictors have sig-
nificant suspicious attribution bias of no-redistribution votes, whereas libertarian
predictors have insignificant suspicious attribution bias of redistribution votes. The
predictors were paid according to their accuracy and the setting encouraged them to
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provide their best guess of the behaviour of fellow in-group members. The combina-
tion of material incentives and framing creates competition for accuracy and makes
it reasonable to assume the measured effect does not reflect differences in partici-
pants’ points of view; rather, the experiment shows supportive evidence of suspicious
attribution among egalitarians. Furthermore, suspicious attribution in my experi-
ment is correlated with projection bias and out-group stereotypes, which supports
the premises of the proposed model of intention attribution.
Suspicious attribution is potentially crucial for understanding the maintenance of
social group boundaries, especially why social groups do not erode in the face of
heterogenous behaviour. Suspicious attribution can account for maintenance of social
group boundaries as it enables people to sustain their belief in the superiority of
their own fairness view. Let us assume that people did not have any suspicious
attribution bias when considering the intentions of heterogenous behaviour of in-
group members, where by in-group members are meant individuals considered to
be relevant sources of social signals. In the absence of suspicious attribution bias,
people’s estimates of heterogeneity of fairness views would increase as they encounter
heterogenous behaviour among in-group members. Heterogenous behaviour would
not be attributed to incentive differences; the behavior would the be attributed to
heterogenous social preferences. This would then lead people to question their own
social preferences, or question the relevance of signals from in-group members as
relevant social information. These two mechanisms would erode identification with
social groups, but are avoided under suspicious attribution.
There are several theoretical and empirical questions arising from this work that
can be addressed in future research. A promising theoretical extension is to analyze
what actions can be equilibrium signals of low-selfishness, i.e., faithful attribution.
This question can be analyzed by allowing workers to have preferences for identi-
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fication as a non-selfish type, to investigate how material incentives, fairness views
and prevalence of types, interact to allow different actions to signal non-selfishness
in equilibrium. Such an extension of the theory can address questions of how sophis-
tication of beliefs, i.e., second or third order beliefs of how others infer intentions,
affect inference in real life. In particular, it seems promising to analyze the develop-
ment of “cheap talk” political correctness or controversial stands as a costly signal of
being a type concerned with outcomes. Furthermore, adding dynamic processes of
updating can address how fast updating happens when incentives for actions change.
In other words, when do actions that are antiquated in bringing about good out-
comes linger as a signal of non-selfishness after incentives for actions have changed?
This can help explain what determines whether a society is prone to conservative or
progressive attitudes. Another possible extension is analyzing how much provision
there will be of a particular type of action as a function of its ability to signal being
a non-selfish type.
The experiment design can address a number of other empirical examples to investi-
gate intention attribution in other settings. Finding suitable situations where ulterior
motives or differences in internalized beliefs could explain differences in choice arising
from salient cleavages other than political, such as ethnic, gender, national, religious
or other social cleavages. One example could be religious practices. Assume that
dedication to a faith and beliefs about the correct practice vary; do more orthodox
believers suspiciously attribute the intentions of liberal statements? Another appli-
cation of the model could be to understand how people attribute intentions to stated
views on immigration policies. Assume people hold varying beliefs about the social
desirability of open borders and varying degrees of willingness to contribute to social
welfare; do people believing in the social desirability of an open border immigration
policy have suspicious attribution of votes against open borders?
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Suspicious attribution bias has troublesome implications for societies with large plu-
rality of fairness views. The bias implies that larger heterogeneity of behaviour
leads to more behaviour being attributed to selfishness. This will lead members of
heterogenous societies to have a negative bias in their estimates of the number of
non-selfish types. Moving beyond attribution of non-selfish intentions, to attribution
of hostile intentions, the mechanism can contribute to cycles of distrust and eventual
conflict, cycles that can arise even among rational actors (Acemoglu and Wolitzky,
2014). Hence, perhaps the most important line of future research is to investigate
what can decrease our tendency towards suspicious attribution. This research can
contribute to identifying interventions that can reduce prejudice and conflict (Paluck,
2012) and help to avoid traps of suspicious attribution.
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6. Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of theorem of no suspicious attribution
A predictor will not gain any information about whether a worker is selfish from any
vote vi ∈ {vr, vnr} if he believes that the following two conditions hold.
(i) There is an equal probability of a worker holding either fairness view, α = 1
2
.
(ii) The probability of a selfish type for all fairness views is equal to µξ = µλ.
Proof: A non-informative vote implies that the probability of a selfish type is equal
for both votes, i.e., E[µr] = E[µnr]. Thus, the theorem implies that if µξ = µλ and
α = 1
2
, then E[µr] = E[µnr] = µ
′. Substituting µξ = µλ = µ′ and α = 12 into (2.3)
gives E[µnr] = µ
′.

Proof of Proposition 1. Intention attribution and projection bias in fair-
ness views
Take any two fairness views n and m ∈ {ξ, λ} such that m 6= n. If holders of fairness
views m and n have common beliefs about the portion of selfish types, µmξ = µ
n
ξ and
µmλ = µ
n
λ, projection bias implies a predictor with view m taking a vote adhering to
view n as a stronger signal of selfishness than a predictor with view n.
Proof: The definition of projection bias, (2.6), implies that the proposition holds
if a vote not adhering to the predictor’s fairness view is always taken as a stronger
signal of selfishness for lower prevalence of opposing fairness view, i.e., ∂E
ξ[µnr]
∂α
< 0
and ∂E
λ[µr]
∂(1−α) < 0 must hold for any µξ, µλ.
I now show that ∂E
ξ[µnr]
∂α
< 0 holds for any µξξ, µ
ξ
λ. From (2.3) I attain that requiring
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∂Eξ[µnr]
∂α
< 0 implies [µξλα + µ
ξ
ξ(1 − αξ)] > [µξξ − µξλ]. This implies that the weighted
average of beliefs of the prevalence of selfish types for both fairness views must be
larger than the difference in the prevalence of selfish types between the two groups.
As average selfishness is a convex combination of selfishness of the two groups, and
I have assumed that the support of the prevalence of selfish types is µi ∈ (0, 1), this
strict inequality always holds. Hence, ∂E
ξ[µnr]
∂α
< 0 holds for any µξ, µλ.
∂E [µr]
∂(1−α) < 0
follows mutatis mutandis.

Proof of Proposition 2. Intention attribution and out-group stereotypes
Out-group stereotypes increase the difference between the predicted selfishness of
workers casting votes not adhering and workers casting adhering to the fairness view
of the predictor.
Proof: Out-group stereotypes are defined as µ−j − µj. Thus the proposition im-
plies that the difference in perceived selfishness between votes for no redistribution
and redistribution should increase in the difference in the portion of selfish liber-
tarians and egalitarians; ∂E[µnr−µr]
∂[µλ−µξ] > 0. It follows from the probability of a no
redistribution vote being cast by a selfish type, (2.4), and the equivalent expression
for redistribution votes that
E[µnr − µr] = µ[ 1
µ+ 2(1− µλ)α −
1
µ+ 2(1− α)(1− µξ) ]
, which always increases in µλ, decraces in µξ and thus grows in [µλ−µξ]. The proof
for the difference between a redistribution or no-redistribution vote and [µξ − µλ]
follows mutatis mutandis.

139
Proof of Theorem of Suspicious Attribution Bias
Assume a predictor of fairness view m holds a rational or an upward biased belief
about the portion of selfish types in his in-group, µmm ≥ µWm . The predictor’s belief
that a vote not adhering to his fairness view is cast by a selfish type will be biased
upward if either:
(i) the predictor has biased out-group stereotypes, µmn > µ
W
n ,
(ii) the predictor has projection bias in fairness views.
Proof: For an egalitarian predictor the belief that a worker is a selfish type after
observing a vote not adhering to his fairness view is Eξ[µnr]. Assume the em-
pirical portions are {µWλ , µWξ , αW} and an egalitarian predictor holds some beliefs
{µξλ, µξξ, αξ} such that µξλ > µWλ , αξ < αW , µξξ ≥ µWξ . Part (i) of the theorem follows
from that it is assumed that µmm ≥ µWm , out-group stereotypes are defined as µλ− µξ
and ∂E
ξ[µr]
∂µξξ
> 0 which follows from (2.3). Thus Eξ[µnr] will be upward biased if
µξλ > µ
W
λ . Claim (ii) follows from
∂Eξ[µnr]
∂αξ
< 0, as follows from the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. That a libertarian will have biased beliefs of a selfish type, Eλ[µr], according
to (i) and (ii) follows mutatis mutandis.

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7. Appendix 2: Further data
7.1. Main regression results
Result 1: Participants’ interpretation of intentions behind redistribution
choices differ by fairness view. Predictors’ estimated difference in selfishness
between workers voting for no redistribution or full redistribution is higher for egal-
itarian predictors (4.1) :Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Dξ + i.
Table A 1. Suspicious attribution and fairness view
Dependent variable:
Ei[µnr − µr]
Dξ 0.518∗
(0.278)
Constant 1.093 ∗∗∗
(0.216)
Observations 210
R2 0.0165
Adjusted R2 0.0117
Residual std. error 807.427 (df = 208)
F statistic 3.48 (df = 1; 208)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Result 3: Biased out-group stereotypes against libertarians among egali-
tarians.
Egalitarian predictors estimate higher differences between egalitarian and libertarian
selfishness: (4.2) :Ei[µξ − µλ] = β0 + β1Dξ + i.
Table A 2. Out-group stereotypes and fairness view
Dependent variable:
Ei[µξ − µλ]
Dξ 0.414
(0.258)
Constant 0.581∗∗∗
(0.201)
Observations 210
R2 0.012
Adjusted R2 0.007
Residual std. error 698.886 (df = 208)
F statistic 2.57 (df = 1; 208)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
142
Result 4: Both projection bias and out-group stereotypes account for
suspicious attribution of no-redistribution votes.
Projection bias predicts differences in predictors’ estimates of selfishness between
workers voting for high and no redistribution: (4.3): Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Ei[1 −
α] + i.
Table A 3. Correlation between suspicious attribution and projection
bias.
Dependent variable:
Ei[µnr − µr]
Ei[1− α] 0.948∗∗
(0.093)
Constant 0.833∗∗∗
(0.024)
Observations 210
R2 0.013
Adjusted R2 0.008
Residual std. error 809.825 (df = 208)
F statistic 2.85 (df = 1; 208)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The out-group stereotype predicts differences in predictors’ estimates of selfishness
between workers voting for high and no redistribution: (4.4) Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 +
β2E
i[µλ − µξ] + i.
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Table A 4. Correlation between suspicious attribution and out-group
stereotypes.
Dependent variable:
Ei[µnr − µr]
Ei[µλ − µξ] 0.396∗∗∗
(0.069)
Constant 1.077∗∗∗
(0.139)
Observations 210
R2 0.131
Adjusted R2 0.131
Residual std. error 709.900 (df = 208)
F statistic 32.53 (df = 1; 208)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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7.2. Details of Result 4: Both projection bias and out-group stereotypes account for
suspicious attribution of no-redistribution votes.
I show here that Result 4 in the results section is robust. I show how explained
variance R2 and significance change with the inclusion of different variables that
explain predictors’ expected differences between the selfishness of workers voting for
redistribution or no redistribution, Ei[µnr−µr]. I define Ei[µ] as the expectation of a
general participant’s reported number of coin flips, and Dfemale as a binary variable
which is one if the predictor is female. Finally, I define the variable DRParty and
DNRParty as a binary variable indicating whether the participant reported voting
for a political party actively pursuing redistribution at the last national election.
I regress the difference in predictors’ expected differences in average coin flips for
workers voting for and against redistribution, on both their prevalence estimate of
egalitarians, their out-group stereotypes and with and without control variables.
Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Ei[1− α] + β2Ei[µλ − µξ] + i (7.1)
Ei[µnr − µr] = β0 + β1Ei[1− α] + β2Ei[µλ − µξ] + β3Ei[µ] + β4Dfemale + β5
DRParty + β6DNRParty + i(7.2)
Table A 1 compares the explained variance, R2, from the regressions and the coeffi-
cients with the from regressing Ei[µnr−µr] on only the predictors prevalence estimate
of egalitarian predictors Ei[1−α] (4.3), and out-group stereotypes Ei[µλ−µξ] (4.4):
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Table A 5. Regression results from estimating (4.3), (4.4),(7.1) and (7.2)
Table 2: Correlation of suspicious attribution of no-redistribution votes Ei[µnr − µr].
Regression Ei[α] Ei[µλ − µξ] R2
(4.3) 0.95* · 0.013
(0.56)
(4.4) · 2.68* 0.013
(1.39)
(7.1) 0.67 0.39*** 0.142
(0.52) (0.07)
(7.2) 0.70 0.38*** 0.142
(0.52) (0.07)
Table 3: *, P-value < 0.10, ***, P-value < 0.01.
Note: The table shows how predictors’ expected prevalence of egalitarians, Ei[α], and out-group
stereotypes correlate with their suspicious attribution of votes against redistribution, Ei[µλ − µξ].
This evidence suggests that both projection bias and out-group stereotypes con-
tribute to the interpretation of intentions, but that out-group stereotypes are the
main driver. All control variables in (7.2) were highly insignificant apart from Ei[µ],
where β3 was estimated to equal 0.41(0.10). Participants with higher µ estimates
also estimated higher differences in conditional µm estimates.
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7.3. Other findings from the main experiment
I find that the majority of our sample, 96 per cent, understand the incentive struc-
tures underlying the redistribution setting in the experiment: a necessary premise
for my model of beliefs to be relevant.
Both egalitarians and libertarians expect worker participants to cast an incentivized
vote for no redistribution, and finding no redistribution fair to report more coin flips.
Considering the difference within one participant’s reported expectations, libertarian
participants expect the reporting difference to be 1.6, whereas a libertarian partici-
pant expects the difference to be 1. The actual difference in reported coin flips for
the worker sample of N = 18 is 1.3.
Participants seem to have comprehended the basic premise of incentives underlying
the vote for redistribution; 96 per cent answered the comprehension check correctly.
I found that men reported significantly more coin flips than women, 7.2 for males
versus 5.7 for females. Women also expect others to report significantly fewer coin
flips than men. Setting the variable DFemale equal to 1 for females and 0 for males,
I estimate the regression as follows.
Ei[µ] = β0 + β1D
Female + i (7.3)
The estimate of β1 is −0.47(0.01); women expect others to report 0.5 coin flips fewer
than men. Finally, I find projection bias in the reported number of coin flips. We
regress participants’ reported number of coin flips CR on the expected reported
number of coin flips among other participants as follows.
Ei[µ] = β0 + β1CR + i (7.4)
The estimate of β1 is 0.18(0.0); for each additional coin flip, the expected reported
number of coin flips among other participants increases by 0.18 flips. Finally, the
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participants’ risk or political preferences did not correlate with their fairness views,
their reported expectations of other participants’ coin flips or their own reported
coin flips.
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7.4. MTurk test
On August 24, 2015, an MTurk pilot was conducted. The full experimental instruc-
tions for both pilots can be found in the online pre-analysis plan (Schøyen, 2017). The
main goal was to show that elicitation of selfish types was orthogonal to the fairness
preference; i.e., egalitarians and libertarians to an equal degree found lying about
coin flips an immoral act. This is equivalent to Assumption 1. B of the theoretical
model and crucial for the design to measure the intentions behind the redistribution
choice. The study was conducted on a sample of 99 American MTurk respondents.
Eighty-eight of the 99 respondents reported that they thought it was immoral to
report the wrong value on a coin flip in a situation where reporting another value
will result in a monetary pay-off. Furthermore, there was zero correlation between
attitudes towards misreporting and third-party preferences for redistribution in a
setting similar to the main experiment.
Participants also reported that they expected participants voting for no redistribution
to report significantly more coin flips and be less likely to donate money to charity
in a hypothetical scenario similar to the main experiment. Applying the coin flip
measure as a measure of selfishness, the estimate of Em[µnr − µr] was 0.60(0.05),
i.e., non-redistributors were expected to report about 50 per cent more favourable
coin tosses. Using the number of people in every 100 people who are likely to donate
an amount of 5 USD to the non-governmental organization “Save the children” as a
measure of selfishness, the estimate of Em[µnr − µr] was 21(0.00); i.e., participants
expected 21 fewer people in every 100 no-redistributors to donate to charity.
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8. Appendix 4: Experiment instructions
In the following, the experiment instructions are described in order of appearance
for each treatment. Before entering the experiment, the subjects in all sessions and
treatments were informed that their response is completely anonymous. Before ev-
ery session, standard introductory information was presented and after every session,
information about age, gender and which political party the subject would vote for
at a national election was elicited. These questions were similar for all sessions and
consequently it is described at the end.
Note that the workers with no incentives over outcomes are referred to as ”third
party” workers in both experimental instructions and in the headlines of the experi-
mental instructions.
8.1. S.1 Work phase. Participants assigned as workers
Experiment introduction is identical for all participants and described at the end.
8.1.1. S.1 T.1 Selfish action
At your desk, a five kroner coin should be available. When you entered the experi-
ment, the instructor should have shown you how to flip a coin and how to spin the
coin. You are now asked to flip or spin the coin 10 times; if your coin lands with the
inscription ”KONGERIKET NORGE ” facing up, you will receive 4 kroner. If your
coin lands with the side with the inscription “5 KRONER” facing up, you receive
nothing.
How many times did the coin land on the side with the inscription “KONGERIKET
NORGE ” facing up?
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8.1.2. S.1 T.2 Work section
Copy the following text. [See Figure 1.] You are given 15 minutes. If the number
of correct words you copy is above the median number copied words in your exper-
imental session, you will be paid 100 kroner. If you copy the median number of
words or below you will be paid nothing. The median is a type of mean measure; the
“median” is the ”middle” value in the list of numbers. If you are not sure about the
meaning of “median”, please raise you hand and we’ll come and assist you. You must
finish at least 100 words to complete the task and be eligible for payment and further
participation in this work round. The text you write will be matched with the orig-
inal text, and its similarity will determine how many correct words will be registered.
Words are shown as in Figure.1. The participants have 15 minutes to finish the
task. They see a text to copy and can press a menu button for more text.
Figure 6: Part of the text the participants will copy.
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The workers completing the copying task and are assigned their payment.
8.1.3. S.1 T.3 Information about income
You produced over the median number of correctly copied words and are assigned a
payment of 100 kroner.
or
You produced the median number of correctly copied words or below, and are as-
signed a payment of 0 kroner.
We have now assigned either 100 or 0 kroner to all participants in the session who
completed the task, in line with the payment schedule we presented before the pro-
duction phase. As a result, half of the participants that completed the task have been
assigned an income of 100 kroner and half of the participants have been assigned an
income of 0 kroner as payment for copying text.
8.1.4. S.1 T.4 Vote over relative income
There will now be a vote amongst you and the other members in your experimental
session who completed the task. The vote will be on whether or not the income from
the experimental session should be equally redistributed amongst the workers within
the experimental session. If the redistribution option is chosen, everyone receives
50 kroner. If the no-redistribution option is chosen, the participants producing over
median keep the income they were previously assigned. The option that receives the
most votes will be implemented. In the unlikely event of a draw an option will be
chosen at random.
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Before you vote you are asked to answer two questions.
Question.1. Not casting a vote, just asking hypothetically, what do you think is
the fairest way to pay the participants of this experiment?
 I think the fairest option is the redistribution option.
 I think the fairest option is the no-redistribution option.
Question.2. If the redistribution option is chosen everyone receives 50 kroner. If
the no-redistribution option is chosen the workers who copied above median number
of words keep their earnings of 100 kroner and the other workers receive 0 kroner.
To make sure that you have understood the instructions, please tick off which one of
the two alternatives below is correct:
 The workers who copied above median number of words will make more money
if the no-redistribution option is implemented. The workers with median or below
number of words will make more money if the redistribution option is implemented.
I believe the workers with the median number of words or below words will make
more money if the no-redistribution option is implemented. The workers with above
median number of words will make more money if the redistribution option is chosen.
You will now cast your vote. Your vote together with the other votes in your group
will count in which redistribution option is implemented.
 I vote for the redistribution option.
153
 I vote for the no-redistribution option.
Vote is cast and the result of the vote is shown to the participants.
The redistribution option was chosen; or The no-redistribution option was chosen.
8.1.5. S.1.T.7 Work phase 2
You now enter the second work phase.
Copy the following text. [See Figure] You are given 15 minutes. If the number
of words you correctly copy is above median you will be paid 100 kroner. If you copy
the median number of words or below you will be paid nothing. You must finish at
least 100 words to complete the task and be eligible for payment.
You produced over the median number of correctly copied words and are assigned a
payment of 100 kroner.
or
You produced the median number of correctly copied words or below and are as-
signed a payment of 0 kroner.
In this round, your payment will be determined by participants who act as third
party spectators and who do not have any personal stake in the decision.
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Vote casted by third party participants.
If the redistribution option was chosen:
The redistribution option was chosen; you and everyone else will be paid 50 kroner.
If the no-redistribution option was chosen: The no-redistribution option was cho-
sen. You produced the median or under and are consequently paid 0 kroner.
or The no-redistribution option was chosen. You produced over or the median and
are consequently paid 100 kroner.
Half of the participants received an income of 100 kroner while the other half receive
0 kroner.
S.1 End
8.2. S.2 Third party
Experiment introduction is identical for all participants and described in the end.
Note that the third parties are in the same session as the workers.
8.2.1. S.1 T.1 Selfish action
At you desk, a five kroner coin should be available. When you entered the experi-
ment, the instructor should have shown you how to flip a coin and how to spin the
coin. You are now asked to flip or spin the coin 10 times; if your coin lands with the
inscription ”KONGERIKET NORGE ” facing up, you will receive 4 kroner. If your
coin lands with the side with the inscription ”5 KRONER” facing up, you receive
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nothing.
How many times did the coin land on the side with the inscription ”KONGERIKET
NORGE ” facing up?. . . . . . .
times.
All third party participants wait while the workers work.
8.2.2. S.1 T.5 Third parties vote over redistribution
The participants assigned the role as a worker have completed a work task. The work
task consisted of copying words from a book for 15 minutes. The participants that
completed above the mean number of words, were assigned a payment of 100 kroner
for their work. The ones producing the mean or below, were assigned nothing for
their work. The median is a type of average measure; the ”median” is the ”middle”
value in the list of numbers. If you are not sure about the meaning of ”median”,
please raise you hand and we’ll come and assist you. The participants were aware of
this income assignment mechanism before they carried out the task.
There will now be a vote amongst you and the other experimental participants as-
signed the role of decision maker on whether or not the income of the workers should
be equally redistributed amongst the workers within the experimental session.
The option that gets the most votes will be chosen. In the unlikely event of a
draw, an option will be chosen at random. If the redistribution option is chosen
everyone receives 50 kroner, if redistribution is not chosen the participants keep the
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income they were previously assigned.
Before you vote you are asked to answer two questions.
Question.1. Not casting a vote; just asking hypothetically what do you think is
the fairest way to pay the participants of this experiment?
 I think the fairest option is the redistribution option.
 I think the fairest option is the no-redistribution option.
Question.2. If the redistribution option is chosen everyone receives 50 kroner. If
the no-redistribution option is chosen the workers who copied above median number
of words keep their earnings of 100 kroner and the other workers receive 0 kroner.
To make sure that you have understood the instructions, please tick off which one of
the two alternatives below is correct:
 The workers who copied above median number of words will make more money if
the no-redistribution option is implemented. The with workers with median or below
number of words will make more money if the redistribution option is implemented.
 I believe the workers with the median number of words or below words will make
more money if the no-redistribution option is implemented. The workers with above
median number of words will make more money if the redistriution option is chosen.
You now cast the counting vote. Please note that the result of the vote will have no
economic consequences for the participants that were chosen not to have the role of
worker. The outcome of the vote has no economic consequences for you.
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 I vote for the redistribution option.
 I vote for the no-redistribution option.
The vote is cast and the result of the vote is shown to the participants.
The redistribution option was chosen. or The no-redistribution option was cho-
sen.
Age, gender, risk- and political preferences are elicited. These questions are simi-
lar for all participants and described at the end.
Thank you for your participation!
8.3. S3. Prediction session
S.3 In the prediction phase, a new group of experimental subjects referred to as pre-
dictors will make incentivized guesses of the overall portions of workers and third
parties that made which choices. They will also guess what the correlation between
the choices made in S.1. and S.2. The predictors make their guesses in a separate
sessions after the work phase
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8.3.1. S.3 T.1 Prediction of worker behavior
Experiment overview. You are to guess what portion of the participants acted in
what way in a previous experimental session previously held at this school. The
experiment and all the relevant details will be described to you. The data from the
experiment has been recorded and your payment will be higher the more precise
your estimate the data. The precision of your estimate is measured by a quadratic
function. You are paid increasingly more the more precise you are, and if you guess
the exact value you will be paid 20 kroner. If it is off by more than 15 percent, you
will not be paid for the estimate. For details on the scoring rule press here.
Link to exact description of scoring rule.
After the experiment has been described to you, you will be shown the exact menus
and choices offered at the first session.
As mentioned, an experimental session was held earlier today or yesterday in this
room with participants from your school. In the experiment, participants assigned
the role of workers did two different tasks.
First the participants were asked to flip or spin a Norwegian 5 kroner coin 10 times.
Before flipping the coin they were told that each time the coin landed with the head
side up they would receive 4 kroner. No one else than the participants themselves
would observe the result of the coin flip and there would be no way after flipping
the coin to check how it landed. The coin given has equal probability of landing on
each side so that if all participants reported truthfully, half of them would rapport
the coin landing on”KONGERIKET NORGE ”.
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After completing this task, the participants assigned the role of workers did a sec-
ond task; a work task. The work task consisted of copying words from the book
“Around the world in 80 days “ by Jules Verne for 15 minutes. The participants
that completed above the median number of words received a payment of 100 kro-
ner for their work, the other half, the ones producing the median number of words
or below , received nothing for their work. The median is a type of average mea-
sure; the ”median” is the ”middle” value in the list of numbers. If you are not sure
about the meaning of ”median”, please raise you hand and we’ll come and assist you.
The workers were aware of this payment mechanism before they did the task. The
participants could then vote for whether or not the final payment should be equally
redistributed among the participants. Before voting they answered two question.
Firstly they were asked what option they thought was the fairest option. Secondly
the participant were asked what option they thought which group would make more
money on if implemented. There were then two options they could vote for:
 The redistribution option; every worker that had completed the task in the session
received 50 kroner.
 The no-redistribution option; every worker received the payment he or she was
assingned to receive.
The option that received the most votes was implemented and in the very unlikely
event of a draw, an option was chosen at random.
You will now be shown screen shots of exactly the same menus as seen by the work-
ers. These are shown to make sure you understand how the previous experimental
session was conducted. Screen shots of the menus of the worker saw with a clear
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label saying this is what the workers saw are shown to the predictors.
Prediction phase:
You are now to predict how the students acted.
Out of 100 experimental subjects assigned the role of workers, how many do you
think chose the redistribution option?
What number of “KONGERIKET NORGE ” do you think was the average reported
among the worker participants? (Please note that they were aware that “KON-
GERIKET NORGE ” was the side giving a payment of 4 kroner. Please also note
that if everyone reports honestly, the expected average will be 5.)
What number of “KONGERIKET NORGE ” do you think was the average reported
among the worker participants that voted for redistribution?
What number of “KONGERIKET NORGE ” do you think was the average reported
among the worker participants that voted for no redistribution?
8.3.2. S.3 T.2 Prediction of third party behavior
There was a second round of work for the worker participants. In this round of
work, the decision of whether to redistribute or not was made by a vote by other
experimental subject assigned the role of third-party decision makers. The workers
completed their task knowing that other participants would decide whether their
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earnings should be redistributed. The workers were then paid in accordance to the
majority choice of the experimental subjects assigned the role of decision makers.
These subjects voted for the redistribution option they found the most fair. Their
payment was simply the show up fee and they had no material interest to vote for
any of the alternatives. Similarly to the workers, they were asked two questions
before voting. Firstly they were asked what option they thought was the fairest
option. The participant were then asked which group would make more money on
what redistribution option being implemented. You will be shown the exact menus
and choices they were given.
The predictors are shown screen shots of the same menus as seen by the third parties
.
Out of 100 experimental subjects assigned the role of third-party decision maker,
how many do you think chose the redistribution option?
They were also given a coin to flip a five kroner coin ten times and were to rapport
how many times this coin landed on the side with the inscription “KONGERIKET
NORGE ”. They were told they would be paid 4 kroner for each time they reported
flipping the coin on the coin landed on the side with the inscription “KONGERIKET
NORGE ”.
What number of “KONGERIKET NORGE ” do you think was the average reported
among the third-party decision makers that voted for redistribution ?
What number of “KONGERIKET NORGE ” do you think was the average reported
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among the third-party decision makers that voted for no redistribution ?
You are now asked some questions about your background and preferences.
8.3.3. S.3 T.3 Predictors vote over redistributive preferences
Another experimental session will be held after this. In this session the participants
assigned the role of worker will complete a work task exactly equal to the work phase
in the one previously described. The work task will consist of copying words from
a book for 15 minutes. The one half of the participants that complete above the
median number of words receive a payment of 100 kroner for their work, the other
half, the ones producing the median or below, receive nothing for their work. The
participants will be aware of this payment mechanism, but not the redistribution
options, before they do the task.
There will now be a vote on whether or not the income from the experimental
session should be redistributed amongst the workers within this future experimental
session. The option which receives the most votes will be chosen, in the event of
a draw an option will be chosen at random. If the redistribution option is chosen
every participant that completed the task receives 50 kroner, if redistribution is not
chosen the participants keep the income they previously assingned.
Before you vote you are asked to answer two questions.
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Question.1. Not casting a vote; just asking hypothetically, what do you think is
the fairest way to pay the participants of this experiment?
 I think the fairest option is the redistribution option.
 I think the fairest option is the no-redistribution option.
Question.2. If the redistribution option is chosen everyone receives 50 kroner. If
the no-redistribution option is chosen the workers who copied above median number
of words keep their earnings of 100 kroner and the other workers receive 0 kroner.
To make sure that you have understood the instructions, please tick off which one of
the two alternatives below is correct:
 The workers who copied above median number of words will make more money
if the no-redistribution option is implemented. The workers with median or below
number of words will make more money if the redistribution option is implemented.
I believe the workers with the median number of words or below words will make
more money if the no-redistribution option is implemented. The workers with above
median number of words will make more money if the redistriution option is chosen.
You will now cast your vote; this vote together with the other votes in your group
will count in which redistribution option is implemented.
Please note that the result of the vote will only have economic consequences for
the participants that were chosen to have the role of worker. The vote has no eco-
nomic consequence for you.
 I vote for the redistribution option.
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 I vote for the no-redistribution option.
8.3.4. S.3 T.4 Elicitation of selfishness
At you desk, a five kroner coin should be available. When you entered the experi-
ment, the instructor should have shown you how to flip a coin and how to spin the
coin. You are now asked to flip or spin the coin 10 times; if your coin lands with the
inscription “KONGERIKET NORGE ” facing up, you will receive 4 kroner. If your
coin lands with the side with the inscription “5 KRONER” facing up, you receive
nothing.
How many times did the coin land on the side with the inscription “KONGERIKET
NORGE ” facing up?. . . . . .
times.
8.3.5. S.3 T.5 Predictors are paid according to accuracy
You will be called up by experimental id number when you can collect your earnings.
Your total payment is kr XXX
S.3 End
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8.4. Introduction, elicitation of age, gender political preferences and risk preferences
After all of the sessions, participants are elicited for political preferences, risk pref-
erences and gender.
8.4.1. Introduction
General overview text:
Welcome as a participant in this experiment. Please read the instructions care-
fully. In economic experiments such as this one, the experimenter will never lie to
or manipulate, the experimental subjects such as yourself. Consequently all the in-
formation you will be given is accurate and not misleading in any way. You will be
given all the information you need. Please do not communicate with the other par-
ticipants during the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand
and ask us. All the information we will use from you is the one you provide; we are
not recording you in any other way. The information will be treated anonymously.
8.4.2. Political preferences
If it was the general elections, (Stortingsvalg), in Norway today what party would
you vote for?
If you do not have the right to vote in Norway, please answer the question as if you
did have a right to vote.
Options:
 Labour Party [Arbeiderpartiet]
166
 Conservative Party [Høyre]
 Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet]
 Centre Party [Senterpartiet]
 Liberal Party [Venstre]
 Socialist Left Party [Sosialistisk Venstreparti]
 Green Party [Miljøpartiet De Grønne]
 I would not vote
 I would not vote for any of the alternatives given here
8.4.3. Gender
What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
 Transgender
8.4.4. Age
What year were you born?
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[Enter year]
8.4.5. Risk preference elicitation
How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, were the
value 0 means: ‘not at all willing to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘very willing
to take risks’
[Enter number between 1 and 10 ]
8.4.6. Precise description of the scoring rule.
Simply put the quadratic scoring rules pays you progressively more the closer you are
to the true value. By progressively is meant your payment increases quadratically
the closer your estimate is to the true estimate value.
The quadratic scoring rule is
pi = A−K(estimate - true value)2
. Where pi is how much you are paid. For all estimates A = 20 kroner. For estimates
in the 0-100 range K = 1
11.25
and for estimates in the 0-10 range K = 1
1.125
. If the
value of pi is negative you will simply be paid nothing for your estimate.
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Paternalist motivation: An experimental test
Abstract
Is people’s willingness to implement their fairness views on a group dependent on
how many in the group share their view? We designed a new lab experiment to
answer this question. Spectator participants were asked how many other people
they believe share their view of whether or not it is fair to redistribute income in a
work task where the output is determined by luck and effort. They were then given
the option to pay two cents to implement the distribution they found fair, upon a pair
of worker participants who had completed the work task. We find that willingness to
pay to implement the distribution the spectator participants found fair is completely
uncorrelated with their beliefs about how many share their view among the affected
worker participants. Furthermore, although spectator participants systematically
overestimate how many share their fairness view, being informed about the true
number does not affect their decision to implement the distribution they found fair.
The results suggest that people have paternalist motivation to implement their views
of the world: they are motivated to implement their own fairness view, regardless
of whether their view is at odds with that of those who are affected. We discuss
how paternalist motivation has implications for delegating collective choice in groups
where fairness views vary, and how our finding contributes to our understanding of
why political polls affect voting.
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1. Introduction
People often exert effort to have their views of the world implemented, beyond what
can be rationalized by their material or private interests. Examples include partici-
pation in civil society, voluntary political activities, revolutions and voting; activities
motivated by changing the world for fellow humans.
How does willingness to implement one’s views relate to the preferences of those
affected? It could be motivated by a belief that the affected share one’s prefer-
ences for how the world should be, non-paternalist motivation. Alternatively, the
motivation could be unrelated to what the affected prefer, paternalist motivation.
Non-paternalist motivation can be rationalized by a belief that the affected would
fare better if the world was in accordance with their own preferences, or a belief that
people have a right to live in a world in accordance with their views. Paternalist
motivation could arise from a belief that the affected will fare better under certain
states of the world, independent of their preferences, or a belief that the world ought
to be in accordance with some principle. Paternalist motivation is negatively defined
as not related to the preferences of the affected. Hence, paternalist motivation could
also arise from much less sophisticated motivations, i.e., people might have an innate
tendency to seek to align the world to their own views.
Motivation to implement states upon others is important for understanding whether
decision makers seek to make socially desirable decisions for groups with mixed views,
or merely implement their own view. If decision makers have a purely non-paternalist
motivation, civic engagement and delegation in bureaucracies function smoothly as
an aggregation of preferences for groups. In contrast, given purely paternalist mo-
tivation, decision makers will only implement the state of the world they find fair.
This will, in many instances, have socially undesirable consequences for those af-
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fected. Hence, paternalist motivation can inform policy makers seeking to design
institutions that facilitate mixed views. An example of an applied question relating
to paternalist motivation is to what degree teachers can be delegated responsibility
for curriculums covering politically debated subjects.
To investigate paternalist motivation, we study how willingness to pay to implement
redistribution is related to whether the affected share the decision maker’s fairness
view. Previous studies have shown that people hold mutually excluding views of
whether or not income should be redistributed in settings where both luck and effort
determine output (Cappelen et al., 2007). Some find it fair to redistribute earn-
ings, others do not. For a person with non-paternalistic motivation, a willingness to
impose redistribution is given by how many in an affected group she believes find
redistribution fair. However, if she has a purely paternalistic motivation for imple-
menting redistribution, there is no reason to expect that the share of individuals
sharing her view will affect her decision.
In our experiment, we randomly assign participants to one of two roles; participants
are either assigned the spectator role of making decisions for which they have no pri-
vate incentives, or, the worker role of completing tasks for payment. We then study
if spectators have a willingness to pay to have the workers’ payment distributed in
the way the spectators find fair. If spectators have a non-paternalist motivation, we
should expect to observe the following two patterns in the experiment: (I). Informa-
tion about the true number of workers sharing the spectator’s fairness view should
be relevant for spectators with non-paternalist motivation in deciding whether or
not to implement a distribution choice. More concretely, if a spectator receives in-
formation that fewer workers than she expects share her view, then this information
should reduce her non-paternalist motivation to implement her view. Furthermore,
assuming that beliefs and preferences are uncorrelated, we should also expect: (II).
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The willingness to pay to impose the spectator’s perceived fair distribution should
be higher for spectators with higher estimates of how many people share her fairness
view among the workers.
Our experiment design is as follows. We first ask what spectators perceive to be a
fair way to distribute income in a hypothetical scenario. In the scenario, a pair of
workers are assigned the task of identifying which letter was next to which number
on a list. Each worker is assigned a separate randomly drawn price between one
and 10 cents per correctly identified number–letter combination. The distribution
alternatives are either full redistribution, workers earn a payment equal to their
combined earnings divided by two, or no redistribution such that workers are paid
their earnings. Spectators are then told that some workers have completed this task,
and asked how many of the workers they believe share their view of what is the
fair distribution; we refer to this as the spectator’s prevalence estimate of fairness
views among the workers. They are then given a choice to pay two cents of their
participation payment to implement the option they report to be the fair option for
a pair of workers who had completed a task identical to the one in the hypothetical
scenario. If they do not pay, the distribution option they find to be the least fair is
implemented upon the workers. In one treatment session, spectators are informed
about the true prevalence of their fairness view among the workers. The information
is given after the spectators reported their expected prevalence, but before deciding
whether or not to pay to implement the distribution alternative they find fair. This is
done to see if the number of workers sharing the spectator’s fairness view is relevant
information to the spectator’s decision of whether to implement the redistribution
she finds fair.
This paper provides three findings. First, we find that two-thirds of spectators are
willing to pay to have their fairness view implemented upon a pair of workers; the
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share implementing is similar among spectators of both fairness views. Second, we
find spectators’ willingness to implement what they consider to be a fair distribution
completely uncorrelated with their perception of how many share their fairness view
among the workers. Third, and the main finding, is that there is no effect of informa-
tion about the true prevalence of fairness views on the probability that a spectator
paid to implement the redistribution she found fair.1 Although participants overes-
timate the prevalence of their fairness view among the workers, there is no evidence
that being informed about the true prevalence affects their decision of whether or
not to implement. This is true for spectators of both fairness views; being informed
about the true prevalence had no effect both for spectators who found their view
to be shared by a majority, or a minority, of the workers. Furthermore, being in-
formed about the true prevalence had no effect for spectators with particularly high
prevalence estimates. The absence of any effect of being informed about the true
prevalence of fairness views, combined with the overestimation of prevalence, pro-
vides causal evidence suggesting that spectators lack non-paternalist motivation; the
large share of spectators implementing is evidence that spectators have paternalist
motivation. The findings suggest that the motivation for implementing fairness views
reflects a notion of how redistribution ought to be, rather than a concern for what
those affected find to be fair. Our analysis is guided by a simple theoretical frame-
work; we clarify the assumptions required to interpret our findings as a rejection of
the presence of non-paternalist motivation among spectators.
The paper relates to three strands of literature: paternalism, the motivation for
voting, fairness views and redistribution. Our definition of paternalist motivation
1The second and third findings were surprising to us and go against our pre-specified hypothesis
(Chen and Schøyen, 2017).
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strays subtly from the classic notion of paternalism as acting to avoid others from
falling in harm’s way against their own will (Coons and Weber, 2013). It contributes
to the literature on paternalism (Coons and Weber, 2013; Thaler and Sunstein, 2003)
by considering mutually excluding fairness views and abstracting from the question
of harm by introducing the concept of paternalist motivation. This is done to discuss
the motivation for implementing states of the world adhering to mutually excluding
ideas of what constitutes fairness. When there are mutually excluding alternatives
that might be conceived as fair, such as whether or not to redistribute income,
it is ambiguous if any party has indeed suffered harm. The question of harm is
then contingent on the eye of the beholder; one woman’s perception of fairness is
another’s perceived unfairness. The role of multiple conflicting views of what is
fair is a fundamental limit to the desirability of liberal paternalism (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003). Our results and concept of paternalist motivation can be extended
to a framework to test and formalize libertarian words of caution; this is of applied
interest in societies with strong political polarization, or that are multicultural.
The paper also relates to the literature on fairness views and redistribution. Previ-
ous studies by Durante, Putterman and Van der Weele (2014) and Buser, Putterman
and van der Weele (2016) investigate how participants’ willingness to pay to imple-
ment their preferred tax rate upon others relates to self-interest, insurance motives,
social concerns and gender. This study establishes that the prevalence of the specta-
tors’ fairness view among those affected is not relevant for spectators when deciding
whether to implement fairness views upon groups. Furthermore, the study is novel in
focusing on the motivation in a setting where the spectator has not been a participant
in a setting equal or similar to any of the affected workers.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the motivation for voting: a costly
type of implementation of social preferences. Paternalist motivation is important
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for understanding why people prefer to vote for political parties with good opinion
polls (Rothschild and Malhotra, 2014). This effect could be caused by opinion polls
being a social signal on what is the right way to vote; the effect could also be a
sign of non-paternalist motivation, i.e., the electorate is also the affected group and
their preferences are relevant for people’s non-paternalist motivation to vote. The
literature on the effect of opinion polls on voting focuses on different aspects of the
expressive utility of votes, including normative social influence, informational social
influence, resolving cognitive dissonance by switching to the side they infer is going
to win and the tendency for conformity. Our study differs from previous studies as
people have already expressed their fairness preference before being informed about
the true prevalence of their view. Hence, we focus on the component of voting
motivation driven by a wish to implement outcomes out of fairness concerns. As
we find no evidence of non-paternalist considerations, the finding is consistent with
the effect opinion polls have on voting that stems from voters changing their minds
about the proper way to vote through social signals of what is the “correct” way to
vote.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we make clear our definitions of paternalist and
non-paternalist motivation in a brief theory section. We then describe the experiment
design and results, before the paper concludes.
2. A theory of spectator motivation for implementing a state upon a group
We consider the utility of a rational decision maker i implementing a state s upon a
group J consisting of N ≥ 2 individuals. We develop definitions of non-paternalist
and paternalist motivation. We allow for i to have both types of motivation, and
consider how her utility of implementing s changes with her type of motivation and
her estimate of how many in J share her fairness view.
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The world can be in either the state s or its complement state sc; we denote a
generic state of the world w such that w ∈ {s, sc}. We assume there is a monetary
cost difference between s and sc for i; the difference between incurring the monetary
cost in s and sc decreases i’s utility by some constant ci > 0. Whether the state of
the world is s or sc changes outcomes for all members of the group J ; it affects i only
through her other-regarding preferences and by her cost of implementing it.
We first consider non-paternalist motivation. We denote an arbitrary individual in
the affected group J as j. Defining a person i’s non-paternalist utility of imposing
some state wc upon an individual j who finds its complement state w to be the fair
state, is defined as vwi (w
c). We define non-paternalist motivation as follows.
Non-paternalistic motivation Assume a person j finds state w to be more fair
than its complement state wc. Then a person i with non-paternalist motivation will
receive strictly higher non-paternalist utility from imposing w upon j than imposing
wc, vwi (w) > v
w
i (w
c).
A spectator i’s difference in non-paternalist utility between implementing w or wc
for a person j finding either w or wc more fair is then:
∆vwi ≡ vwi (w)− vwi (wc), ∆vw
c
i ≡ vw
c
i (w
c)− vwci (w). (1)
We define that the decision maker i believes that a portion, αi(s), of individuals in
J prefer the state s.
αi(s) ≡ Ei
[
Number of Individiduals in J preferring s
N
]
(2)
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The expected non-paternalist utility difference for i between imposing s on the group
J is then as follows.2
N
(
αi(s)∆v
s
i − (1− αi(s))∆vs
c
i
)
(3)
We now define paternalist motivation.
Paternalistic motivation A person i with paternalistic motivation has a posi-
tive utility differential between imposing state s and complement state sc upon a
group of individuals, J . κi > 0, if and only if i finds s to be fairer than its s
c.
Assume that i is aware that j finds sc to be the fair state. The utility for j is
not relevant to the paternalist motivation of i; i will have some utility κi > 0 of
implementing s upon j regardless of the views of j.3
We now consider i’s decision to implement s upon J under both paternalist and
non-paternalist motivation. Assume that the decision maker finds the state s to be
the fair state of the world; all arguments hold, ceteris paribus, if she finds sc to be
2Note the relationship between utilitarianism and non-paternalist motivation. Suppose the fol-
lowing two relations hold. (I). An individual j affected by state s has a higher utility of living under
the state she finds fair, and i is aware of this. (II). i is a utilitarian who will receive some utility
from increasing the overall utility of individual j. If (I) and (II) hold, it follows that she will have
some utility from imposing the state that j finds fair rather than the state that j finds less fair;
this coincides with the definition of non-paternalist motivation.
3 Note that paternalistic motivation can arise from what we refer to as a Kantian moral mo-
tivation. Suppose that i finds the state s to be inherently morally right; the state has inherent
qualities that exist independent of the sentiments of or utility for individuals in J or i herself. See
for instance Rosati (2006) for a discussion of Kantian moral motivation.
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the fair state. The expected utility for i to implement s upon J , when the alternative
to implementing is sc, is then as follows.
Ei[∆u
s
i ] = N
(
αi(s)∆v
s
i − (1− αi(s))∆vs
c
i
)
+ κi − ci (4)
Note that the expected utility of implementing the state varies between decision mak-
ers for both the different components of non-paternalist utility
(
αi(s)∆v
s
i − (1− αi(s))∆vsci
)
,
the size of the group N , the paternalist utility κi and the utility loss of implementing
ci. The decision maker will implement state s whenever (utilf2) is positive. By the
definition of ∆vwi in (harkonen) and the definition of non-paternalist motivation, it
holds that ∆vsi > 0 and ∆v
sc
i > 0. From this and (utilf2), it follows directly that de-
cision makers with higher prevalence estimates and more non-paternalist motivation
will have a higher utility of implementing s, i.e.,
∂Ei[∆u
s
i ]
∂αi(s)
= N [∆vsi + ∆v
sc
i ] > 0.
We now briefly discuss the probability that a random decision maker in a group of
decision makers I implements s, [Pi = 1]. If the preference parameters ∆v
s
i and
∆vs
c
i are drawn from distributions that are independent of the distribution of the
belief parameter αi, the probability that a random decision maker implements s,
will be positively correlated with her prevalence estimate αi(s). Furthermore, if
decision makers are given information about the true prevalence of a fairness view
among the workers, implying that it is lower than their expected prevalence, it will
lower the utility of implementing and weakly decrease the probability of a random
spectator implementing; the size of the effect depends on how many decision makers
in the group have their utility changed from positive to negative by the information,
lowering their αi(s). Given that all parameter distributions have continuous support
for their entire domain and the size of the group of decision makers is infinitely large,
information increasing the median αi(s) in a group will strictly increase the expected
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number of spectators in a group of spectators who are implementing.
3. Experimental design
We now present the experiment design. Participants are randomly assigned to one
of two roles: worker or spectator. The main focus of the study is on the spectators’
choices; the workers complete their task so that the choices made by spectators are
about concrete outcomes rather than hypothetical scenarios.
First, workers complete two rounds of work where they are given one minute to
identify which number is next to a specified letter on a list of numbers and letters.
Each worker draws a unique price between one and 10 cents; the worker earns this
price per correctly identified number–letter combination. Before completing the work
task, the workers are asked whether they find it fair to redistribute earnings in a
scenario of a pair of workers who have completed a task identical to the one they are
to perform subsequently. The redistribution alternatives are that either workers are
each paid an equal half of their combined earnings, referred to as the redistribution
option, or that the workers are paid a wage according to their separate earnings,
referred to as the no-redistribution option.
Second, the two spectator sessions, a control session and a treatment session, are held
simultaneously. Spectators are randomly allocated to sessions. In both sessions,
the spectators are first presented the same hypothetical scenario as the workers,
i.e., a pair of workers had completed tasks and have earned a random price per
solved task. The spectators are then asked whether they find the redistribution
or the no-redistribution option fair. In the control session, the spectators are then
given a choice to pay two cents to implement their preferred redistribution upon a
pair of workers. The cost of implementing the spectator’s view of redistribution,
two cents, is deliberately chosen to be low, to permit identification of very “weak”
183
preferences for implementing. They are informed that if they do not pay two cents to
implement their preferred distribution, the distribution they found least fair will be
implemented. In the treatment-group spectator session, the spectators are informed
about the true prevalence of their redistribution preferences among the workers after
giving their prior belief, but before they make the choice of whether to pay two cents
to implement it. This is done to investigate whether knowing the true prevalence will
affect the probability of a spectator being willing to pay to implement her third-party
preference.
A pre-analysis plan, Chen and Schøyen (2017), was posted online before the exper-
iment was conducted. The experiment design session is described in Appendix B,
and the experiment instructions in Appendix C.4
4. Results
We conducted the experiment on Amazon’s online platform for experiments, MTurk,
where we recruited participants with IP addresses registered in the United States
of America. We first gathered data from 336 workers. Among the workers, 33%
found redistribution fair, while 67% found no-redistribution fair. The information
treatment consisted of informing spectators of this prevalence.
Table tab: descriptive statistics breaks down the spectators by control or treatment
group, by their fairness view and by whether they implemented the distribution they
found fair. Spectators overestimate how many share their fairness view; this finding,
defined as projection bias (Ross, Greene and House, 1977), is in line with previous
4 Participants were randomly allocated to one of the two sessions with equal probability until
the total sample size of 672 was reached. The sample sizes differ in the control group and the
treatment group because of small sample issues with our true randomization algorithm.
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studies on projection bias across a wide number of settings (Ross, Greene and House,
1977; Alicke, Dunning and Krueger, 2005).
Result 1: The majority of spectators are willing to pay to implement their fairness
view.
About two-thirds of spectators are willing to pay two cents to implement their pre-
ferred redistributive option. Fairness views are uncorrelated with willingness to pay
to implement. The portion of participants implementing is stable at two-thirds for
both fairness views and treatment or control session; this can be seen from the second
column labelled “Percentage of spectators” in Table tab: descriptive statistics.
Result 2. Willingness to implement fairness views is uncorrelated with prevalence
estimates αi(s).
Spectators’ willingness to implement their fairness view is uncorrelated with their
prior prevalence estimate of how many share their view αi(s). This can be seen from
pairwise comparing average prevalence estimates in the far right column of Table tab:
descriptive statistics. The average prevalence estimates are similar for participants
choosing to implement or not implement. Figure fig: Histogram of AplhaEasy shows
the portion of spectators choosing to implement according to whether their prior
belief of prevalence was above or below the actual prevalence among the workers,
or accurate. Prevalence estimates are on average similar in both the information
treatment where the true prevalence was revealed and in the control treatment,
which can be seen from Figure fig: Histogram of AplhaEasy.
We regress the probability of a spectator in the control group implementing her
preferred redistribution s, [Pi = 1] on her prevalence estimate and on how many
185
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Treatment Fairness Number of Implemented Percentage of Prevalence
Group view spectators or not spectators estimate
No information
Redistribution 85
Yes 69% 50.37%
No 31% 53.77%
No-redistribution 222
Yes 68% 70.23%
No 32% 69.07%
Information
Redistribution 105
Yes 62% 52.03%
No 38% 57.83%
No-redistribution 260
Yes 70% 71.15%
No 30% 68.81%
Sample size 672
Note: The first column from the left labelled treatment group divides spectators into categories
according to whether they received the information treatment or not. The second column from
the left labelled fairness view shows how many in the control or treatment categories found re-
distribution or no-redistribution fair. The third column labelled number of spectators shows the
number of spectators having different fairness views for the different categories. The fourth column
labelled implemented or not shows the percentage of spectators implementing their fairness view for
treatment, fairness view and whether they implemented. The far right column labelled prevalence
estimate shows the average prevalence estimate for participants in each category.
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Figure 1: Histogram of percentage of spectators choosing to implement according to their prevalence
estimate of the fairness view among workers. The categories reflect whether the spectator estimate
of how many shared her fairness view among a hundred workers was over the actual, under the
actual or accurate within an interval of plus/minus five workers.
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found her preferred form of redistribution s fair αi(s).
[Pi = 1] = β0 + β1αi(s) + i (5)
Table 2 shows the results from estimating (first): β1 is estimated to be -0.0002 (0.900)
for the control group.5 The result is robust for the pooled sample and the treatment
group data, as shown in Table 2.
Figure fig: Histogram of Aplha shows the distribution of prevalence estimates for
subsamples of fairness views and whether participants are in the treatment or control
group. The bars show total number of spectators with a prevalence estimate within
the bin on the horizontal axes. The bars are divided into spectators choosing to
implement or not to implement the distribution they find fair. Comparing those
who prefer no-redistribution in the control and treatment groups, the distributions
of prevalence projections are similar, so are the percentage of spectators willing to
pay to implement. The same holds for those who prefer redistribution in the control
and treatment groups. To confirm our graphical observation, we tested for differences
in distributions of projected prevalence between spectators choosing to implement or
not implement, using a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for equal distribution (0.9672) for
the main sample and all subsamples in Figure fig: Histogram of Aplha. Details about
the test and further results can be found in Appendix sec: KS tests. Assuming that
the prevalence estimates and paternalist motivation are not negatively correlated,
5The probability of no effect given the observed estimate, P-value, are stated in parenthesis
throughout the main paper.
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Table 2: Estimation of (first): Correlation between willingness to implement fairness view and
prevalence estimate of own fairness view, αi(s).
Dependent variable: [Pi = 1]
Pooled sample Control group Treatment group
αi(s) 0.0002 −0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.667∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.087) (0.080)
Observations 672 307 365
R2 0.0001 0.0001 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
Residual std. error 0.467 (df = 670) 0.466 (df = 305) 0.469 (df = 363)
F statistic 0.056 (df = 1; 670) 0.016 (df = 1; 305) 0.190 (df = 1; 363)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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this finding is supportive of the absence of paternalist motivation.6
Result 3. There is no causal effect of receiving information about true prevalence
αW (s) on spectators’ willingness to implement fairness view.
The third and main finding of our study is that being informed about the true
prevalence of their fairness view had no effect on the probability that spectators
implemented the redistribution alternative they found fair. The spectators in the
treatment session are shown the true prevalence of their redistribution preference
among the workers before deciding whether or not to implement. The numbers they
are shown were from the first worker session in which 67 per cent of workers found
no-redistribution to be fair, while 33 per cent found redistribution to be fair. Defining
a binary variable DT equal to 1 when a spectator received treatment, we estimate
the treatment effect by running the following.
[Pi = 1] = β0 + β1DT + i (6)
The treatment effect of the information treatment is shown in Table Treatment. The
effect of being in the information treatment, β1, was estimated to be -0.007(0.84).
To allow for non-linear effects between the prevalence estimate and treatment effect,
we also estimated a difference-in-difference interaction of the effect of being in the
6 The psychology literature on the self in social cognition (Alicke, Dunning and Krueger, 2005)
offers a compelling defence for the assumption that prevalence estimates and paternalist motivation
are not negatively correlated. Dissonance minimization will lead norm-seeking spectators with a
strong dedication to their fairness view to avoid information that lowers the estimate of how many
share their view, biasing their estimates of how many share their view upwards. This is a common
general explanation for our tendency to overestimate the commonness of our own traits, and is
referred to as projection bias. This mechanism will also make the correlation between estimates of
how many share a view and willingness to implement a fairness view, positive.
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The bottom dark (blue) bars represent the portion of spectators who are willing to pay to implement
their redistribution preference, while the top light (magenta) bars are spectators choosing not to
implement their preferred redistribution. The total bars show spectators with a prevalence estimate
within the bin on the horizontal line. The vertical lines depict the true prevalence of redistribution
preferences among the workers.
Figure 2: Histogram of spectators’ prevalence estimates of workers fairness view and spectator
implementation rate.
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Table 3: Estimation of (Reg2): Treatment effect of being informed about the true prevalence of
fairness view.
Dependent variable:
[Pi = 1]
DT −0.007
(0.036)
Constant 0.684∗∗∗
(0.027)
Observations 672
R2 0.0001
Adjusted R2 −0.001
Residual std. error 0.467 (df = 670)
F statistic 0.041 (df = 1; 670)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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treatment group and having a prevalence estimate higher than the true prevalence
among the workers, Dαi(s)>αW (s), as follows.
[Pi = 1] = β0 + β1Dαi(s)>αW + β2DT + β3[DT ×Dαi(s)>αW ] + i (7)
The results from estimating (diffInDiff) are shown in Table Tab: Projection Bias
Effect, Treatment Effect, and Their Interaction Effect among Treatment Participants
that Overly Projected Prevalence. The parameters β1, β2, β3 where estimated to
be [β1 = 0.046(0.43), β2 = 0.064(0.24), β3 = −0.100(0.21)]. The difference in the
treatment effect for participants with high or low prior prevalence estimates, β3, is
almost estimated to be zero; this implies there was no difference in the effect of
being informed about the true prevalence on the probability of implementing for
spectators with high or low prior prevalence estimates. In other words, the effect of
being positively or negatively surprised about the prevalence of one’s fairness view
on the decision to implement equals zero. This suggests that being informed has no
effect on participants’ decision to implement. If the true prevalence was relevant to
participants with non-paternalist motivation being informed that their prior belief of
prevalence was deflated or inflated, it should have opposite effects, giving a negative
β3 estimate. The absence of differences between these groups is strong evidence that
information about the true prevalence was irrelevant to the implementation decision.
The treatment effect is robustly zero considering subsamples of spectators with par-
ticularly high prior estimates of the commonness of their own fairness view; in other
words, there was no treatment effect for individuals with prior beliefs of prevalence
particularly far from the actual prevalence. We denote the actual prevalence of
workers’ fairness views as αW (s). We found highly insignificant treatment effects
with varying direction of treatment effect when running (Reg2) for the subsample of
spectators with prevalence estimate biases [αi(s)−αW (s)] larger than 20, 30 and 40.
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Table 4: Estimation of (diffInDiff): Difference-in-difference regression of high prior prevalence
estimates and information treatment.
Dependent variable:
[Pi = 1]
Dαi(s)>αw(s) 0.046
(0.058)
DT 0.064
(0.067)
DT ×Dαi(s)>αw(s) −0.100
(0.080)
Constant 0.652∗∗∗
(0.049)
Observations 672
R2 0.002
Adjusted R2 −0.002
Residual std. error 0.467 (df = 668)
F statistic 0.546 (df = 3; 668)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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These results can be seen in Tables App1 – App3 in Appendix sec: Effects Associated
with Sizes of Projection Bias.
Furthermore, we tested whether the distribution of spectators implementing condi-
tional on the prevalence estimates is equal for the control and treatment distributions.
We conducted the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test on the distributions of spectators’ will-
ingness to implement conditional on their prevalence estimate for the control and
treatment samples. We found the distributions to be equal for both the control
and treatment groups (p-value of 0.689), which is a strong indicator that being in-
formed about the true prevalence had no effect on willingness to implement their
preferred distribution; these results are reported in Appendix sec: Control Group
versus Treatment Group.
Summary of main findings
Spectators systematically overestimated the prevalence of their own fairness view.
Assuming spectators’ utility of implementing the state they found fair is a continuous
distribution, implies that a portion of spectators had only marginal positive utility
when choosing to implement their view or keeping their two cents. About two-
thirds of spectators choose to implement the redistribution they found fair. This
is true for participants finding they share the minority view of the workers, viewing
redistribution as fair, or the majority view, finding no-redistribution fair. This would
imply any changes in spectators’ utility should change some spectators’ utility of
implementing the redistribution they find fair from positive to negative. Hence, if the
information that the actual prevalence of people sharing the decision maker’s fairness
view was relevant, and we assume utility from implementing to be a continuous
distribution, it should tip some individuals to not implement. However, there was no
difference in the numbers of spectators implementing between the control group and
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the information treatment, nor any correlation or distributional difference between
prevalence estimates and willingness to implement or differences in distributions. We
conclude from this that within the established definitions in the theory section, we
confirm the presence of paternalist motivation, and do not find evidence to indicate
any non-paternalist motivation among the spectators in our sample.
5. Conclusion
We have found spectators’ willingness to implement the redistribution alternative
they found fair, to be uncorrelated with their estimate of how many people share
their fairness view. Furthermore, spectators have an upward bias in their estimates
of how many among the affected workers shared their view of what the fair redistri-
bution option is, but being informed about the true prevalence had no effect on their
willingness to implement their fairness view.
An implication of our finding is that efforts guided by a paternalist motivation to
impose states upon others may have socially negative consequences from a utilitar-
ian perspective; such efforts might lower the utility of the persons affected if people
have a lower utility of living under institutions adhering to fairness views they do
not hold themselves. An applied example of this problem is the question of whether
to give school teachers greater autonomy over choosing the curriculum; our result is
supportive that they will put in an effort to do so, but will not take into considera-
tion political sensitivity beyond what issues the teachers themselves find to be fair.
However, education might very well be better if the teacher is given autonomy and
thus receives a utility bonus from teaching a curriculum she believes to have the fair
message.
Our finding poses new questions for future research. Under paternalist motivation
there exists a trade-off between voluntary participation to change outcomes for others
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to states they do not find fair and the alternative of no-contribution. Fully analyzing
the cost and benefit of delegation under paternalist motivation remains both an em-
pirical and theoretical subject open for new research. Empirical questions of interest
are whether the finding generalizes beyond fairness norms to political issues, religious
preferences or lifestyle choices, and how distributions and strength of preferences of
the affected are relevant for implementation decisions. Furthermore, the design and
theory apply a binary alternative to implementation. How another default outcome,
when the decision maker omits to implement, is a very much applied problem for
inquiry; this enlightens the question of the trade-off between omission versus the risk
of erroneous commission. Theoretical insights into the desirability of implementation
under different degrees of paternalist motivation and different preference structures
of the affected could also be developed.
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Appendix A. Appendix A: Further results
Appendix A.1. Effects associated with sizes of projection bias
Appendix A.1.1. With projection biases larger than 20
Table A.5: Correlation between projected prevalence and spectators’ willingness to implement their
fairness views: Subsamples with projection biases larger than 20
Dependent variable:
[Pi = 1]
αi(s) 0.002
(0.003)
Constant 0.468∗∗
(0.211)
Observations 180
R2 0.004
Adjusted R2 −0.001
Residual std. error 0.479 (df = 178)
F statistic 0.765 (df = 1; 178)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A.1.2. With projection biases larger than 30
Table A.6: Correlation between projected prevalence and spectators’ willingness to implement their
fairness views: Subsamples with projection biases larger than 30
Dependent variable:
[Pi = 1]
αi(s) 0.006
(0.004)
Constant 0.178
(0.325)
Observations 85
R2 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.013
Residual std. error 0.477 (df = 83)
F statistic 2.139 (df = 1; 83)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A.1.3. With projection biases larger than 40
Table A.7: Correlation between projected prevalence and spectators’ willingness to implement their
fairness views: Subsamples with projection biases larger than 40
Dependent variable:
[Pi = 1]
αi(s) 0.010
(0.012)
Constant −0.203
(0.999)
Observations 34
R2 0.021
Adjusted R2 −0.010
Residual std. error 0.496 (df = 32)
F statistic 0.680 (df = 1; 32)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A.2. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is based on a measure of distances between two cu-
mulative distribution functions (CDF). We investigate whether the empirical CDF
of participants’ prevalence estimates have sufficient distance such that they are likely
to be generated from different distributions. These are the distributions graphically
presented in Fig. fig: Histogram of Aplha. The p-value of the Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test estimates the probability that two observed samples are drawn from the same
distribution.
Appendix A.2.1. All spectators
We test the equality of the distributions between those who were willing to pay and
those who were not, using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.9672.
Appendix A.2.2. Control group versus treatment group
We test the equality of the distributions between those who implemented in the con-
trol group and those who implemented in the treatment group, using Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.689.
Appendix A.2.3. Control group
Within the control group, we test the equality of the distributions between those who
implemented and those who did not, using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value
is 0.9201.
Appendix A.2.4. Control group: Prefer no-distribution
Within the subsample in the control group preferring no-distribution, we test the
equality of the distributions between those who implemented and those who did not,
using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.8231.
202
Appendix A.2.5. Control group: Prefer distribution
Within the subsample in the control group preferring distribution, we test the equal-
ity of the distributions between those who implemented and those who did not, using
Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.8943.
Appendix A.2.6. Treatment group
Within the treatment group, we test the equality of the distributions between those
who were willing to pay and those who were not, using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests.
The p-value is 0.9862.
Appendix A.2.7. Treatment group: Prefer no-distribution
Within the subsample in the treatment group preferring no-distribution, we test the
equality of the distributions between those who were willing to pay and those who
were not, using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.6823.
Appendix A.2.8. Treatment group: Prefer distribution
Within the subsample in the treatment group preferring distribution, we test the
equality of the distributions between those who were willing to pay and those who
were not, using Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests. The p-value is 0.2267.
Appendix B. Appendix B: Experiment overview
Each spectator makes a decision for one round of work by one pair of workers. Each
worker works four separate rounds and is paired with a different worker and different
spectator in each round. Participants are randomly allocated as workers or to one of
the two spectator treatments.
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Appendix B.1. Sequence for workers
• Stage 1: The workers are asked whether they found redistribution or no-
redistribution fair in a hypothetical scenario.
• Stage 2: Workers are then allocated to pairs of two. Workers perform a work
task consisting of identifying what number is next to a letter on a list of letter–
number combinations. Each worker draws a random price and earned the
number of correctly identified letters multiplied by his or her drawn price.
• Stage 3: Workers are paid according to the choice of one spectator.
For each pair of workers, stages 2 and 3 are repeated for four rounds. In each round,
the workers are paired with a new partner and the pair is assigned to a new unique
spectator. Each spectator decides whether to implement her preferred redistribution
preference upon one pair of workers for one round.
Appendix B.2. Sequence for control-group spectators
• Stage 1: Spectators are elicited for their third-party redistribution preferences.
• Stage 2: Spectators are elicited for their beliefs regarding how many of the
workers shared their third-party preferences, αi(s).
• Stage 3: Spectators choose whether to pay USD 0.02 to implement their pre-
ferred redistribution option.
Appendix B.3. Sequence for treatment-group spectators
• Stage 1: Spectators are elicited for their third-party redistribution preferences.
• Stage 2: Spectators are elicited for their beliefs regarding how many of the
workers share their third-party preferences, αi(s).
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• Stage 3: Spectators are informed about the empirical prevalence of their redis-
tribution preference among the workers, αW .
• Stage 4: Spectators choose whether to pay USD 0.02 to implement their pre-
ferred redistribution option.
Appendix C. Appendix C: Experimental instructions
All text in italics is left out of the experiment and only included for a reader overview.
Screens indicate when the program will change text.
Appendix C.1. Worker instructions
Appendix C.1.1. Screen 0: Instruction on M:Turk
Task Link Instructions (Click to expand)
Thank you for your participation in this task. Please read all instructions carefully.
The results from this task will be used in a research project at the Norwegian School
of Economics. Participation in the study is completely voluntary.
You are free to decline to participate, or to end participation at any time and for
any reason.
Your will remain anonymous throughout the task. None of the information collected
can be traced back to individual participants. We will only use your participant ID
to assign payments and to check that you have not participated in this task before.
The duration of the task is approximately 5 min.
If you have any questions regarding this task, please contact xianwen.chen@gmail.com.
To verify that you have actually completed the task, you are required to enter a
unique participant ID below. You will receive your participant ID at the end of the
task, following the link below.
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Task link: Link to the on-line task
Provide the participant ID here:
Appendix C.1.2. Screen 1: Introduction
Thank you for your participation in this task. Please read all instructions carefully.
The results from this task will be used in a research project at the Norwegian School
of Economics. Participation in the study is completely voluntary.
You are free to decline to participate, or to end participation at any time and for
any reason.
Your will remain anonymous throughout the task. None of the information collected
can be traced back to individual participants. We will only use your participant ID
to assign payments and to check that you have not participated in this task before.
The duration of the task is approximately 5 min.
If you have any questions regarding this task, please contact xianwen.chen@gmail.com.
Click the “>>” button to indicate that you have read and understand the above
information and that you agree to participate in this study.
Appendix C.1.3. Screen 2: Hypothetical Scenario
Assume two workers have been completing an identical task. The task is identifying
the number on a list that is next to a given letter. The worker gets paid per correctly
identified word. Each worker gets paid a separate randomly drawn price. The price
can be any whole number from 1 to 10 cents.
Elicit hypothetical preferences. Which of the payment options do you find to be the
most fair option?
1. No-redistribution: Each worker is paid separately for their work. In other
words the workers get paid for the number of words they identified times the
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price they are randomly assigned.
2. Redistribution: The total earnings of the two of workers are divided equally
among the workers. In other words each worker gets paid the sum of the
payments of the two workers divided by two.
Appendix C.1.4. Screen 3: Work task
You are now going to perform a letter-number decoding task equal to that described
in the previously described scenario. A sequence of letters with corresponding num-
bers will be displayed on the screen. You should write the number corresponding to
the given letter in the box below the sequence.
An example of the task is provided below (Figure fig: example letter identifier list).
You should type the number that corresponds to the letter O, which in this case is
47.
A new sequence will be displayed directly below the first. You will not know whether
your answers are correct until the end of the task. The task will last for 60 seconds.
Remaining time will be displayed at the top of the page.
After completing the task a price between 1 and 10 cents per word will be drawn at
random. Another experimental participant will choose whether your earnings will
be redistributed with another worker, or whether you will receive payment equal to
your earnings.
Appendix C.1.5. Screen 4
You will now perform the letter-number decoding task.
When you are ready, press “>>” to start the task.
207
Figure C.3: Example of letter identifier list.
Appendix C.1.6. Screen 5
Twenty letter identifier list will appear for the workers. Each worker is given one
minute to complete as many tasks as possible.
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Appendix C.1.7. Screen 6
You solved (number of correctly identified numbers).
You will now perform the letter-number decoding task one more time.
When you are ready, press “>>” to start the task.
Appendix C.1.8. Screen 7
Twenty letter identifier list will appear for the workers. Each worker is given one
minute to complete as many tasks as possible.
Appendix C.1.9. Screen 8: Information of payment
You solved (number of correctly identified numbers in the second round) this round
at the drawn price of (randomly drawn price in the second round ) cents.
In addition, you solved (number of correctly identified numbers in the first round) in
the first round at the drawn price of (randomly drawn price in the first round) cents.
Thank you for participating in the study. Please remember that your participant ID
is (randomly generated participant ID).
You will receive your payment within 2 weeks.
When you are ready, it is very important that you press “>>” to end the survey!
Please remember to submit your participant ID (randomly generated participant ID)
in Amazon MTurk!l
Appendix C.2. Spectator session: control-group
Appendix C.2.1. Screen 0: Instruction on M:Turk
Survey Link Instructions (Click to expand)
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Please read all instructions carefully.
The results from this survey will be used in a research project at the Norwegian
School of Economics. Participation in the study is completely voluntary.
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You are free to decline to participate, or to end participation at any time and for
any reason.
Your will remain anonymous throughout the survey. None of the information col-
lected can be traced back to individual participants. We will only use your participant
ID to assign payments and to check that you have not participated in this survey
before.
The duration of the survey is approximately 5 min.
If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact xianwen.chen@gmail.com.
To verify that you have actually completed the survey, you are required to enter a
unique participant ID below. You will receive your participant ID at the end of the
survey, following the link below.
Survey link: Link to the on-line survey
Provide the participant ID here:
Appendix C.2.2. Screen 1: Introduction
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Please read all instructions carefully.
The results from this survey will be used in a research project at the Norwegian
School of Economics. Participation in the study is completely voluntary.
You are free to decline to participate, or to end participation at any time and for
any reason.
Your will remain anonymous throughout the task. None of the information collected
can be traced back to individual participants. We will only use your participant ID
to assign payments and to check that you have not participated in this task before.
The duration of the survey is approximately 5 min.
If you have any questions regarding this survey, please contact xianwen.chen@gmail.com.
Click the “>>” button to indicate that you have read and understand the above
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information and that you agree to participate in this study.
Appendix C.2.3. Screen 2: Hypothetical Scenario
Same as Screen 2 of workers.
Appendix C.2.4. Screen 3: Real Scenario
There has been performed an experiment like the one described on the M:Turk
platform with participants like yourself. Worker participants completed the task as
described and drew a random price between 1 and 10 cents. Before completing the
work task the workers were asked which of the payment options, redistribution or
no-redistribution they found to be the fair option.
Elicit α: for participants with third party preferences for redistribution. Among 100
worker participants how many do you think find the redistribution option fair?
Elicit α: for participants with third party preferences for no-redistribution. Among
100 worker participants how many do you think find the no-redistribution option
fair?
Appendix C.2.5. Screen 4A: Elicit real 2 cent preferences for participants with third
party preferences for redistribution
You are to decide how payment should be done for one pair of worker participants.
You can pay 2 cents of your 1.11 dollar participation earning to implement the
distribution you previously stated you found to be the fair option: the redistribution
option.
I choose to:
1. Pay 2 cents to implement the redistribution option.
2. Not pay 2 cents. The no-redistribution option will then be implemented.
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Appendix C.2.6. Screen 4B: Elicit real 2 cent preferences for participants with third
party preferences for no-redistribution
You are to decide how payment should be done for one pair of worker participants.
You can pay 2 cents of your 1.11 dollar participation earning to implement the dis-
tribution you previously stated you found to be the fair option: the no-redistribution
option.
Would you like to pay 2 cents to implement the no-redistribution option?
I choose to:
1. Pay 2 cents to implement the no-redistribution option.
2. Not pay 2 cents. The redistribution option will then be implemented.
Appendix C.2.7. Screen 5: End
Thank you for participating in the study. Please remember that your participant ID
is (randomly generated participant ID).
You will receive your payment within 2 weeks.
When you are ready, it is very important that you press “>>” to end the survey!
Please remember to submit your participant ID (randomly generated participant ID)
in Amazon MTurk
!
Appendix C.3. Spectator session: Treatment-group
For the treatment-group spectator session, everything is identical as in the control-
group spectator session, except that an additional screen is added between Screen 3
and Screen 4. In the new screen, the following treatment text is displayed. Treatment
Screen: Revelation of empirical α
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Treatment Screen: Revelation of empirical α for participants with third party prefer-
ences for redistribution:
Among 100 worker participants, XX found the redistribution option to be the most
fair option.
Treatment Screen: Revelation of empirical α for participants with third party prefer-
ences for no-redistribution:
Among 100 worker participants, XX found the no-redistribution option to be the
most fair option.
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